Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted on four indictments alleging indecent assault and battery on a person with an intellectual disability in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 13F. The crimes were alleged to have occurred between on or about January 1, 2008 and on or about September 16, 2011. On the effective date of November 2, 2010, the Legislature amended the statute substituting the term “mentally retarded person” with “person with an intellectual disability.” On appeal from the denial of his postconviction motions, Defendant asserted that the term “intellectual disability” renders Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 13F unconstitutionally vague and that he was convicted under an ex post facto law. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 13F, as amended, is constitutional; and (2) the convictions do not violate the ex post facto prohibitions of the Massachusetts Constitution or United States Constitution. View "Commonwealth v. St. Louis" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and declined to grant relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in admitting medical records and related testimony and by instructing the jury on consciousness of guilt; (2) the trial judge did not err in admitting expert testimony concerning the statistical significance of DNA evidence; (3) the trial judge did not err by admitting the victim’s T-shirt into evidence, despite a purported discovery violation by the Commonwealth; (4) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during her opening statement or her closing argument; and (5) the trial judge properly denied Defendant’s motion for required findings of not guilty. View "Commonwealth v. Cole" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. Defendant appealed. Defendant also filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that she was deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel. Defendant’s appeal was stayed pending resolution of her motion for a new trial. On the Commonwealth’s motions, the trial judge ordered that trial counsel be summonsed to testify at the hearing on Defendant’s motion and that Defendant provide the Commonwealth with certain discovery. Defendant subsequently filed a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking relief from these orders. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denied extraordinary relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Defendant had an adequate alternative remedy by way of appeal from any adverse ruling on the motion for a new trial. View "Field v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on three indictments charging armed robbery with a firearm while masked. Defendant used a BB gun to perpetrate each of the robberies. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery by means of a firearm, holding that a BB gun does not satisfy the statutory requirement of a “firearm” within the meaning of the armed robbery statute. Remanded to the superior court for entry of judgments of guilt on the lesser included offense of unarmed robbery. View "Commonwealth v. Garrett" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions and the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial and declined to reduce the degree of guilt pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant’s conviction; (2) Defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose certain evidence; (3) there was no error due to the Commonwealth’s exclusion of third-party culprit evidence; (4) the judge judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to exclude hearsay statements by the victim’s girl friend; (5) the prosecutor did not engage in impermissible misconduct; (6) defense counsel’s performance was not constitutionally deficient; and (7) Defendant failed to establish that a new trial was required because the prosecutor had represented him on several previous occasions. View "Commonwealth v. Watkins" on Justia Law

In 1995, Randall Trapp and four other inmates, who were adherents of Native American religious practices, filed a complaint asserting that the Department of Correction (DOC) had violated their rights to exercise their religion. In 2003, the parties entered into a settlement agreement requiring the DOC to construct a purification lodge at the Souza-Baranowski Correctional Center (SBCC). Within six months of building the SBCC lodge, the DOC halted all ceremonies, citing health concerns that resulted from smoke filtering into the main building from wood fires at the lodge. In 2010, Trapp and Robert Ferreira filed an amended complaint against the Commissioner of Correction and two DOC employees at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk, alleging that the lodge’s closure violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), article 2 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and the 2003 settlement agreement. A superior court judge entered a declaratory judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on all three claims. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the closure of the SBCC lodge violated RLUIPA and the settlement agreement. View "Trapp v. Roden" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and declined to grant relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding that the trial judge did not err by (1) permitting the Commonwealth’s DNA expert to testify about the results of DNA testing performed by another analyst, who was not available to testify; (2) limiting direct examination of Defendant’s primary mental health expert witness; (3) instructing the jury regarding the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility; and (4) not limiting the jury’s consideration of evidence of consciousness of guilt solely to the issue of Defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime. View "Commonwealth v. Chappell" on Justia Law

In 1983, Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree. In 2013, Petitioner filed in the trial court a motion for appointment of counsel to filed for forensic and scientific analysis pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws 278A, 5. The judge denied Petitioner’s motion. Petitioner then filed in the county court a petition seeking relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to pursue issues related to chapter 278A. A single justice denied the petition, and Petitioner appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) to the extent that Petitioner sought relief pursuant to chapter 211, section 3, his petition was properly denied on the basis that he had an adequate alternative remedy; but (2) Petitioner properly sought leave to appeal from the denial of his motion for appointment of counsel pursuant to the gatekeeper provision of chapter 278, 33E. Remanded. View "Monteiro v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. While his appeal was pending, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial. The motion was denied. Defendant’s appeal from the denial of the motion was consolidated with his direct appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial, holding (1) the prosecutor at times crossed over the line of propriety in his conduct at trial, including in his cross-examination of Defendant and in his closing argument, but the errors did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (2) there was no reason to reduce the verdict or to order a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Cadet" on Justia Law

Two weeks before Defendant’s eighteenth birthday, delinquency complaints were filed alleging two counts of rape of a child under sixteen. Defendant appeared in the juvenile court and was duly arraigned. After Defendant turned eighteen, the Commonwealth sought youthful offender indictments against Defendant on the basis of a subset of the acts that were the subject of the complaints. After the indictments were returned, the Commonwealth entered nolle prosequi on all of the delinquency complaints. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictments. In Mogelinski I, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over the youthful offender indictments under the facts of this case. Thereafter, the Commonwealth brought a new complaint in the juvenile court against Defendant essentially identical to those where nolle prosequi was previously entered in order to seek a transfer hearing. The juvenile court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the juvenile court, in fact, had jurisdiction to proceed on the basis of the newly filed complaint. View "Commonwealth v. Mogelinkski" on Justia Law