Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of masked armed robbery and of being a subsequent offender, holding (1) Defendant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a showup identification procedure was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to misidentification as to deny him the due process of law; and (2) the trial judge did not commit prejudicial error in denying Defendant’s motion to preclude the victim from making an in-court identification. In so holding, the court declined to extend its holding in Commonwealth v. Collins, 21 NE 3d 528 (Mass. 2014) to preclude all in-court identifications preceded by out-of-court showup identification procedures. View "Commonwealth v. Dew" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial judge’s denial of Defendant’s motion for postconviction testing of evidence, holding that thad Defendant failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his motion met the requirements of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278A, 7(b)(3) and (4).Defendant sought testing of four cigarette butts collected by investigators near the crime scene. The trial judge found that Defendant failed to meet his burden under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 178A, 7(b) to establish that a reasonably effective defense attorney would have sought testing of the evidence, and that DNA testing had the potential to result in evidence material to the identity of the perpetrator. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Defendant’s motion. View "Commonwealth v. Moffat" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and the denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial, holding that Defendant’s motion to suppress his confession was properly denied.Following a police interview lasting nearly five hours, Defendant confessed to having killed his mother. Defendant filed a motion to suppress his statement as involuntary. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. On appeal, Defendant argued that the waiver of his Miranda rights was involuntary, that his confession was obtained absent a valid waiver of his right to prompt arraignment, that his confession was coerced, that he was arrested without probable cause, and that his counsel was ineffective not not seeking suppression on certain grounds. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction and declined to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to order a new trial or reduce the degree of guilt, holding that the trial judge committed no error warranting reversal, and there was no constitutionally ineffective assistance by trial counsel. View "Commonwealth v. Cartright" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed Defendant’s convictions of involuntary manslaughter and assault and battery and remanded the case for a new trial.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge committed reversible error by failing to conduct a voir dire after the prosecutor reported that some jurors fell asleep during the trial. The Supreme Judicial Court held that Defendant met his burden to show that the judge’s response to the information about the sleeping jurors was a structural error that could not be considered harmless, and therefore, Defendant’s convictions must be vacated. View "Commonwealth v. Villalobos" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and declined to grant relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. On direct appeal, the court held (1) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress certain computer evidence; (2) the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in declining to exclude evidence related to Defendant’s computer username and Internet search results, Defendant’s prior bad acts, and the victim’s statements and e-mail messages; (3) any misstatement made by the prosecutor during closing argument was not so great that it created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (4) the trial judge’s instruction to the jury permitting them to infer an intent to kill based on the use of poison properly instructed the jury on the use of dangerous weapons. View "Commonwealth v. Keown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The court also denied Defendant’s motion for a reduced verdict and declined to grant extraordinary relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. The court held (1) there was no error committed by trial counsel, the trial judge or the prosecutor that created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (2) there was no reason to remand Defendant’s case to the superior court for renewed consideration of his motion to reduce the verdict or to grant him relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Kolenovic" on Justia Law

In a jury trial of an operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OUI) case, a trial judge should not give a jury instruction that specifically mentions the absence of breathalyzer or other alcohol-test evidence unless the defendant requests it.Defendant was convicted of one count of OUI. During trial, the jury was instructed about the absence of alcohol-test evidence in the judge’s final instructions over Defendant’s objection. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) giving the objected-to instruction regarding alcohol-test evidence constituted error; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the error was prejudicial. View "Commonwealth v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32A(b) and (d) both punish possession with intent to distribute a class B substance, but 32A(b) carries a mandatory minimum sentence of two years while 32A(d) carries a mandatory minimum sentence of three and one-half years. Defendant was charged with and convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, second offense, under section 32A(c) and (d), among other crimes. The judge, however, sentenced Defendant pursuant to section 32A(a) and (b). The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case to the superior court for resentencing, holding (1) the judge’s decision not to sentence Defendant pursuant to the statutes under which he was properly charged and convicted was error; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (3) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction for assault and battery on a police officer; and (4) the jury instructions on self-defense created no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. View "Commonwealth v. Ehiabhi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty and armed assault with the intent to murder, among other crimes. The court held (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial after the Commonwealth’s expert witness purportedly commented on the credibility of Defendant or Defendant’s expert witness; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying motion to vacate the conviction because of a verdict slip error characterizing the armed assault with intent to murder indictment as assault with intent to murder; (3) the judge’s instruction to the jury describing what would happen if the jury found Defendant not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (4) Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction regarding the effects of drugs on Defendant’s criminal responsibility; and (5) Defendant was not entitled to relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Dunn" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and of unlawful possession of a firearm and declined to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the conviction to murder in the second degree. The court held (1) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, but Defendant was not prejudiced by the error; (2) the trial judge properly admitted statements of the victim under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule; (3) the Commonwealth’s ballistics expert was competent to testify about the trajectory of the shot that killed the victim; and (4) Defendant received effective assistance of counsel. View "Commonwealth v. Castano" on Justia Law