Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Following a jury-waived trial, a superior court judge determined that Defendant was a sexually dangerous person and ordered him civilly committed. Defendant’s past sexual offenses included a noncontact offense and at least two noncontact offenses accompanied by a contact offense. In determining whether Defendant was a “menace,” the judge found that Defendant was likely to commit in the future not only noncontact offenses, but that there was a “significant possibility” that Defendant would commit future contact offenses. At the time of Defendant’s trial the Supreme Judicial Court had not yet decided Commonwealth v. Suave, in which the Court defined the term “menace." Therefore, the Court remanded the matter to the trial court for reconsideration in light of Suave. View "Commonwealth v. Walker" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was found to be a sexually dangerous person and ordered civilly committed. While the judge found that although Defendant was only likely to commit noncontact sexual offenses in the future, the judge concluded that the offenses would instill in Defendant's victims a “reasonable apprehension of being subjected to a contact sex crime,” and thus Defendant was a “menace” as defined in Commonwealth v. Suave. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to prove that Defendant was a menace to the health and safety of others and a sexually dangerous person within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123A; and (2) Defendant’s commitment as a sexually dangerous person did not violate his substantive due process rights. View "Commonwealth v. Fay" on Justia Law

Following a trial, a judge of the superior court civilly committed Defendant based on the judge’s finding that Defendant was a sexually dangerous person. The judge noted that Defendant’s sexual offenses were noncontact offenses but nevertheless concluded that Defendant was likely to engage in sexual offenses in the future to a degree that made him a “menace” to the health and safety of other persons. At the time of Defendant’s trial, the Supreme Judicial Court had not yet decided Commonwealth v. Suave, in which the Court held (1) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123A permits a finding of sexual dangerous based on a defendant’s history of committing noncontact sexual offenses and his likelihood of committing only noncontact offenses in the future, and (2) to find that a defendant is a “menace,” the State must show the defendant’s predicted sexual offenses are likely to instill in his victims “a reasonable apprehension of being subjected to a contact sex crime.” In the instant case, because the judge did not make his findings within the Suave framework, the Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case for further consideration in light of Suave. View "Commonwealth v. Almeida" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to several charges, including indecent assault and battery. As a condition of his probation, Defendant was required to register as a sex offender. Defendant was subsequently convicted of failing to register in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 6, 178H. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The appeals court affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Pike" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was found guilty of statutory rape. Defendant filed a motion for relief from the obligation to register as a sex offender. After a hearing, the judge (1) concluded that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, 178E(f) did not bar him from relieving Defendant of the obligation to register, and (2) relieved Defendant of the obligation of registering with the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB). The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case with instructions to vacate the judge’s order reliving Defendant of the obligation to register as a sex offender, holding that the plain language of section 178E(f) forbids a judge of relieving the defendant of the obligation to register with SORB when the defendant has been convicted of a sex offense involving a child. View "Commonwealth v. Dalton" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder on a theory of felony-murder and aggravated rape. The conviction of murder was affirmed on appeal and the conviction of aggravated rape was vacated as duplicative. Since 2002, Defendant unsuccessfully sought to obtain DNA testing of the physical evidence that was used to support the expert opinion evidence introduced at trial. In 2012, Defendant filed a motion for DNA testing pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278A, 3, asserting that he was factually innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted and that DNA testing could establish the identity of a third party who contributed to seminal fluid found in the victim’s vagina and clothes and “may wholly exonerate” him. The motion judge denied Defendant’s motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the motion judge applied an incorrect standard in denying Defendant’s motion for DNA testing and that the motion met the requirements of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278A, 3. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Wade" on Justia Law

After a probation revocation hearing, a district court judge found that Defendant had violated the conditions of his probation and revoked Defendant's probation. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the judge made no separate finding as to good cause for proceeding without a witness with personal knowledge of the evidence presented, as required by Rule 6(b) of the District Court Rules for Probation Violation Proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing comported with due process because the hearsay testimony on which the judge relied was substantially reliable and trustworthy; (2) Rule 6(b) of the District Court Rules of Probation Violation Proceedings is not to be construed as requiring more than is constitutionally mandated, and due process does not require, when the hearsay is substantially reliable, separate proof as to good cause; and (3) there was no improper interference by the office of the district attorney with the probation department’s conduct of the hearing that would give rise to a violation of article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. View "Commonwealth v. Bukin" on Justia Law

Defendant, his brother, his sister-in-law, and his cousin worked together in a tiling business in Oklahoma. All four individuals were hired to install tile in a fast-food restaurant under construction in Clinton. While working on the job, Defendant stabbed and killed the general manager with no apparent provocation or motive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress statements Defendant made to the police; (2) the joinder of the firearms charges with the murder charge for trial did not prejudice Defendant; (3) the admission of certain hearsay evidence at trial did not prejudice Defendant; (4) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s first motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing; and (5) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue a defense of lack of criminal responsibility based on evidence that Defendant may have been suffering from a spontaneous recurrence of methamphetamine-induced psychosis at the time of the stabbing. View "Commonwealth v. Spray" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and of unlawful possession of a firearm. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress identification evidence and affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding that the trial judge did not err in (1) denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, as the police had good reason to conduct a showup identification procedure, and Defendant did not meet his burden of showing that he was subjected to a showup identification procedure that was unnecessarily suggestive; (2) admitting into evidence surveillance videotape recordings; (3) limiting cross-examination of a witness on the issue of bias; (4) deciding not to discharge a juror; and (5) instructing the jury. View "Commonwealth v. Meas" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder in the first degree. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial judge (1) did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress his statements to police; (2) did not deny Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by denying Defendant’s motion for a change of venue; (3) did not err in denying the admission of certain “third-party culprit” evidence and Defendant’s request for a third-party culprit instruction at trial; and (4) did not abuse his discretion in excluding expert testimony regarding the phenomenon of false confessions. View "Commonwealth v. Hoose" on Justia Law