Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and declined to grant extraordinary relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding that there was no basis to set aside or reduct the verdict.Specifically, the Court held (1) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the conviction of murder in the first degree; (2) there was no reversible error in the manner in which the judge handled two issues that arose in connection with two sitting jurors; (3) the judge did not err in admitting prior bad acts evidence to show motive; and (4) the statements made by the Commonwealth during closing argument were proper. View "Commonwealth v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and declined to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to grant a new trial or to reduce or set aside the verdict, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant's prior bad acts; (2) Defendant was not prejudiced by the judge's decision not to give Defendant's preferred eyewitness instruction; (3) there was no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision to deny Defendant's motion for a mistrial; and (4) there was no basis to grant extraordinary relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Bryant" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, holding that the Commonwealth erroneously elicited false testimony and failed to correct the false testimony, which created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.During trial, a state police trooper testified that Defendant told police during two separate interviews that he was picked up on the night of the shooting in the area of a Dunkin' Donuts restaurant that was near the crime scene. Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the trooper testified falsely. The judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) as made clear by the trooper's police reports and transcripts of Defendant's interviews with police, Defendant never told police that he was picked up or near Dunkin' Donuts; (2) because the testimony was blatantly false and pertained to a critical component of the Commonwealth's case, it was error for the prosecutor not to correct the testimony; and (3) the error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. View "Commonwealth v. Ware" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's convictions, holding that the motion judge committed reversible error in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search and seizure of a motor vehicle in which he was a passenger and in denying Defendant's postconviction motion for discovery of wiretap recordings of his conversations with a confidential informant.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) Defendant's motion to suppress should have been granted because Defendant was subjected to an illegal seizure, and the evidence obtained from the subsequently impoundment and search of the vehicle was the direct result of the illegal seizure, and the error was not harmless; (2) the trial judge did not err in admitting evidence of Defendant's prior bad acts; and (3) the motion judge properly denied Defendant's postconviction motion for a new trial but erred in denying the motion for discovery. View "Commonwealth v. Tavares" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of carrying a loaded firearm unlawfully as an armed career criminal with one predicate offense, holding that Defendant's indictment was not void and that Defendant's conviction of assault and battery could serve as a predicate offense under the Massachusetts Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, 10G.Defendant was indicted for several unlawful firearm offenses, and the indictments also alleged that Defendant previously had been convicted of three violent crimes and was thus subject to enhanced penalties under the ACCA. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to carrying a loaded firearm unlawfully as an armed career criminal with one predicate offense. Defendant later filed a motion to vacate the ACCA conviction and sentence for a new trial. The motion was denied. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) although the indictment did not set forth the alleged ACCA predicate convictions, the indictment was not void because Defendant had sufficient notice of the crimes charged; (2) Defendant's prior conviction of assault and battery qualified as a predicate offense under the ACCA; (3) counsel was not ineffective; and (4) Defendant's guilty plea on the ACCA charge was entered into intelligently and voluntarily. View "Commonwealth v. Wentworth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated and set aside a superior court judgment affirming a Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) decision to classify John Doe as a level two sex offender, holding that there was not substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's decision to classify Doe as a level two sex offender by clear and convincing evidence.SORB classified Doe as a level two sex offender after Doe was convicted of two counts of open and gross lewdness. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) SORB had jurisdiction to classify Doe as a sex offender; (2) in order classify an individual as a level two sex offender, the hearing examiner is required to make three explicit determinations by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) in light of this three-prong test, the hearing examiner did not support her decision to classify Doe as a level two sex offender by clear and convincing evidence. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice denying Petitioner's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief.While Petitioner was incarcerated in Indiana for unrelated offenses, he filed a petition for a speedy disposition of Massachusetts charges underlying this action pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Commonwealth had failed to bring him to trial within the time frame required by the IAD. A district court judge allowed the motion. Meanwhile, Petitioner had been indicted on the same charges. Petitioner moved to dismiss the charges on jurisdictional grounds. The superior court judge denied the motion. Petitioner then filed his Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition arguing that in denying the jurisdictional motion, the superior court judge had revoked the district court judge's dismissal of the complaint. The superior court denied the IAD motion before the single justice acted on the Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition. Thereafter, the single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice did not err in denying relief. View "Ghebrehiwet v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder and declined to exercise its power under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the conviction to murder in the second degree, holding that no reversible error occurred in the proceedings below.After he was convicted Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance particularly in regards to DNA evidence presented by the Commonwealth. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial and a subsequent motion for reconsideration. Defendant appealed, raising the same ineffective assistance of counsel claims and, for the first time, a challenge that certain evidence should have been excluded as hearsay. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the challenged testimony was properly admitted against Defendant as a statement by a party opponent; and (2) none of Defendant's claims of error regarding defense counsel's treatment of the DNA evidence required a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Barnett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's conviction of simple assault and threatening to commit a crime, holding that the criminal docket of one of Defendant's friends was improperly admitted as evidence against Defendant and that the jury was permitted to return a guilty verdict without reaching a unanimous consensus as to which facts supported that charge.Defendant's convictions stemmed from a violent encounter among four men. During trial, the judge allowed into evidence a copy of the certified criminal docket in Defendant's friend's Charles's case, which reflected that Charles had pleaded guilty to assault by means of a dangerous weapon for an incident charged on the same day as the incident in which Defendant was charged. On appeal, Defendant argued that the certified docket sheet from Charles's case should not have been admitted and that the jury should have been given a specific unanimity instruction with respect to the offense of threatening to commit a crime. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding that both claims constituted reversible error. The Court vacated the convictions and remanded the matter for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Palermo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the jury's verdict in favor of Defendant in this medical malpractice action for injuries arising after surgery, holding that while the trial judge did not err under current law of evidence in excluding certain out-of-court statements, under new grounds for finding unavailability adopted in this opinion, the testimony's absence was grounds for a new trial.The out-of-court statements at issue in this case were made by a medical student who participated in the surgery. The trial judge determined that the statements could not be entered in evidence as statements of a party opponent made by an agent nor as statements against interest by an unavailable declarant. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial after taking the opportunity to adopt as a matter of common law proposed Mass. R. Evid. 804(a)(3), which would allow a declarant in a civil case to be deemed unavailable if he or she testifies to a lack of memory about the subject matter in question. The Court held that if the trial judge had had the benefit of the grounds for finding unavailability adopted today, it would have been an abuse of discretion not to have admitted the statements as statements against interest by an unavailable witness. View "Hedberg v. Wakamatsu" on Justia Law