Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal to resolve whether Michigan law recognizes the doctrine of "imperfect self-defense" as an independent theory that automatically mitigates criminal liability for a homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter when a defendant acts as the initial aggressor and then claims that the victim’s response necessitated the use of force. The Court held that the doctrine does not exist in Michigan law as a freestanding defense mitigating murder to voluntary manslaughter, although the Court recognized that factual circumstances that have been characterized as imperfect self-defense may negate the malice element of second-degree murder. When analyzing the elements of manslaughter in light of defendant’s self-defense claim, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling on the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to sustain Defendant Verdell Reese, III's manslaughter conviction. Therefore, the Court reversed in part the Court of Appeals’ judgment, affirmed the trial court’s verdict of manslaughter, and remanded this case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration of Defendant’s remaining issue on appeal.

This case arose from a physical struggle between Defendant Angel Moreno, Jr. and two Holland police officers when the officers sought to enter Defendant's home without a warrant. As a result, Defendant was charged with resisting and obstructing a police officer and causing injury under MCL 750.81d. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendant was properly charged after trial. It was determined that the officers entered his home illegally. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that MCL 750.81d did not abrogate Defendant's common-law right to resist illegal police conduct. As such, the Court instructed the trial court to grant Defendant's motion to quash the charges against him on the basis that the officers' conduct was unlawful.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Michigan and federal constitutions barred defendant's retrial. Defendant Lamar Evans was accused of burning a vacant house. There was no dispute that the trial court wrongly added an extraneous element to the statute under which Defendant was charged. Specifically, the trial court ruled that the prosecution was required to present proof that the burned house was not a dwelling, which was not a required element of MCL 750.73. As a result of the trial court's erroneous addition of this extraneous element to the charged offense, it granted Defendant's motion for a directed verdict and entered an order of acquittal, dismissing the case. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that when a trial court grants a defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the basis of an error of law that did not resolve any factual element of the charged offense, the trial court's ruling does not constitute an acquittal for the purposes of double jeopardy and retrial is therefore not barred. Accordingly, because the trial court's actions did not constitute an acquittal for the purposes of double jeopardy, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 2005, Defendant Kent Lee and his wife babysat their neighbor's two boys. Defendant prepared the children for bedtime by bathing them. The younger boy, a three-year-old, was uncooperative when Defendant tried to diaper and dress him. According to Defendant, he used his finger to "flick" the child's penis in an effort to get his attention. When the child did not respond, Defendant flicked him again. The child cried after the second flick. Defendant was subsequently charged with second-degree criminal sexual conduct and second-degree child abuse. At his sentencing hearing, the prosecution requested that Defendant be required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offenderâs Registration Act's (SORA) catch-all provision. The judge did not require the registration, finding that the crime was not a "sex act." Approximately twenty months after the sentencing, the prosecution moved for an entry of order requiring Defendant to register under SORA. Defendant objected, but the trial court reversed itself, and required the registration. Defendant appealed. The appellate court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred when it required Defendant to register 20 months after he was sentenced. The Court reversed the appellate court and vacated the trial court's decisions.

A jury convicted Defendant-Appellant Drew Peltola on drug possession charges. The trial court considered Defendant's prior criminal history ("prior record variables" or PRVs), and calculated his sentence to be in the five to twenty-three month range, with a statutory minimum at twenty years. Because defendant had a prior conviction for a controlled substance, the trial court applied a sentence enhancement. As a result, the court doubled both the minimum and maximum sentences for each conviction and sentenced defendant within the enhanced guidelines range to concurrent terms of 4 to 40 years' imprisonment. Defendant unsuccessfully appealed the trial court's scoring of his PRVs. The question before the Supreme Court involved whether the trial court miscalculated Defendant's sentence based on its scoring of the PRVs. Upon consideration of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's enhancing of Defendant's sentence range was authorized by Michigan law. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision and Defendant's sentence.