Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's conviction for kidnapping but affirmed all other convictions, holding that the verdicts of murder in the first degree were consonant with justice but that Defendant's kidnapping conviction must be vacated because it was based on an inveiglement theory previously dismissed by the motion judge.Defendant was found guilty of three counts of murder in the first degree, kidnapping, and witness intimidation. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that his conviction of kidnapping based on a 2010 incident must be vacated because the theory of kidnapping was invalid or foreclosed by the superior court judge's ruling on a pretrial motion to dismiss. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding (1) Defendant's 2010 kidnapping conviction must be reversed, as the theory on which the prosecution proceeded at trial had previously been dismissed by the court; (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error; and (3) there is no reason for this Court to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to order a new trial or direct the entry of verdicts of a lesser degree of guilt. View "Commonwealth v. Hall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that Defendant's right to choice of private counsel and right to be present during a critical stage of the proceedings under both the federal and state constitutions were violated during his criminal trial, requiring automatic reversal absent waiver, but that the delay of more than thirty years in bringing these claims under these circumstances waived the claims under state and federal constitutional law.In 1982, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. In 2015, Defendant filed a second motion for a new trial asserting that the appointment of his court-appointed, State-funded counsel violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment and article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) Defendant's right to choice of private counsel and right to be present during a critical stage of the proceedings under both the federal and state constitutions were violated, and these violations were structural errors; (2) the delay in bringing these claims combined with the fact that the transcript clearly depicting the constitutional violations was available for Defendant in 1991 and for the public defense counsel screening his claims in 1992-1993 and 2000 waived Defendant's claims; and (3) there was no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. View "Commonwealth v. Francis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court declared that periods of delay resulting from trial continuances pursuant to the Court's emergency orders should be excluded from the computation of time limits on pretrial detention under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58A and 58B.In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Supreme Judicial Court issued a series of emergency orders designated to protect the public health by minimizing the need for in-person proceedings at court houses. In the orders, the Court continued all criminal jury trials to a date no earlier than September 8, 2020 and declared that the time periods of the trial continuances shall be excluded from speedy trial computations. At issue in these three cases was whether the periods of delay resulting from continuances pursuant to the Court's emergency orders should be excluded from the computation of statutory time limits on pretrial detention under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58A or 58B. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the cases to the single justice for entry of orders directing the lower courts to reconsider their prior orders releasing Defendants from detention under chapter 276, sections 58A and 58B, holding that the time periods of these continuances must be excluded in computing the time limits on pretrial detention. View "Commonwealth v. Lougee" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice denying, without a hearing, Defendant's petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying relief.After Defendant's motion to suppress was allowed, the Commonwealth applied for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal. A single justice allowed the application and directed the appeal to the Appeals Court. An interlocutory appeal was entered more than a year after the single justice granted the Commonwealth leave to appeal. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the underlying charges, arguing that his speedy trial and due process rights had been violated. The motion was denied. Defendant then filed his Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition seeking leave to cross-appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not show that the ordinary process of trial and appeal was inadequate for him to obtain review of his speedy trial and due process claims. View "Ramos v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice denying the Commonwealth's petition, filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, for relief from an interlocutory order the superior court in an underlying criminal case without deciding the merits, holding that the single justice did not abuse her discretion in denying the petition.Defendant was indicted on numerous firearm and ammunition charges. Defendant filed in the trial court a motion for discovery pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2) seeking Boston police department records concerning social media surveillance on Snapchat. In his motion, Defendant asserted that the Boston police department was using Snapchat as an investigatory tool almost exclusively against black males and sought discovery he claimed would support a claim of racial discrimination. The superior court judge allowed the motion. The Commonwealth filed its Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition, arguing that the judge erred in concluding that Defendant had met his burden in asserting selective prosecution that would warrant the requested discovery. The single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the matter did not warrant the exercise of the Court's extraordinary general superintendence power. View "Commonwealth v. Dilworth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the sentencing judge imposed illegal sentences by entering continuances without a finding and immediately dismissing criminal charges without imposing any terms and conditions or probation, but the Court declined to remand the case for resentencing as to the legal sentences because ordering Defendant to be resentenced would not be just.Defendant was charged with several offenses in connection with three separate instances. The judge sentenced Defendant to thirty days in a house of correction for the charge of assault and battery and entered continuances without a finding and dismissed all remaining charges. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the continuances without a finding, which were immediately dismissed without any terms and conditions, constituted illegal sentences under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 18. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the continuances without a finding constituted illegal sentences because they contained no terms and conditions; but (2) it would be unfair to Defendant to vacate a disposition reflecting what appeared to be a common practice, and so this ruling applies prospectively from the date of this decision. View "Commonwealth v. Ellsworth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court declined to remand this case for resentencing, holding that the sentencing judge imposed an illegal sentence by entering a continuance without a finding and immediately dismissing a charge absent any terms and conditions or probation but that this holding shall apply prospectively from the date of this decision.Defendant was charged with five counts, including breaking and entering, and admitted to sufficient facts as to all five counts. The sentencing facts found facts sufficient for a guilty plea and entered a continuance without a finding as to the breaking and entering charge. The judge ordered the dismissal of the charge for 4 p.m. that day and did not set any conditions or terms on the dismissal. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the continuance without a finding amounted to an illegal sentence; but (2) this holding applies prospectively from the date of this decision. View "Commonwealth v. Rossetti" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the entry of continuance without a finding and immediate dismissal of the criminal case but held that the disposition cannot be imposed in any such future case because, without the imposition of terms and conditions or probation, the continuance without a finding constituted an illegal sentence and that this disposition shall apply prospectively from the date of this decision.Defendant was charged with counterfeit drug possession with intent to distribute and other crimes. Defendant admitted to sufficient facts as to the crime. As to the counterfeit drug charge, the sentencing judge found sufficient facts and entered a continuance without a finding. The Commonwealth filed a motion requesting that the sentencing judge revise or revoke the entry of the continuance without a finding because the order was an "illegal disposition" contrary to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 18. The judge denied the motion without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial court affirmed, holding (1) because the sentencing judge did not impose any terms or conditions on the record, the continuance without a finding was an illegal disposition; and (2) this holding shall apply prospectively from the date of this decision. View "Commonwealth v. Beverly" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for murder in the first degree and other crimes, affirmed orders denying Defendant's pretrial and postconviction motions, and declined to grant extraordinary relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding that no reversible error occurred in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial judge did not err in deciding not to instruct the jury on self defense; (2) although it was error to require that Defendant's testimony take narrative form without his attorney's express prior invocation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3(e), there was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arising out of this error; (3) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictments; and (4) the trial judge properly denied Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress certain statements he made to officers at the police station without the benefit of prior Miranda warnings. View "Commonwealth v. Miranda" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for murder in the first degree and felony murder and declined to exercise its authority to reduce or set aside the murder verdict, holding that the record revealed no basis to support relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) there was no error, constitutional or otherwise, regarding the manner in which defense counsel and the trial judge invoked Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (e), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1416 (2015), and related procedures approved in Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 438 Mass. 535 (2003); (2) the trial court did not err by allowing the testimony of a substitute medical examiner; (3) the trial judge's failure to sever Defendant's trial from that of his codefendant did not result in prejudicial error; and (4) Defendant's conviction of and sentencing for both felony-murder, with attempted armed robbery as the predicate felony, and armed assault with the intent to rob did not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. View "Commonwealth v. Leiva" on Justia Law