Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A former state senator was indicted on two counts of using his official position to secure unwarranted privileges by directing his publicly funded Senate staff to perform campaign work for his 2018 and 2020 reelection efforts. The Senate president received anonymous complaints about this conduct, which led to a Senate ethics committee investigation. The committee found that the senator knowingly had his staff perform campaign and fundraising work during regular business hours, ignored repeated warnings that this was inappropriate, and violated Senate rules and likely state conflict-of-interest and campaign-finance laws. The committee recommended disciplinary measures, and the matter was referred to state ethics and campaign finance authorities, eventually resulting in criminal indictments after a grand jury investigation.A judge of the Massachusetts Superior Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictments, which argued for legislative immunity under the Massachusetts Constitution and claimed that the prosecution violated separation of powers principles. The defendant also argued that the prosecutor improperly excluded a grand juror for alleged political bias without court approval. After the motion was denied, the defendant sought interlocutory review in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County under G. L. c. 211, § 3.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that interlocutory review of a denial of a motion to dismiss based on legislative immunity in a criminal case must be sought under G. L. c. 211, § 3, not through the doctrine of present execution. The court further held that the defendant was not immune from prosecution under either the state constitution’s speech or debate clause or separation of powers provisions. Additionally, while the prosecutor erred in excusing a grand juror for bias without judicial involvement, the defendant was not prejudiced, so dismissal was not warranted. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded for entry of judgment denying extraordinary relief. View "Tran v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this case, a juvenile defendant was implicated in a home invasion and rape that occurred in Methuen, Massachusetts, in November 2018. The victim identified three intruders, and subsequent investigation led to the defendant’s arrest. After his arrest, police obtained a DNA sample from the defendant via a warrantless buccal swab, which the Commonwealth later conceded was unlawful. The resulting DNA evidence was suppressed. However, after the defendant was indicted as a youthful offender, the Commonwealth, relying on evidence independent of the suppressed DNA, successfully moved for a court order compelling a second, postindictment buccal swab. DNA evidence from this second swab was admitted at trial.The Essex County Division of the Juvenile Court Department initially heard the case. The judge suppressed the first DNA sample but granted the Commonwealth’s motion to compel the second sample, finding probable cause based on evidence unrelated to the initial, unlawful swab. At trial, the defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated rape and other offenses. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and probation. The defendant appealed, challenging both the order compelling the second DNA sample and the jury instructions regarding “serious bodily injury” as an element of aggravated rape. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred the case from the Appeals Court for review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the second, court-ordered buccal swab was lawfully obtained based on independent probable cause and was not tainted by the prior illegality, so the DNA evidence was properly admitted. The Court also found no error in the jury instructions. However, because the general verdict did not specify which aggravating theory the jury relied on, and only one theory was supported by sufficient evidence, the aggravated rape conviction was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Commonwealth v. Carvajal" on Justia Law

A police officer in East Bridgewater observed two men riding a moped without helmets and initiated a traffic stop. The operator, John Pena, had a suspended license and an outstanding warrant, while the passenger, Erik Ferrara, also lacked a driver’s license. Unable to secure the moped, the officer arranged for it to be towed and conducted an inventory search, discovering a backpack in the storage compartment. Inside the backpack, the officer found a loaded handgun with its serial number removed, along with Ferrara’s identification card and other personal items. Ferrara was arrested and later claimed ownership of some items in the backpack but denied knowledge of the firearm.In the Brockton Division of the District Court Department, Ferrara moved to suppress the evidence from the search, arguing that the impoundment and inventory search violated departmental policy. The motion was denied, and Ferrara proceeded to trial, where a jury found him guilty of carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a loaded firearm without a license, and defacement of a firearm’s serial number. Other charges were dismissed at the Commonwealth’s request. Ferrara appealed, challenging the denial of his suppression motion and the sufficiency of evidence for the defacement conviction.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. It held that the motion to suppress was properly denied, finding the impoundment and inventory search consistent with departmental policy and constitutional requirements. However, the court vacated Ferrara’s firearm possession convictions and ordered a new trial, as the jury had not been properly instructed that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ferrara did not possess a firearms license. The court also reversed the conviction for intentional defacement of a firearm, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support that charge under the theory presented to the jury. View "Commonwealth v. Ferrara" on Justia Law

In the early morning of July 7, 2012, a group of men, including the defendant and his cousin, forcibly entered a home in Billerica, Massachusetts, intending to commit robbery. Several were armed. During the attempted robbery, a struggle broke out between the intruders and the residents. The defendant was struck with a tea kettle, and in the ensuing chaos, one of the residents was fatally shot. The perpetrators fled without obtaining any money. The defendant later sought medical treatment for injuries sustained during the incident.After being identified as a suspect, the defendant was interviewed by police on multiple occasions. He initially denied involvement but later made incriminating statements after being shown a portion of his cousin’s recorded interview implicating him. The defendant moved to suppress these statements, arguing they were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights and were involuntary. The Superior Court judge denied the motion to suppress, finding no violation. At trial, the defendant was convicted by a jury of felony-murder in the first degree and armed home invasion. The attempted armed robbery conviction was dismissed as duplicative. The defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress, the jury instructions on armed home invasion, and seeking relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. It held that the defendant’s statements were not the product of custodial interrogation prior to Miranda warnings, and that his subsequent waiver of rights and statements were voluntary. The Court also found that, although the trial judge’s jury instruction on armed home invasion contained a minor legal error, it did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Finally, the Court declined to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, finding no basis to disturb the verdict. The convictions were affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Estabrook" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who, after responding to an online advertisement posted by an undercover police officer posing as two twenty-year-old women, learned that the supposed women were actually fifteen years old. Despite this, he continued to arrange a meeting for sexual services in exchange for money, drove from Massachusetts to Rhode Island, and was arrested upon arrival. He was found in possession of cocaine and ultimately pleaded nolo contendere in Rhode Island to indecent solicitation of a child, receiving a suspended sentence and probation. The individual also had a prior history of criminal justice involvement, including violations of abuse prevention orders and drug-related charges.Following his conviction, the Massachusetts Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) issued a preliminary determination classifying him as a level two sex offender. After a de novo hearing, a SORB hearing examiner confirmed this classification, applying several risk-elevating factors, including targeting children, stranger victims, substance abuse, criminal justice contact, hostility towards women, and number of victims. The individual challenged the classification in the Massachusetts Superior Court, arguing that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence, particularly contesting the application of certain risk factors. The Superior Court denied his motion for judgment on the pleadings and affirmed the SORB decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case after transferring it from the Appeals Court. The court held that the hearing examiner did not abuse discretion in applying or weighing the challenged risk factors. However, the court found that the hearing examiner’s written decision was ambiguous regarding whether the individual’s information should be disseminated to the public, which is essential for determining the proper classification level. As a result, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded the matter to SORB for a clear, written conclusion on both the need for dissemination and the classification level. View "Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 528042 v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law

A former Massachusetts State Police trooper retired in March 2018 after a 21-year career. While assigned to overtime patrol programs funded by federal grants, he falsely reported working over 700 overtime hours in 2015 and 2016, receiving more than $50,000 in unearned pay. He attempted to conceal his conduct by submitting falsified motor vehicle citations. In July 2018, he pleaded guilty in federal court to one count of embezzlement from an agency receiving federal funds, was sentenced to three months in prison, one year of supervised release, and ordered to pay restitution.Following his conviction, the State Board of Retirement suspended his pension and held a hearing. The hearing officer recommended, and the board adopted, a finding that under G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), the plaintiff and his beneficiaries were not entitled to any retirement benefits due to his conviction for an offense involving violation of laws applicable to his office. The board ordered the return of his accumulated contributions, less certain deductions. The plaintiff sought judicial review in the Massachusetts District Court, raising constitutional challenges under Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, arguing the forfeiture was an excessive fine and cruel or unusual punishment. The District Court judge entered judgment for the retirement board.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the pension forfeiture constituted a fine under Article 26 but was not excessive, adopting the United States Supreme Court’s multifactor analysis for excessive fines under the Eighth Amendment. The court also held that, even assuming Article 26’s cruel or unusual punishment provision applied to fines, the forfeiture was not cruel or unusual. The court affirmed the District Court’s judgment and the retirement board’s decision. View "Raftery v. State Board of Retirement" on Justia Law

In 2002, the defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to two concurrent life terms without parole. Following the 2024 decision in Commonwealth v. Mattis, which deemed life without parole for emerging adults unconstitutional, the defendant, who was 19 at the time of the crimes, sought resentencing to life with parole eligibility after 15 years and correction of his mittimus to reflect time served. The Commonwealth opposed and requested a hearing to determine if the sentences should be consecutive.The trial court granted the Commonwealth's request for a hearing, prompting the defendant to seek relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court reserved and reported the matter to the full court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that double jeopardy principles do not prevent resentencing the defendant to consecutive life terms with parole eligibility after 15 years. The court reasoned that such a change would not increase the aggregate punishment, as the original sentence was life without parole. The court also determined that a resentencing hearing is necessary to decide whether the sentences should be concurrent or consecutive, as the Mattis decision did not automatically alter the defendant's sentence.Additionally, the court ruled that the defendant is entitled to credit for time already served on each of the concurrent life sentences. Therefore, even if resentenced to consecutive terms, the defendant would be immediately eligible for parole, having already served over 23 years. The case was remanded for a resentencing hearing consistent with this opinion. View "Perez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

On November 4, 2015, a resident near a secluded dirt road in Worcester heard a loud bang and saw flames. Firefighters found a burning vehicle with a charred body inside, later identified as Marie Martin. An autopsy revealed a bullet in her skull. The investigation led to Donovan E. Goparian, who was indicted for murder. In 2020, a jury convicted him of first-degree murder based on deliberate premeditation. Goparian filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory evidence from a Federal inmate implicating a third party. The motion judge denied the request for an evidentiary hearing and did not act on the request for postconviction discovery. The motion for a new trial was also denied.The defendant appealed both his conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court found that the judge abused his discretion by denying the defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing and failing to act on the request for postconviction discovery. The court concluded that the defendant had made an adequate showing that the Commonwealth had possession, custody, or control of the exculpatory information and that its nondisclosure could have prejudiced the defendant.The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order denying the motion for a new trial, reversed the order denying the request for an evidentiary hearing, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also ordered postconviction discovery concerning the exculpatory information and deferred plenary review of the defendant's direct appeal pending resolution of the motion for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Goparian" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder for the stabbing death of Carlos Ramos in the apartment of Maria Samot, a key witness who is deaf, illiterate, and severely language deprived. Samot communicates using idiosyncratic gestures rather than any recognized language. At trial, her testimony was interpreted by a team of certified deaf and ASL interpreters, but no determination was made regarding the appropriateness of these interpreters as required by Massachusetts law (G. L. c. 221, § 92A). This led to significant issues during cross-examination, where Samot provided numerous nonresponsive answers.The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that justice had not been done due to noncompliance with the statute. The motion judge, who was also the trial judge, held an evidentiary hearing where experts testified about the extent of Samot's communication challenges and the inadequacy of the interpretation provided at trial. The judge found that the failure to make the required determination under § 92A raised a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice and allowed the motion for a new trial. The Commonwealth appealed.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the defendant had the right to challenge the admission of Samot's testimony due to the statutory violation. The court found that the failure to make the required determination under § 92A was an error that prejudiced the defendant, as it affected the accuracy of the interpretation and the ability to cross-examine the witness effectively. The court concluded that the judge did not abuse her discretion in granting a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Lozada" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle after his license had been revoked. The revocation was due to a prior conviction for motor vehicle homicide and operating under the influence (OUI). The defendant argued that his motion to dismiss the complaint should have been allowed because the citation was not issued at the time and place of the violation, as required by the "no-fix" statute. The police learned of the violation weeks later through a television news report and issued the citation after investigating the report.In the Dedham Division of the District Court Department, the defendant's motion to dismiss was denied. The judge found that additional time was reasonably necessary to investigate the violation. The defendant's motion for reconsideration was also denied. At trial, the judge found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to eighteen months in a house of correction. The defendant appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the delay in issuing the citation was justified because additional time was reasonably necessary to investigate the violation. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant operated a motor vehicle after his license had been revoked and before it was restored. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the penalty only applied during the pendency of the revocation period, clarifying that the penalty continues to apply until the license or right to operate is restored. The judgment was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Foley" on Justia Law