Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In December 2009, defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder, second-degree murder, assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder, carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony, and two counts of unlawful imprisonment. The jury acquitted the defendant of first-degree premeditated murder, and first-degree home invasion. Because first-degree home invasion was the only felony that defendant was charged with that could have supported the conviction for first-degree felony murder, the initial jury verdict was, plainly, inconsistent. The Court of Appeals reversed defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court erred by denying defendant's constitutional right to represent himself. The Court of Appeals remanded this case to the trial court for a new trial, and the Supreme Court denied the prosecution's application for leave to appeal. The prosecution then filed an amended information setting forth the charges on retrial. The defendant was re-charged with each of the charges of which he was initially convicted. Defendant moved to dismiss the first-degree felony-murder charge, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented a second prosecution on that charge because he stood acquitted of the only predicate felony, which was one of the elements of felony murder. The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, agreeing that a second jury could not reconsider the home-invasion element of felony murder given the preclusive effect of his acquittal of home invasion. The Court of Appeals granted the prosecution's interlocutory application for leave to appeal and reversed the trial court's order in an unpublished opinion per curiam, holding that because the jury's verdict was inconsistent, that inconsistency negated the application of the collateral-estoppel doctrine in the second prosecution. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a defendant whose conviction for felony murder was reversed on appeal could be retried for that charge when he was also acquitted of the only felony that supported it. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the collateral-estoppel strand of Double Jeopardy Clause jurisprudence prevented the prosecution from re-charging the defendant with felony murder. Because the defendant’s acquittal of the only supporting felony triggered collateral estoppel, the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded a second felony-murder prosecution of defendant. View "Michigan v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Defendant was a passenger in an automobile that was stopped by the police for a traffic violation. As defendant exited the vehicle, officers observed defendant drop a silver automatic handgun into the map pocket of the car door and quickly close the door. Defendant was 21 years old at the time and had no prior criminal history. After establishing that defendant did not possess a permit to carry a concealed weapon, he was arrested and subsequently charged with the crime of carrying a concealed weapon (CCW). The prosecutor permitted defendant to plead guilty to the reduced charge of attempted CCW and recommended a probationary sentence. At sentencing, defense counsel urged the court to delay sentencing for one year, at which time defendant would be "very close to graduating from college" and the prosecutor's office might change its mind and either dismiss the case entirely or permit defendant to plead guilty to a misdemeanor. The prosecutor objected to a delayed sentence and asked that defendant be sentenced to probation. The trial court expressed concern that defendant would "end up with a felony," thus limiting his employment opportunities. Expressing its unhappiness with the prosecutor's position, the court stated that it would consider "the delayed sentence with one day over a year; then [the court] would have lost jurisdiction." The next time the parties returned to court, defense counsel requested that sentencing be delayed for one year to give defendant the opportunity to show that he deserved "significant leniency" from the court. The prosecutor continued to object to delayed sentencing, stating that the prosecutor's office did not intend to reduce the criminal charge any further. The trial court stated that it found it "disturb[ing]" that the prosecutor opposed defendant's proposed sentence. The trial court announced that it would exercise its discretion and delayed the imposition of defendant's sentence for one year. On appeal, the prosecutor argued the trial court had no legal authority to dismiss the case over the prosecution's objections, because MCL 771.1 did not permit dismissal of the case. The Court of Appeals found no merit to the prosecutor's appeal. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether MCL 771.1(2) divested sentencing judge of jurisdiction if a defendant is not sentenced within one year after the imposition of a delayed sentence. The Supreme Court held that it did not. "The one-year limitation designates the maximum amount of time that sentencing may be delayed in order to provide defendant the chance to establish his worthiness of leniency. After one year, sentencing may no longer be delayed for that purpose, and the judge is required to sentence defendant as provided by law." The appellate court's decision was overruled and the case remanded to the trial court for defendant's sentencing. View "Michigan v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Matthew Makowski filed an action in the Court of Claims against the Governor and the Secretary of State, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to reverse then-Governor Jennifer Granholm's decision to revoke her commutation of plaintiff's nonparolable life sentence that had been imposed for his first-degree murder and armed robbery convictions. The Governor had signed the commutation, it was signed by the Secretary of State and affixed with the Great Seal. Four days later, the Governor decided to revoke the order, and all copies of the commutation certificate were destroyed. Plaintiff alleged that the commutation was final when it was signed, sealed, and delivered to the Department of Corrections, and argued the Governor lacked the authority to revoke a completed commutation. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the governor's exercise of discretion over commutation decisions. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Governor's exercise of the commutation power presented a nonjusticiable political question. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the Constitution did not give the Governor the power to revoke a validly granted commutation: "[b]ecause the Governor signed plaintiff's commutation and delivered it to the Secretary of State, where it was signed and affixed with the Great Seal, plaintiff was granted an irrevocable commutation of his sentence." View "Makowski v. Granholm" on Justia Law

Defendant Chad Garrison, stole four snowmobiles and two trailers from vacation homes in Cheboygan County. He pleaded guilty to one count of larceny of property valued at $1,000 or more, but less than $20,000, as a second-offense habitual offender. While the case was pending, the three victims of defendant’s theft traveled back and forth from their primary residences in order to secure their stolen property and attend a restitution hearing. At the hearing, the victims testified that they had incurred travel expenses related to these trips in the cumulative amount of $1,125. The sentencing court included $977 of this amount in its restitution order over defense counsel’s objection. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court on the restitution issue. The Court determined that neither the Crime Victim's Rights Act nor MCL 769.1a authorized courts to include victims’ travel expenses in a restitution award. The Court concluded that the sentencing court abused its discretion by doing so in this case. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court, concluding that the statutes do authorize such payments because they require courts to order full restitution, i.e., restitution that is complete and maximal. Therefore, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on this issue and remanded this case to the Cheboygan Circuit Court for reinstatement of the original restitution order. View "Michigan v. Garrison" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court centered on the proper test for applying the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v Maryland. In "Michigan v. Lester," (591 NW 2d 267 (1998)), the Court of Appeals adopted a four-factor test that added a requirement of defendant diligence to the traditional Brady test. Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor the Michigan Supreme Court endorsed that element. Defendant’s convictions for felony murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony arose out of the shooting death of Kevin Harris in 2008. Harris was a cocaine dealer, who often used Jared Chambers as a middleman to connect with buyers. Chambers occasionally contacted Harris through Harris’ girlfriend, Heather Holloway. The sole question at trial concerned the identity of the shooter. Only defendant, Holloway, and Chambers witnessed the shooting and they did not agree about what happened: defendant identified Chambers as the shooter while Holloway and Chambers identified defendant. There was no physical evidence to tie either defendant or Chambers to the shooting. The defense theory was that Chambers shot Harris, and that Holloway identified defendant as the shooter out of fear of Chambers. On the last day of trial, the prosecution called its final witness. When questioned, that witness was surprised that Holloway’s second written statement did not confirm that she had mentioned Chambers and was confident that the video recordings would verify his recollection. He was also surprised to learn that the recordings had not been provided to defendant. After trial, defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial and requested a copy of the interview recordings. Counsel amended the motion to add claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct regarding the failure to provide the recorded statements. There was no dispute that the defendant never had the recordings. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial, concluding that his due process rights were violated pursuant to Brady because the suppressed videotaped recordings undermined confidence in the outcome of the trial. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The Supreme Court held that a diligence requirement was not supported by Brady or its progeny. Thus, the Court overruled Lester and reaffirmed the traditional three-factor Brady test. Because defendant could not establish that the suppressed evidence was material, however, his Brady claim failed. View "Michigan v. Chenault" on Justia Law

Defendant Schuyler Chenault was convicted by jury of felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The only question at trial was the identity of the shooter. The girlfriend of the victim identified defendant as the shooter. She gave police videotaped interviews, but defendant's counsel did not receive copies of those recordings. The girlfriend's statements did not mention that another person was also present at the shooting: only defendant, the girlfriend and this third party witnessed the shooting, and there was no physical evidence to tie anyone to the shooting. Defendant moved for a new trial and requested a copy of the recordings of the taped interview. Defense counsel also added claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct regarding the failure to provide the recordings. The trial court granted defendant's motion for a new trial, but the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that defense counsel did not exercise due diligence, and that defendant had not been denied effective assistance of counsel because there was no prejudice. Agreeing with the appellate court's analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed that court's reversal of the trial court. View "Michigan v. Chenault" on Justia Law

In "Michigan v. Fobb," the Court of Appeals held that an extortion conviction under the "against his will" prong of MCL 750.213 could only be maintained when the act defendant sought to compel entailed "serious consequences" to the victim. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case required the Court to revisit the Fobb decision. Defendant James Early Harris, Jr. was convicted by a jury of extortion, carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer, and three counts of carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony. Defendant agreed to pay Willie Neal $400 to fix the transmission on defendant's truck. Neal began working on the truck in the driveway that defendant shared with a neighbor, but stopped when it began to rain. Upset by Neal’s refusal to work in the rain, defendant went into his house and returned with a gun. Defendant told Neal that he would "silence him" unless Neal resumed working on the truck or returned a portion of defendant’s down payment for the work. Neal refused, and defendant returned home. When police officers arrived, they found defendant in the driveway carrying a rifle. Relying on Fobb, defendant argued that he could not be convicted of extortion because the act defendant sought to compel (continued work on the truck) was not of serious consequences to the mechanic. But the plain language of the extortion statute, MCL 750.213, defined extortion in terms of whether the defendant maliciously threatened a person with harm in order to "compel the person so threatened to do . . . any act against his will." The Supreme Court concluded defendant's conduct satisfied the requirements set forth in MCL 750.213, and affirmed his conviction of extortion. Furthermore, the Court overruled the Court of Appeals decisions in "Michigan v. Fobb" and "Michigan v. Hubbard" to the extent that those decisions required that the act or omission compelled by the defendant be of serious consequence to the victim. View "Michigan v. Harris" on Justia Law

Defendant Ronald Earl was convicted by a jury of bank robbery and two counts of possession of less than 25 grams of a controlled substance. At the time defendant committed the offenses, MCL 780.905 required that all defendants convicted of a felony pay a $60 crime victim’s rights assessment. The statute was amended effective December 16, 2010, to raise the assessment for convicted felons to $130. At defendant’s sentencing in 2011, the court ordered defendant to pay the $130 crime victim’s rights assessment under MCL 780.905(1)(a). Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the increased victim's rights fund assessment did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Michigan v. Earl" on Justia Law

Chandra Valencia Smith-Anthony was convicted by a jury of larceny from the person. While monitoring closed-circuit television monitors at a department store, the store's loss-prevention officer observed defendant acting suspiciously while shopping and proceeded to follow her. The officer saw defendant select a perfume box set from a display and later slip it into one of her bags. Defendant was stopped by the officer when she left the store with the item in her bag. In a split opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction, concluding that the prosecution had failed to establish the from-the-person element of larceny from a person because there was no evidence that defendant had committed the larceny within the officer's area of immediate presence or control as required by the statute. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals properly reversed defendant's conviction because there was insufficient evidence to support it. View "Michigan v. Smith-Anthony" on Justia Law

Stanley Duncan was charged with five counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and four counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. His wife Vita Duncan was charged with two counts of first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct. A three-year-old victim was qualified to testify at the separate preliminary examinations held for each defendant. Both were bound over for a single jury trial. The victim was called to the stand, but became visibly agitated and unable to answer the court's questions regarding telling the truth and telling a lie. The court then ruled the victim was not competent to testify, suffering from "a then existing mental infirmity." The prosecution asked the court to declare the victim unavailable, but the court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals denied the prosecution's applications for leave for appeal. The Supreme Court granted the prosecution's motion for consideration: the child victim was unavailable within the meaning of Michigan's Rule of Evidence 804(a)(4), and the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded the child was not unavailable. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Duncan" on Justia Law