Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a Michigan Department of State (DOS) certificate of mailing is testimonial in nature, and whether its admission without accompanying witness testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the state and federal constitutions. The DOS generated the certificate of mailing to certify that it had mailed a notice of driver suspension to a group of suspended drivers. The prosecution sought to introduce this certificate to prove the notice element of the charged crime, driving while license revoked or suspended (DWLS), second offense. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that a DOS certificate of mailing is not testimonial because the circumstances under which it was generated would not lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. Instead, the circumstances reflected that the creation of a certificate of mailing, which is necessarily generated before the commission of any crime, is a function of the legislatively authorized administrative role of the DOS independent from any investigatory or prosecutorial purpose. Therefore, the DOS certificate of mailing may be admitted into evidence absent accompanying witness testimony without violating the Confrontation Clause.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendant-Appellant Joseph Vaughn was entitled to a new trial because the circuit court closed the courtroom during voir dire in violation of defendant's constitutional rights. In 2002, Defendant was arrested on weapons and attempted murder charges when he shot at a retired police officer and a neighbor. Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court held that a defendant's right to a public trial is subject to the forfeiture rule articulated in "Michigan v Carines" (597 NW2d 130 (1999)) and that the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that defendant's failure to assert his public trial right necessarily "forecloses the later grant of relief." In applying the "Carines" forfeiture rule to defendant's appeal, however, the Court concluded that defendant was not entitled to a new trial because he did not establish that his forfeited claim of error "seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Furthermore, the Court concluded that defendant was not entitled to a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion to the extent that it was inconsistent with this opinion, and affirmed defendant's convictions.

This case presented the question of whether Defendant Ramon Bryant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. A fair-cross-section claim under the Sixth Amendment requires a defendant to make a prima facie case as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in "Duren v Missouri," (439 U.S. 357 (1979)). The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant had satisfied the three Duren prongs, establishing a violation of his right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community, and granted defendant a new trial. In its review, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred because defendant failed to show under the second prong that the representation of African-Americans in venires from which juries were selected was not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of African-Americans in the community. The Court held "that when applying all the relevant tests for evaluating the representation data, a court must examine the composition of jury pools or venires over time using the most reliable data available to determine whether representation of a distinct group is fair and reasonable. Having considered the results of these tests using the most reliable data set, which included the composition of jury pools or venires over a three-month period, [the Court concluded] that defendant failed to show that the representation of African-Americans was not fair and reasonable."

In two consolidated cases, the issue central to both involved MCL 768.27a(1). In relevant part, in a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of committing a listed offense against a minor, evidence that the defendant committed another listed offense against a minor is admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it may be relevant. Upon review of these cases, the Supreme Court concluded that MCL 768.27a "irreconcilably" conflicted with the Michigan Rules of Evidence 404(b). Further, the Court held that evidence admissible under MCL 768.27a remains subject to MRE 403, which provided that a court may exclude relevant evidence if the danger of unfair prejudice, among other considerations, outweighs the evidence's probative value. "In applying the balancing test in MRE 403 to evidence admissible under MCL 768.27a, . . . courts must weigh the propensity inference in favor of the evidence's probative value rather than its prejudicial effect."

The Supreme Court granted leave in three cases to consider the substantive and procedural aspects of the affirmative defense of medical use of marijuana under section 8, MCL 333.26428, of the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA). Given the plain language of the statute, the Court held that a defendant asserting the section 8 affirmative defense is not required to establish the requirements of section 4, MCL 333.26424, which pertains to broader immunity granted by the Act. The Court of Appeals erred by reaching the opposite conclusion in "People v King," and the Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment in that case. Further, to establish the affirmative defense under section 8, the Court held that a defendant must show under section 8(a)(1) that the physician’s statement was made after enactment of the MMMA but before commission of the offense.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the death of a coperpetrator of a crime may be scored under offense variable (OV) 3, MCL 777.33, which concerns "physical injury to a victim." Upon review, the Court concluded that a coperpetrator is properly considered a "victim" for purposes of OV 3 when he or she is harmed by the criminal actions of the charged party, in this case, Defendant Marteez Laidler. Because the Court concluded that the coperpetrator's death constituted such a harm, the Court reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated Defendant's sentence. The trial court properly assessed 100 points for OV 3 because the coperpetrator was harmed by the criminal actions of Defendant.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether MCR 6.302 and constitutional due process require a trial court to inform a defendant pleading guilty or no contest to first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I) or second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSCII) that he or she will be sentenced to mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring, if required by MCL 750.520b(2)(d) or MCL 750.520c(2)(b). Defendant David Cole was charged with two counts of CSC-II under MCL 750.520c(1)(a). The trial court agreed not to exceed a five-year minimum term of imprisonment for each charge, with the sentences to run concurrently. At the plea hearing, the prosecution read both CSC-II counts and described them as being punishable by up to 15 years in prison and requiring mandatory testing for sexually transmitted diseases. Defendant indicated to the trial court that he understood the CSC-II charges and that he faced a maximum penalty of 15 years' imprisonment. The trial court stated that it had agreed to a five-year concurrent cap on the minimum sentence, but that it had made no other agreement with regard to the plea or the sentence. The trial court never informed Defendant that, if sentenced to prison, he would be subject to mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring. Defendant moved to amend the judgment of sentence or permit withdrawal of his plea, arguing in part that the failure to advise him of the mandatory penalty of lifetime electronic monitoring rendered his plea involuntary. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant sought leave to appeal. In a split opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded to allow Defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring is part of the sentence itself. Therefore, at the time a defendant enters a guilty or no-contest plea, the trial court must inform the defendant if he or she will be subject to mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring. In the absence of this information about a direct and automatic consequence of a defendant's decision to enter a plea and forgo his or her right to a trial, no defendant could be said to have entered an understanding and voluntary plea. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue.

Defendant James Buie was convicted in 2001 of sexually assaulting BS and two female minors: LS, age 13, and DS, age 9. The assaults occurred after BS, seeking to trade sex for cocaine, invited defendant into the apartment where she was babysitting LS and DS. In lieu of the desired bargain, Defendant held BS at gunpoint and raped her, LS, and DS. LS and DS were unable to identify the man who assaulted them, but at trial BS identified defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether witness testimony taken by two-way, interactive video was properly admitted during defendant’s trial. The Court's consideration implicated two issues: (1) whether Defendant's constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him was violated by the admission of video testimony; and (2) whether the admission of video testimony violated MCR 6.006(C). Because the Court concluded that Defendant waived his right of confrontation under the United States and Michigan Constitutions and that the court rule was not violated, it reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case back to the appellate court for consideration of Defendant’s remaining issues.

This case required the Supreme Court to revisit and reemphasize, several aspects of the test governing motions for a new trial, set forth in "Michigan v. Cress" (664 NW2d 174 (2003)). The Court began with "the unremarkable observation that when the Defendant possesses knowledge of evidence at the time of trial, that evidence cannot be characterized as 'newly discovered' under the first part of the 'Cress' test." In addition, the Court clarified that knowledge of evidence at the time of trial necessarily implicates the third part of the "Cress" test, which requires the Defendant to undertake "reasonable diligence" to discover and produce the evidence at trial. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the Defendant carries the burden of making the requisite showing regarding each of the four parts of the "Cress" test. "Adherence to these principles-- each of which is discernable from our caselaw-- is necessary to maintain the balance between generally upholding the finality of criminal judgments, and unsettling such judgments in the unusual case in which justice under the law requires." In this case, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals "strayed" from these principles by overlooking that Defendant and defense counsel were both well aware at the time of trial alleged newly discovered evidence could have supported the defense and impermissibly relieved Defendant of her burden of showing that she could not, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstated the trial court's order denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, and remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of Defendant's remaining issues.

Defendant Glenn Williams appealed his conviction of armed robbery, arguing that because he was unsuccessful in feloniously taking or removing any actual property from the intended target of his robbery, there was not a sufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea to the charge of armed robbery. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed: "[w]hen the Legislature revised the robbery statute, MCL 750.530, to encompass a 'course of conduct' theory of robbery, it specifically included 'an attempt to commit the larceny' as sufficient to sustain a conviction for robbery itself. [The Court] conclude[d] that this amendment effectuated a substantive change in the law governing robbery in Michigan such that a completed larceny is no longer necessary to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery or armed robbery."