Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Kelsey Fitzsimmons, a North Andover police officer, was indicted in Essex County on one count of assault by means of a dangerous weapon. The Commonwealth alleged that during the service of an abuse prevention order, Fitzsimmons deceived officers regarding firearms in her home, drew a firearm, pointed it at an officer, and pulled the trigger, though the gun did not discharge. She then allegedly attempted to chamber a round before being shot by an officer. The Commonwealth presented further evidence of Fitzsimmons’s prior alcohol-related violence, mental health struggles, and a 2019 misdemeanor conviction for intoxicated and disruptive behavior. Fitzsimmons relied on medical and psychological evidence suggesting she was suitable for outpatient care and posed no credible risk of harm.Initially, the District Court ordered Fitzsimmons held on dangerousness grounds. A Superior Court judge subsequently found her dangerous but released her subject to strict conditions, including house arrest, GPS monitoring, and alcohol abstinence monitored by SCRAM testing. When Fitzsimmons claimed she could not physically comply with SCRAM testing due to injuries, the judge vacated the release order and detained her pretrial. Fitzsimmons moved for reconsideration, proposing urine testing as an alternative, but the judge denied the motion, finding that urine testing would interfere with house arrest requirements.Fitzsimmons then petitioned a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, arguing the judge erred in refusing less restrictive alternatives and in her conduct. The single justice denied the petition, concluding there was no error or abuse of discretion. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that neither the hearing judge nor the single justice abused their discretion in ordering detention when Fitzsimmons could not comply with the least restrictive conditions necessary for community safety. The Court also found no requirement for de novo review and rejected Fitzsimmons’s arguments under the Americans with Disabilities Act and other statutes. Judgment was affirmed. View "Fitzsimmons v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who pleaded guilty in 2012 to multiple sex offenses involving his minor children. He was sentenced to ten years in state prison followed by ten years of probation, with mandatory global positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a condition of probation under Massachusetts law. The statute required GPS monitoring for the entirety of his probation, but at the time of sentencing, no specific exclusion zones were established. After serving his prison sentence and two years of probation with GPS monitoring, the defendant sought relief from the GPS monitoring condition, arguing that it was unreasonable and unconstitutional, particularly due to its ten-year duration.After the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Feliz, which required individualized judicial findings regarding the reasonableness of GPS monitoring as a probation condition, the defendant filed a motion in the Superior Court for such an individualized assessment. The Superior Court judge denied the motion, finding that the Commonwealth had shown continued GPS monitoring was reasonable, based in part on the defendant’s classification as a level three sex offender and the victims’ statements about ongoing harm. However, the judge did not make findings regarding the reasonableness of the specific ten-year duration of GPS monitoring.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case on direct appellate review. The Court held that a judge must consider the duration of GPS monitoring in evaluating its reasonableness under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The holding clarified that a judge may only impose GPS monitoring for a duration found to be reasonable, even if that period is less than the statutory term of probation. Because the Superior Court judge did not evaluate the ten-year duration, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order denying the defendant’s motion and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Commonwealth v. Arnold" on Justia Law

The case arose from a criminal prosecution in which the defendant was charged with violating an abuse prevention order issued under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 209A. The order directed the defendant to "stay away" from the victim's residence, which was a multi-unit building, but did not set a specific distance for compliance. On the day in question, the defendant was observed by police walking on a street parallel and behind the victim’s residence, eventually reaching a point approximately 200 feet away from the victim’s home but on the opposite side of the block. He was arrested at that location. There was no evidence the defendant entered the victim’s property or that the victim was at home at the time.The Cambridge Division of the District Court Department conducted a jury trial, at which the defendant was convicted of violating the abuse prevention order. The defendant’s motions for a required finding of not guilty were denied at multiple stages. On appeal, the Appeals Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find a violation. The defendant sought, and was granted, further appellate review by the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the evidence under the standard of whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court held that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant had positioned himself so proximate to the victim’s property that he would have been able to abuse or contact the victim if she were present. Accordingly, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction, set aside the verdict, and ordered that judgment enter for the defendant. View "Commonwealth v. Carino" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted, along with a codefendant, of murder in the first degree by extreme atrocity or cruelty after a joint jury trial in 1984. The killing occurred during a fight, and both men received mandatory sentences of life without parole. More than thirty years later, the defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that his trial counsel ignored his repeated requests to seek a plea bargain for a lesser charge, specifically murder in the second degree, which carries the possibility of parole. The defendant claimed he did not learn until 2016 that his attorney had not pursued plea negotiations and that the prosecutor might have been open to a plea if both defendants agreed.After the original convictions were affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court under plenary review, the codefendant separately moved for a new trial, asserting ineffective assistance in plea negotiations. The Superior Court judge held evidentiary hearings on both the codefendant’s and the defendant’s motions. The judge found that neither attorney had secured or pursued a pretrial plea to murder in the second degree, and that the prosecutor would only have considered such a plea if both defendants agreed. Since this circumstance never arose before trial, the judge denied both motions, finding the arguments were speculative.On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered whether ineffective assistance may be found when counsel fails to pursue a reasonable plea negotiation at the defendant’s request. The court held that such a claim requires a showing that counsel’s failure was unreasonable and resulted in prejudice—specifically, a reasonable probability that the prosecutor and judge would have accepted the plea, and that the defendant suffered a more severe outcome by going to trial. The court affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial, concluding that there was no reasonable probability a stand-alone plea would have been accepted by the prosecutor. View "Commonwealth v. Mosso" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was tried on six charges involving sexual abuse of minors. At trial, the jury acquitted him on five counts relating to two minors but convicted him on one count involving a third minor. After the trial, he filed a timely notice of appeal. Subsequently, the Executive Office of the Trial Court issued a notice under the Massachusetts automatic sealing statute, informing him that records relating to the acquitted counts would be sealed unless he requested otherwise. The notice also stated that he would lose access to those records once sealed. The individual did not respond, and some records were sealed.After this, appellate counsel was appointed to represent the individual on appeal. Counsel attempted to obtain the trial records, including those pertaining to the acquitted counts, but discovered that certain documents had been sealed. Counsel then moved for access to these sealed documents, arguing that not having access would hinder effective appellate representation. The motion judge allowed only limited access—counsel could view the documents at the clerk’s office under supervision and take notes, but could not make copies. The individual submitted an affidavit authorizing counsel’s access, but the motion judge maintained the restrictions. Seeking broader access, the individual petitioned a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court under G. L. c. 211, § 3. The single justice reserved and reported the matter to the full court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the automatic sealing statute does not preclude a defendant or the defendant’s appellate counsel from accessing the defendant’s own sealed criminal records. The court concluded that the statute’s text, legislative history, and related statutory framework support the view that sealing is aimed at precluding public access—not preventing the defendant and counsel from reviewing the records necessary for appeal. The court vacated the lower court’s order restricting access and remanded for entry of an order providing access to the sealed records. View "Gravito v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A student at Dearborn School in Boston was found in possession of a nine millimeter Glock pistol with six rounds of ammunition during an administrative search. The juvenile, who had previously been subject to threats and assaults while commuting to school, did not have a license to carry the firearm but did possess a valid firearm identification card. After his arrest, the juvenile was readmitted to school, graduated, and subsequently completed occupational training and part-time employment.The Suffolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department issued a delinquency complaint charging the juvenile with unlawful possession of a firearm, carrying a loaded firearm without a license, and unlawful possession of ammunition. During plea negotiations, the juvenile recommended a continuance without a finding (CWOF) on the firearm counts, while the Commonwealth sought commitment to the Department of Youth Services (DYS) until the juvenile’s nineteenth birthday. Both parties agreed to dismiss the ammunition charge. The judge allowed the CWOF on the firearm counts and dismissed the ammunition count, rejecting the Commonwealth’s argument that a CWOF was prohibited for the firearm charge. The judge subsequently denied the Commonwealth’s motion to revise or revoke the sentence, and the Commonwealth appealed.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed whether a Juvenile Court judge may impose a CWOF for a juvenile charged with carrying a firearm without a license under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). The court held that the statutes governing juvenile proceedings permit the judge to impose a CWOF for this offense, as the prohibition against CWOFs applies only to certain enumerated sex offenses and not to firearm offenses under § 10 (a). The order denying the Commonwealth’s motion to revise or revoke the sentence was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Q." on Justia Law

Benjamin Tariri was charged with multiple counts of embezzlement and larceny, allegedly misappropriating nearly $2 million from clients while working as an attorney. He was arrested at Logan International Airport attempting to board a one-way flight to Iran, where he had recently spent six months. Tariri had longstanding ties to the United States but also significant connections to Iran. After his arraignment in the Boston Municipal Court, he was released on cash bail and required to submit to GPS monitoring with an inclusion zone restricting his movements to certain areas, primarily to mitigate his risk of flight.Following indictment and arraignment in the Superior Court, the bail and GPS conditions were maintained, with the inclusion zone expanded to cover additional areas. Tariri moved to modify or vacate the GPS condition, arguing that it hindered his ability to work and prevented him from visiting his wife and child in East Boston. The motion judge expanded the inclusion zone to address employment concerns but otherwise denied further relief. Tariri then filed a petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court, which a single justice denied, finding no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s order.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the single justice’s denial for clear error of law or abuse of discretion. The court held that GPS monitoring with an inclusion zone, imposed as a condition of pretrial release, was a reasonable and constitutional search under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, given the particularized risk of flight and the legitimate governmental interest in ensuring Tariri’s appearance in court. The judgment of the single justice was affirmed. View "Tariri v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A man was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, aggravated assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and armed assault with intent to murder, following a shooting outside a residence in Boston. Surveillance footage and cell phone records linked him to the scene, and police later recovered clothing matching that worn by the shooter from an apartment where he was staying. The defendant was arrested about a week after the incident. The police obtained a search warrant for the apartment, and the search yielded evidence used at trial.In the Superior Court, the defendant moved to suppress evidence from the apartment, arguing that the search warrant was tainted by a statement he made to police that was later suppressed, and that the warrant affidavit omitted material information. The judge denied both the motion to suppress and the request for a Franks hearing. During jury selection, the judge allowed the Commonwealth to exercise a peremptory strike against a Black juror after finding the prosecutor’s reason was race-neutral and genuine, and excused another juror for cause based on her views about police credibility, which the defendant challenged. The judge also excused two jurors who could not serve due to a religious holiday. At trial, the judge permitted a police officer familiar with the defendant to identify him in surveillance footage, and denied a motion for mistrial after a dispute over the officer’s testimony about prior encounters with the defendant.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. It held that the search warrant was valid under the independent source doctrine and that the affidavit established probable cause without the suppressed statement. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the jury selection rulings or in admitting the identification testimony. The Court affirmed the convictions for murder, aggravated assault and battery, and armed assault with intent to murder, but vacated the conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm and remanded for further proceedings on that charge. View "Commonwealth v. Almeida" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with first-degree murder after fatally shooting Trung Tran, an innocent bystander, during an altercation with Irving Sanchez at a salon. The defendant claimed that Sanchez initiated the confrontation, displayed a firearm, and threatened him, prompting the defendant to fire two shots in self-defense. One of these shots struck Tran, who was nearby. Witnesses provided differing accounts, with some stating that Sanchez struck the defendant and that the defendant fired in response, but none confirmed that Sanchez was armed. The defendant admitted to the shooting and was arrested at the scene.A Hampden County grand jury indicted the defendant for murder. The Superior Court, recognizing the novel legal issue of transferred intent self-defense, reported questions of law to the Appeals Court regarding whether this defense is available in Massachusetts and, if so, whether it is a complete or partial defense. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted direct appellate review to address these questions.The Supreme Judicial Court held that a defendant may assert transferred intent self-defense to justify the killing of an unintended victim, such as an innocent bystander, if the killing occurred during the lawful exercise of self-defense against an assailant. However, this defense is only partial: if the defendant’s conduct in exercising self-defense was wanton or reckless, resulting in a high likelihood of substantial harm to an unintended victim, the defendant may be held criminally liable for involuntary manslaughter, not murder. The court remanded the matter to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Commonwealth v. Santana-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with twenty-one felony counts stemming from a fifteen-minute crime spree in February 2019, during which he attempted to break into homes, engaged in a physical altercation, stopped vehicles at gunpoint, and was ultimately apprehended by police. He was arraigned in May 2019 and held on high bail. Over the next several years, the case was delayed by issues including the Commonwealth’s slow production of mandatory discovery, changes in defense counsel, and the defendant’s own motions and requests. The COVID-19 pandemic led to statewide orders suspending jury trials for extended periods, further delaying proceedings.The case was heard in the Hampden Superior Court, where the defendant filed multiple motions to dismiss, arguing that the delay violated both the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure (rule 36) and his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Superior Court judge excluded various periods from the speedy trial calculation, including time attributable to COVID-19 orders, delays caused by defense motions, and periods when the defendant changed counsel or requested continuances. The defendant was ultimately convicted on most counts after a bench trial, and he appealed directly to the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that delays resulting from its COVID-19 orders do not weigh against the Commonwealth in evaluating constitutional speedy trial claims. The Court further found that, after excluding periods attributable to the pandemic, defense motions, and other justified delays, the remaining delay did not violate rule 36 or the defendant’s constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment or Article 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Larace" on Justia Law