Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation and declined to allow relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. The Court held (1) the trial judge properly denied Defendant’s motion to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter based on sudden combat; (2) the judge’s reasonable provocation instruction was not erroneous; (3) there was no error in the judge’s instructions as to lesser included offenses; (4) the trial judge did not err in dismissing a nondeliberating juror toward the end of the trial; and (5) an error in a limiting instruction given after the judge allowed the Commonwealth to introduce prior bad act evidence was harmless. View "Commonwealth v. Howard" on Justia Law

While an appellate court generally may remand a case for resentencing while affirming the underlying conviction, it was nevertheless improper to do so under the particular circumstances of this case.Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal offenses in 2000, and the charges were placed on file at that time. In 2014, a judge brought the filed charges forward and sentenced Defendant on them. The Appeals Court remanded the matter to give the sentencing judge an opportunity to explain the basis for the sentences he imposed. The Appeals Court then affirmed the convictions on the filed charges but vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing due to doubts it had concerning their propriety. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the proper disposition of this case was simply to affirm the district court’s judgments without remand for resentencing because, once the convictions were affirmed, no purpose could be served by remanding the matter for resentencing because, while the case was pending in the Appeals Court, Defendant finished serving his sentences, rendering moot any error. View "Commonwealth v. Padua" on Justia Law

While an appellate court generally may remand a case for resentencing while affirming the underlying conviction, it was nevertheless improper to do so under the particular circumstances of this case.Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal offenses in 2000, and the charges were placed on file at that time. In 2014, a judge brought the filed charges forward and sentenced Defendant on them. The Appeals Court remanded the matter to give the sentencing judge an opportunity to explain the basis for the sentences he imposed. The Appeals Court then affirmed the convictions on the filed charges but vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing due to doubts it had concerning their propriety. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the proper disposition of this case was simply to affirm the district court’s judgments without remand for resentencing because, once the convictions were affirmed, no purpose could be served by remanding the matter for resentencing because, while the case was pending in the Appeals Court, Defendant finished serving his sentences, rendering moot any error. View "Commonwealth v. Padua" on Justia Law

The police in this case had the authority to stop and perform a Terry-type search of a motor vehicle after an anonymous 911 caller reported that the driver of the vehicle threatened the caller, a fellow motorist, with a gun.Defendant, the driver of the vehicle at issue, was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon. On appeal, Defendant argued that the police lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle, and therefore, the trial court should have suppressed the pellet gun found in his vehicle. The Appeals Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the information possessed by the police gave them reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop and perform a protective sweep of Defendant’s vehicle; (2) given the safety concerns of the police, reasonable suspicion was all that was required; and (3) therefore, the motion judge properly denied the motion to suppress. View "Commonwealth v. Manha" on Justia Law

The police in this case had the authority to stop and perform a Terry-type search of a motor vehicle after an anonymous 911 caller reported that the driver of the vehicle threatened the caller, a fellow motorist, with a gun.Defendant, the driver of the vehicle at issue, was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon. On appeal, Defendant argued that the police lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle, and therefore, the trial court should have suppressed the pellet gun found in his vehicle. The Appeals Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the information possessed by the police gave them reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop and perform a protective sweep of Defendant’s vehicle; (2) given the safety concerns of the police, reasonable suspicion was all that was required; and (3) therefore, the motion judge properly denied the motion to suppress. View "Commonwealth v. Manha" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, holding that the judge who conducted Defendant’s third competency hearing did not err in finding him competent to stand trial notwithstanding testimony from both prosecution and defense experts that he was not competent.Defendant argued both prior to and during trial that he was not competent to stand trial due to an organic brain injury and a diagnosis of pervasive developmental disorder. Competency hearings were held before five different judges, and Defendant was found competent to stand trial at the first, third, fourth, and fifth hearings. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the judge who conducted the third competency hearing used the correct standard procedure to determine competency, appropriately placed the burden on the Commonwealth to prove competency by a preponderance of the evidence, and properly explained the reasons for his decision, and thus, there was no error in his determination of competency; and (2) a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, imposed on a developmentally disabled individual, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. View "Commonwealth v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, holding that the judge who conducted Defendant’s third competency hearing did not err in finding him competent to stand trial notwithstanding testimony from both prosecution and defense experts that he was not competent.Defendant argued both prior to and during trial that he was not competent to stand trial due to an organic brain injury and a diagnosis of pervasive developmental disorder. Competency hearings were held before five different judges, and Defendant was found competent to stand trial at the first, third, fourth, and fifth hearings. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the judge who conducted the third competency hearing used the correct standard procedure to determine competency, appropriately placed the burden on the Commonwealth to prove competency by a preponderance of the evidence, and properly explained the reasons for his decision, and thus, there was no error in his determination of competency; and (2) a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, imposed on a developmentally disabled individual, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. View "Commonwealth v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the county court denying Appellant’s petition filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that retrying Appellant after his first trial ended in a mistrial will not violate his protection against double jeopardy.Appellant was charged with murder in the first degree. After deliberating for several days, the jury reported that they were deadlocked. The judge determined that the deliberating and alternate jurors had improperly communicated and thus engaged in misconduct. Appellant filed a motion for a mistrial on this basis. The judge allowed the motion. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The judge denied the motion. Appellant then filed this petition seeking review of that decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the evidence was legally sufficient to support a murder verdict against Appellant, retrying him will not violate the guarantee against double jeopardy. View "Pinney v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the county court denying Appellant’s petition filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that retrying Appellant after his first trial ended in a mistrial will not violate his protection against double jeopardy.Appellant was charged with murder in the first degree. After deliberating for several days, the jury reported that they were deadlocked. The judge determined that the deliberating and alternate jurors had improperly communicated and thus engaged in misconduct. Appellant filed a motion for a mistrial on this basis. The judge allowed the motion. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The judge denied the motion. Appellant then filed this petition seeking review of that decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the evidence was legally sufficient to support a murder verdict against Appellant, retrying him will not violate the guarantee against double jeopardy. View "Pinney v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court declined, in this case, to depart from the tenet that a traffic stop constitutes a reasonable seizure for purposes of article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights where a police officer has observed a traffic violation, notwithstanding the officer’s underlying motive for conducting the stop.The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop and affirmed Defendant’s conviction of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, holding (1) the stop at issue was justified based on the law enforcement officer’s observation of the vehicle speeding; (2) a question to the driver about the smell of marijuana did not fall beyond the permissible scope of the stop; and (3) the motion judge did not err in finding that the driver freely and voluntarily consented to the search of the vehicle. View "Commonwealth v. Buckley" on Justia Law