Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Donald Michael Hardy was convicted after pleading guilty to one count of carjacking. His sentence was 12 to 50 years' imprisonment. Hardy filed a motion for resentencing, challenging the OV scoring and claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the circuit court denied. Hardy then appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the sentence. Defendant Devon DeCarlos Glenn, Jr. was convicted after pleading guilty to armed robbery and felonious assault. He was sentenced to 15 to 30 years' imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction and 18 to 48 months' imprisonment for the felonious assault conviction. The Court of Appeals vacated Glenn's sentence and remanded for resentencing, concluding that although Glenn's conduct used more violence than was strictly necessary to complete an armed robbery, it was not egregious enough in relation to the other conduct listed in the sentencing guidelines to justify the score the circuit court gave him. Both defendants appealed their sentences to the Supreme Court; after review, the Supreme Court found no error in the circuit court's scoring of Hardy's sentence. However, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in Glenn's case and remanded for recalculation of his sentence. View "Michigan v. Glenn" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to redact the majority of the detectives' out-of-court statements from the interrogation of Defendant John Musser where they commented on his credibility. Most of the statements made had no probative value, and their admission undermined the reliability of the jury's verdict because the jury may have relied on those statements in reaching its verdict. The Court felt the limiting jury instruction did not cure this error. Accordingly, the Court vacated defendant's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Musser" on Justia Law

Defendant Samuel Elliott was convicted of armed robbery for holding up a gas station. He had been on parole for a prior conviction, and was arrested the day after the alleged robbery for a parole violation. Defendant's brother called police to inform them of Defendant's misdeed. Police interrogated Defendant until he invoked his right to counsel. While in jail, Defendant confessed his crime to a parole officer when she asked about the gas station robbery and the ramifications of having violated parole. The parole officer did not inform Defendant of his Miranda rights before questioning him. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress his statements made to the parole officer at trial. The appellate court reversed, finding the statements should have been suppressed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err in its conclusion that because Defendant was not subject to a custodial interrogation by the parole officer, even if she was a law enforcement officer, neither Defendant's right to be given a series of warnings before custodial interrogation nor his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation was violated. View "Michigan v. Elliott" on Justia Law

Defendant Rayfield Clary was convicted by jury of assault with intent to commit murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Defendant's first trial ended in mistrial; after his second, he appealed the outcome. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, concluding that defendant had been improperly impeached with his silence. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the prosecution’s references at trial to defendant’s postarrest, post-Miranda silence with the police were improper. View "Michigan v. Clary" on Justia Law

Defendant David Burns was tried by jury and convicted of first-degree sexual conduct. The victim, his four-year-old daughter, told a bible school teacher, who happened to be a forensic interviewer and sexual-assault nurse examiner. The teacher conditionally testified at trial regarding the child's out-of-court statements before the child herself was called to testify. The prosecutor then tried to have the child testify, but was unsuccessful. The teacher's testimony was admitted, on the grounds that defendant told the child "not to tell" of the alleged abuse, rendering her unavailable to testify, and making the teacher's statement admissible under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing rule. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the State failed to establish by a preponderance defendant had both specific intent to cause the child's unavailability, and that the wrongdoing in fact caused her unavailability. The State appealed, but the Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court and affirmed that court's reversal. View "Michigan v. Burns" on Justia Law

Defendant Rodney Lee Koon was stopped for speeding. During the stop, defendant voluntarily produced a marijuana pipe and informed the arresting officer that he was a registered patient under the MMMA and was permitted to possess marijuana. A blood test to which defendant voluntarily submitted several hours later revealed that his blood had a THC content of 10 ng/ml. The State charged defendant with operating a motor vehicle with the presence of a schedule 1 controlled substance in his body under MCL 257.625(8). The prosecution sought a jury instruction that the presence of marijuana in defendant's system resulted in a per se violation of the Michigan Vehicle Code. Defendant argued that the zero-tolerance provision could not possibly apply to MMMA registered patients because the MMMA prevented the prosecution of registered patients for the medical use of marijuana, including internal possession, and only withdraws its protection when the patient drives while "under the influence" of marijuana. Moreover, the MMMA resolved conflicts between all other acts and the MMMA by exempting the medical use of marijuana from the application of any inconsistent act. The district court and circuit court agreed with defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the MMMA yielded to the Legislature's determination in MCL 257.625(8) that it is unsafe for a person to drive with any marijuana in his or her system. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether the MMMA's protection superseded the Michigan Vehicle Code's prohibition and allowed a registered patient to drive when he or she has indications of marijuana in his or her system but is not otherwise under the influence of marijuana. The Court concluded that it did. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstated the judgment of the Circuit Court, and remanded this case to the District Court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Koon" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned whether defendant Kadeem White was subjected to "interrogation" or "express questioning or its functional equivalent" after he invoked his right to remain silent. Defendant allegedly turned a drug buy into an armed robbery by pulling out a gun instead of making the purchase. He and the victim allegedly struggled over the gun, the gun went off, and the victim was killed. Defendant was then taken into custody. Because the Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that defendant was not subjected to such questioning after he invoked his right to remain silent, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which correctly reversed the trial court's decision to suppress defendant's voluntarily given confession. View "Michigan v. White" on Justia Law

Jacob Trakhtenberg was convicted of three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. The charges stemmed from allegations of sexual contact made by defendant's then 8-year-old daughter. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether collateral estoppel could be applied to preclude review of defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when a prior civil judgment held that defense counsel's performance did not amount to malpractice. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that collateral estoppels may not be applied in these circumstances because defendant did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Given this conclusion, the Court concluded further that defense counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient because she failed to exercise reasonable professional judgment when she decided to forgo any investigation of the case before settling on a defense strategy. "That deficiency prejudiced defendant by undermining the reliability of the outcome of his trial, which rested solely on the credibility of the complainant and defendant." Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the trial court for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Trakhtenberg" on Justia Law

Defendant Kurtis Minch pled guilty to possessing a short-barreled shotgun and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether Michigan's "felon in possession" statute prevents a police department from delivering lawfully seized noncontraband firearms to the designated agent of a convicted felon. The Court concluded that it does. "The statute does not, however, prevent a court from appointing a successor bailee to maintain possession of a defendant's weapons during his or her period of legal incapacity." View "Michigan v. Minch" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether defendant was properly convicted of first degree criminal sexual assault under MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(ii), which requires that a defendant be related to the victim "by blood." It was undisputed that defendant Jason Zajaczkowski was not related to the victim, but the prosecution asserted that a civil presumption of legitimacy had been met, thereby establishing the relationship "by blood" for the purposes of the conviction. Upon review of the civil presumption of legitimacy implicated by Michigan statutory and caselaw, the Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution could not establish that a blood relationship between the defendant in this case and his victim. "Moreover, the presumption of legitimacy cannot be substituted for a blood relationship in order to fulfill this element of the crime charged." Accordingly, the vacated defendant's conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and remanded the case for entry of a conviction of third-degree criminal sexual conduct in accordance with defendant's plea agreement, and for resentencing. View "Michigan v. Zajaczkowski" on Justia Law