Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted leave in three cases to consider the substantive and procedural aspects of the affirmative defense of medical use of marijuana under section 8, MCL 333.26428, of the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA). Given the plain language of the statute, the Court held that a defendant asserting the section 8 affirmative defense is not required to establish the requirements of section 4, MCL 333.26424, which pertains to broader immunity granted by the Act. The Court of Appeals erred by reaching the opposite conclusion in "People v King," and the Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment in that case. Further, to establish the affirmative defense under section 8, the Court held that a defendant must show under section 8(a)(1) that the physician’s statement was made after enactment of the MMMA but before commission of the offense.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the death of a coperpetrator of a crime may be scored under offense variable (OV) 3, MCL 777.33, which concerns "physical injury to a victim." Upon review, the Court concluded that a coperpetrator is properly considered a "victim" for purposes of OV 3 when he or she is harmed by the criminal actions of the charged party, in this case, Defendant Marteez Laidler. Because the Court concluded that the coperpetrator's death constituted such a harm, the Court reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated Defendant's sentence. The trial court properly assessed 100 points for OV 3 because the coperpetrator was harmed by the criminal actions of Defendant.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether MCR 6.302 and constitutional due process require a trial court to inform a defendant pleading guilty or no contest to first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I) or second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSCII) that he or she will be sentenced to mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring, if required by MCL 750.520b(2)(d) or MCL 750.520c(2)(b). Defendant David Cole was charged with two counts of CSC-II under MCL 750.520c(1)(a). The trial court agreed not to exceed a five-year minimum term of imprisonment for each charge, with the sentences to run concurrently. At the plea hearing, the prosecution read both CSC-II counts and described them as being punishable by up to 15 years in prison and requiring mandatory testing for sexually transmitted diseases. Defendant indicated to the trial court that he understood the CSC-II charges and that he faced a maximum penalty of 15 years' imprisonment. The trial court stated that it had agreed to a five-year concurrent cap on the minimum sentence, but that it had made no other agreement with regard to the plea or the sentence. The trial court never informed Defendant that, if sentenced to prison, he would be subject to mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring. Defendant moved to amend the judgment of sentence or permit withdrawal of his plea, arguing in part that the failure to advise him of the mandatory penalty of lifetime electronic monitoring rendered his plea involuntary. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant sought leave to appeal. In a split opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded to allow Defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring is part of the sentence itself. Therefore, at the time a defendant enters a guilty or no-contest plea, the trial court must inform the defendant if he or she will be subject to mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring. In the absence of this information about a direct and automatic consequence of a defendant's decision to enter a plea and forgo his or her right to a trial, no defendant could be said to have entered an understanding and voluntary plea. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue.

Defendant James Buie was convicted in 2001 of sexually assaulting BS and two female minors: LS, age 13, and DS, age 9. The assaults occurred after BS, seeking to trade sex for cocaine, invited defendant into the apartment where she was babysitting LS and DS. In lieu of the desired bargain, Defendant held BS at gunpoint and raped her, LS, and DS. LS and DS were unable to identify the man who assaulted them, but at trial BS identified defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether witness testimony taken by two-way, interactive video was properly admitted during defendant’s trial. The Court's consideration implicated two issues: (1) whether Defendant's constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him was violated by the admission of video testimony; and (2) whether the admission of video testimony violated MCR 6.006(C). Because the Court concluded that Defendant waived his right of confrontation under the United States and Michigan Constitutions and that the court rule was not violated, it reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case back to the appellate court for consideration of Defendant’s remaining issues.

This case required the Supreme Court to revisit and reemphasize, several aspects of the test governing motions for a new trial, set forth in "Michigan v. Cress" (664 NW2d 174 (2003)). The Court began with "the unremarkable observation that when the Defendant possesses knowledge of evidence at the time of trial, that evidence cannot be characterized as 'newly discovered' under the first part of the 'Cress' test." In addition, the Court clarified that knowledge of evidence at the time of trial necessarily implicates the third part of the "Cress" test, which requires the Defendant to undertake "reasonable diligence" to discover and produce the evidence at trial. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the Defendant carries the burden of making the requisite showing regarding each of the four parts of the "Cress" test. "Adherence to these principles-- each of which is discernable from our caselaw-- is necessary to maintain the balance between generally upholding the finality of criminal judgments, and unsettling such judgments in the unusual case in which justice under the law requires." In this case, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals "strayed" from these principles by overlooking that Defendant and defense counsel were both well aware at the time of trial alleged newly discovered evidence could have supported the defense and impermissibly relieved Defendant of her burden of showing that she could not, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstated the trial court's order denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, and remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of Defendant's remaining issues.

Defendant Glenn Williams appealed his conviction of armed robbery, arguing that because he was unsuccessful in feloniously taking or removing any actual property from the intended target of his robbery, there was not a sufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea to the charge of armed robbery. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed: "[w]hen the Legislature revised the robbery statute, MCL 750.530, to encompass a 'course of conduct' theory of robbery, it specifically included 'an attempt to commit the larceny' as sufficient to sustain a conviction for robbery itself. [The Court] conclude[d] that this amendment effectuated a substantive change in the law governing robbery in Michigan such that a completed larceny is no longer necessary to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery or armed robbery."

The Supreme Court granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal to resolve whether Michigan law recognizes the doctrine of "imperfect self-defense" as an independent theory that automatically mitigates criminal liability for a homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter when a defendant acts as the initial aggressor and then claims that the victim’s response necessitated the use of force. The Court held that the doctrine does not exist in Michigan law as a freestanding defense mitigating murder to voluntary manslaughter, although the Court recognized that factual circumstances that have been characterized as imperfect self-defense may negate the malice element of second-degree murder. When analyzing the elements of manslaughter in light of defendant’s self-defense claim, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling on the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to sustain Defendant Verdell Reese, III's manslaughter conviction. Therefore, the Court reversed in part the Court of Appeals’ judgment, affirmed the trial court’s verdict of manslaughter, and remanded this case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration of Defendant’s remaining issue on appeal.

This case arose from a physical struggle between Defendant Angel Moreno, Jr. and two Holland police officers when the officers sought to enter Defendant's home without a warrant. As a result, Defendant was charged with resisting and obstructing a police officer and causing injury under MCL 750.81d. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendant was properly charged after trial. It was determined that the officers entered his home illegally. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that MCL 750.81d did not abrogate Defendant's common-law right to resist illegal police conduct. As such, the Court instructed the trial court to grant Defendant's motion to quash the charges against him on the basis that the officers' conduct was unlawful.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Michigan and federal constitutions barred defendant's retrial. Defendant Lamar Evans was accused of burning a vacant house. There was no dispute that the trial court wrongly added an extraneous element to the statute under which Defendant was charged. Specifically, the trial court ruled that the prosecution was required to present proof that the burned house was not a dwelling, which was not a required element of MCL 750.73. As a result of the trial court's erroneous addition of this extraneous element to the charged offense, it granted Defendant's motion for a directed verdict and entered an order of acquittal, dismissing the case. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that when a trial court grants a defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the basis of an error of law that did not resolve any factual element of the charged offense, the trial court's ruling does not constitute an acquittal for the purposes of double jeopardy and retrial is therefore not barred. Accordingly, because the trial court's actions did not constitute an acquittal for the purposes of double jeopardy, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 2005, Defendant Kent Lee and his wife babysat their neighbor's two boys. Defendant prepared the children for bedtime by bathing them. The younger boy, a three-year-old, was uncooperative when Defendant tried to diaper and dress him. According to Defendant, he used his finger to "flick" the child's penis in an effort to get his attention. When the child did not respond, Defendant flicked him again. The child cried after the second flick. Defendant was subsequently charged with second-degree criminal sexual conduct and second-degree child abuse. At his sentencing hearing, the prosecution requested that Defendant be required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offenderâs Registration Act's (SORA) catch-all provision. The judge did not require the registration, finding that the crime was not a "sex act." Approximately twenty months after the sentencing, the prosecution moved for an entry of order requiring Defendant to register under SORA. Defendant objected, but the trial court reversed itself, and required the registration. Defendant appealed. The appellate court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred when it required Defendant to register 20 months after he was sentenced. The Court reversed the appellate court and vacated the trial court's decisions.