Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court remanded this criminal case to the court of appeals for a decision on the merits, holding that the State can appeal the dismissal of the charges against Defendant under Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04, subdivision 1(1).After the State charged Defendant with second-degree criminal sexual conduct he filed a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The State appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that the district court's order was not appealable under Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for the merits, holding that the district court's order was appealable because the dismissal was not premised solely on a factual determination. View "State v. Gray" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's request for postconviction relief, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict of possession of shoplifting gear under Mo. Rev. Stat. 609.521(b).Appellant was detained by police after employees from a retail clothing store called the police with suspicions that Appellant was shoplifting. A search revealed pieces of aluminum foil in Appellant's possession, some of which were wrapped around security sensors attached to items of unpurchased merchandise. A jury found Appellant guilty of violating section 609.521(b). Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that the foil was not "an instrument designed to assist in shoplifting or defeating an electronic article surveillance system under the possession of shoplifting gear statute. The district court denied relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Appellant's conviction. View "Douglas v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting the petition for a writ of prohibition filed by the State prohibiting the district court from enforcing a "taint team" order, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was implicated in this case.Appellant, a juvenile at the time of his offense, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to two consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of release. After Miller v. Alabama, 467 U.S. 460 (2012), was decided, Appellant was granted resentencing. At issue during the hearing was copies of recorded calls made by Appellant while he was incarcerated. The district court ordered the State to use a taint team to review the recorded calls for attorney-client communications on the ground that Appellant's the constitutional right to counsel was implicated. The court of appeals granted the State's petition for a writ prohibiting the court from enforcing the taint team order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that relief was not warranted because (1) the Sixth Amendment was not implicated here; and (2) the State would be injured and without any adequate remedy to correct the unauthorized action of the court. View "State v. Flowers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's convictions for driving after cancellation-inimical to public safety (DAC-IPS) based on the conclusion that Minn. Stat. 171.24, subd. 5 is unenforceable on private property, holding that the statute is enforceable on private property.Defendant, whose license was cancelled as inimical to public safety, was charged with DAC-IPS after a law enforcement officer observed him drive a motor vehicle down a private driveway. Defendant filed a motion to suppress and to dismiss the complaint for lack of probable cause. The district court denied the motions. The district court subsequently found Defendant guilty. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the DAC-IPS requires a license only when a vehicle is operated on a street or highway. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the DAC-IPS statute is enforceable in private property; and (2) the district court properly denied Defendant's motions to suppress and dismiss, resulting in restatement of Defendant's convictions. View "State v. Velisek" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part Defendant's convictions for first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree assault-fear, holding that the district court committed reversible error when it relied on the doctrine of transferred intent.The Supreme Court remanded the matter, holding that the district court (1) did not violate the accomplice-corroboration statute, Minn. Stat. 634.04, when it found that Defendant committed the murder with premeditation; (2) did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence Defendant proffered to impeach one of the State's witnesses; but (3) committed reversible error by relying on the doctrine of transferred intent to find Defendant guilty of second-degree assault-fear. View "State v. Spann" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this lawsuit brought by Appellants seeking a declaration "that individuals are restored to civil rights and possess the fundamental right to vote guaranteed by [Minn. Const. art. VII] by virtue of being released or excused from incarceration following a felony," holding that there was no error.At issue before the Supreme Court was (1) whether Minn. Const. art. VII, 1 requires that a person convicted of a felony be restored to the right to vote upon being released or excused from incarceration; and (2) whether Minn. Stat. 609.165 is contrary to the fundamental right to vote or to equal protection protections under the state Constitution. The Supreme Court held (1) under article VII, section 1, a person convicted of a felony cannot vote in Minnesota unless his or her right to vote is restored in accordance with an affirmative act or governmental mechanism restoring the person's right to vote; and (2) section 609.165 does not violate the fundamental right to vote, and there was insufficient evidence to prove that the statute violates the Minnesota Constitution's equal protection principle. View "Schroeder v. Simon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the district court to allow a witness to testify using live, two-way remote view technology during a jury trial in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, holding that Defendant's right to confrontation was not violated in the proceedings below.During Defendant's jury trial on a third-degree sale of a controlled substance charge, the district court allowed one of the State's witness to testify via Zoom because she had been exposed to COVID-19 and was forced to quarantine. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the two-part test set forth in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), is the appropriate test to assess whether a Confrontation Clause violation under the federal or state constitutions; and (2) Defendant's right to confrontation under the federal and state constitutions when the district court permitted the witness to testify using remote view technology under the circumstances of this case. View "State v. Tate" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court dismissing this complaint brought by patients (collectively, Patients) in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP), holding that the district court erred.Patients were ordered by the Minnesota Commitment Appeals Panel (CAP) to be transferred to Community Preparation Services (CPS), which would have been a reduction in custody. CAP issued Patients' transfers orders, but the orders did not provide a specific date by which the transfers to CPS should occur. State officials did not transfer Patients, and about two years after the transfer orders were issued Patients filed petitions for a writ of mandamus demanding that the transfers be effectuated. The state officials filed motions to dismiss, arguing that qualified immunity shielded them from liability. The district court granted the motions to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the state officials had a clear obligation to execute the CAP transfer orders within a reasonable period of time; and (2) remand was required. View "McDeid v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court summarily denying Defendant's second petition for postconviction relief, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree felony murder and attempted first-degree premeditated murder, among other crimes. Defendant later filed the postconviction petition at issue, asserting that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a trial before an impartial jury and that his trial counsel and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance. The district court summarily denied the petition as time barred and procedurally barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it summarily denied Defendant's second postconviction petition as untimely. View "White v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it summarily denied Appellant's eighth petition for postconviction relief as untimely.Appellant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder under an aiding and abetting theory of liability. In his eighth petition for postconviction relief, Appellant invoked the time-bar exception for newly discovered evidence, relying on an affidavit of one of his codefendants. The district court summarily denied the petition as untimely based on its determination that the statements in the affidavit were not newly discovered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it summarily denied Appellant's postconviction petition. View "El-Shabazz v. State" on Justia Law