Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed a postconviction order that summarily denied Appellant’s public-trial claim on the grounds that the claim was barred by the rule announced in State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976).Appellant was convicted of one count of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree murder. During trial, the district court required spectators to present photographic identification before entering the courtroom. In his petition for postconviction relief Appellant asserted that the photographic-identification rule denied him his right to a public trial provided by the federal and state constitutions and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not seeking a stay to expand the record regarding the courtroom “closure.” Relying on the rule announced in Knaffla, the postconvcition court summarily denied the petition for postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant’s public-trial claim was raised by Appellant and rejected by the Supreme Court on direct appeal, the postconviction court properly concluded that Knaffla barred the claim; and (2) Appellant forfeited appellate review of his argument that the interests-of-justice exception applied in his case. View "Taylor v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for first-degree premeditated murder and his sentence of life in prison without the possibility of release.The State in this case initially filed a complaint charging defendant with second-degree intentional murder. Defendant attempted to plead guilty to the charge, but the district court refused to accept the plea when it learned that the State had amended its complaint to charge first-degree premeditated murder. Contrary to Defendant’s arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances of this case when it did not accept Defendant’s straight guilty plea to second-degree intentional murder; and (2) sufficient evidence supported the district court’s conclusion of law that the State proved premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Petersen" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers did not violate Defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when, after Defendant invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, they later asked him if he was willing to sign a written consent to the taking of a DNA sample and explained to him why they sought the sample.Defendant was charged with possession of a firearm by an ineligible person and possession of a short-barreled shotgun. Defendant filed a motion to suppress DNA evidence and his admission that he had handled the shotgun, claiming that the officers conducted a second custodial interrogation after he had invoked his privilege against self-incrimination. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officers did not violate Defendant’s constitutional privilege against self-incrimination because, although Defendant’s statements that he had already handled the shotgun were incriminating testimonial communications, none of the officers’ actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating testimonial communication. Therefore, a Miranda warning was not required. View "State v. Heinonen" on Justia Law

In this case where a petitioner’s former attorneys appealed an order of the district court dismissing a postconviction petition as moot following the death of the petitioner, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the attorneys did not have standing to seek review of the district court’s order.Here, Petitioner died after filing an amended petition for postconviction relief. The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the petition was technically moot due to Petitioner’s death and that the significant-public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine was not satisfied. Petitioner’s former attorneys appealed. The Supreme Court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal because the attorneys, whose attorney-client relationship with Petitioner terminated on his death and who were not aggrieved parties themselves, lacked standing. View "Glaze v. State" on Justia Law

In this case where a petitioner’s former attorneys appealed an order of the district court dismissing a postconviction petition as moot following the death of the petitioner, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the attorneys did not have standing to seek review of the district court’s order.Here, Petitioner died after filing an amended petition for postconviction relief. The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the petition was technically moot due to Petitioner’s death and that the significant-public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine was not satisfied. Petitioner’s former attorneys appealed. The Supreme Court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal because the attorneys, whose attorney-client relationship with Petitioner terminated on his death and who were not aggrieved parties themselves, lacked standing. View "Glaze v. State" on Justia Law

A district court “participates” in a plea bargaining negotiation (see State v. Johnson, 156 N.W.2d 218 (Minn. 1968) when it provides unsolicited comments regarding the propriety of the parties’ competing settlement offers. When a defendant successfully challenges the validity of a guilty plea because of the district court’s participation, the plea is only invalid if it was involuntary under the totality of the circumstances.The district court in Appellant’s case made unsolicited comments about the propriety of the parties’ competing settlement offers before the parties reached an agreement for the court to accept or reject. Appellant later filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging that the court’s participation in the plea negotiations made her plea invalid and required a remedy of automatic plea vacated. The postconviction court disagreed and denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed. Because the law in existence at the time Appellant filed her postconviction petition did not require a defendant to establish that her guilty plea was involuntary, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the district court to give Appellant an opportunity to amend her postconviction petition in light of the holdings announced today. View "Wheeler v. State" on Justia Law

A district court “participates” in a plea bargaining negotiation (see State v. Johnson, 156 N.W.2d 218 (Minn. 1968) when it provides unsolicited comments regarding the propriety of the parties’ competing settlement offers. When a defendant successfully challenges the validity of a guilty plea because of the district court’s participation, the plea is only invalid if it was involuntary under the totality of the circumstances.The district court in Appellant’s case made unsolicited comments about the propriety of the parties’ competing settlement offers before the parties reached an agreement for the court to accept or reject. Appellant later filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging that the court’s participation in the plea negotiations made her plea invalid and required a remedy of automatic plea vacated. The postconviction court disagreed and denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed. Because the law in existence at the time Appellant filed her postconviction petition did not require a defendant to establish that her guilty plea was involuntary, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the district court to give Appellant an opportunity to amend her postconviction petition in light of the holdings announced today. View "Wheeler v. State" on Justia Law

Failing to register is a continuing crime that includes the entire range of dates on which Defendant failed to register in this case, and a jury was not required to find the date of Defendant’s current offense.Defendant was convicted of knowingly failing to register as a predatory offender. Under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, prior felony sentences are used to calculate criminal history scores unless a period of fifteen years has elapsed between “the date of the current offense” and the expiration of the prior felony sentence (see Minn. Stat. 243.166). Defendant argued that “the date of the current offense” for his crime was the last day the offense occurred and that a jury must decide that date. The court of appeals concluded that “the date of the current offense,” which is a continuing offense, is the first day the offense occurs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in including Defendant’s 1996 felony conviction in his criminal history score because fifteen years had not elapsed between the expiration of Defendant’s sentence for his 1996 conviction and the start of his current offense; and (2) Defendant’s sentence did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). View "State v. Washington" on Justia Law

The warrantless search of Defendant’s property violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights in this case.Here, an officer entered Defendant’s property, examined a stolen camper trailer and then, after obtaining Defendant’s consent, searched Defendant’s home. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the officer’s examination of the camper was unconstitutional and tainted his subsequent consent to the search of his home. The district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that because the camper was on a driveway that was impliedly open to the public, the officer’s entry onto Defendant’s property was lawful and that the officer had authority to seize the camper under the plain-view doctrine. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the camper was located on property that was afforded the constitutional protections of the home; and (2) the officer’s conduct was beyond the objectively reasonable scope of any implied license to enter Defendant’s property, and therefore, the warrantless search violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. View "State v. Chute" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of second-degree murder, and one count of attempted second-degree murder, holding that any alleged errors, whether separate or cumulative, were harmless.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by allowing the State to depose a material witness before trial, admitting a redacted transcript of the deposition at trial, and admitting evidence that, one week before the murders, Defendant had pointed a gun at two of the victims and threatened to kill everybody in the apartment. The Supreme Court held that Defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility that any of the alleged errors substantially affected the verdict, and therefore, Defendant was not entitled to a new trial. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law