Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Mississippi Supreme Court
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Jeffrey Yeatman pled guilty to one count of simple assault on a law-enforcement officer and two counts of third-offense driving under the influence. Each of the three counts had a separate cause number. The Circuit Court sentenced him: for simple assault on a law-enforcement officer (cause number 2006-0161-CR), five years imprisonment and a fine of $5,000 as a habitual offender; for third-offense DUI (cause number 2006-0327-CR), five years imprisonment and a fine of $5,000 as a habitual offender; and for third-offense DUI (cause number 2006-0328-CR), one year imprisonment, four years of post-release supervision, and a fine of $100. All sentences were to run consecutively. Yeatman sought post-conviction relief from his convictions for simple assault on a law-enforcement officer and third-offense DUI. The trial court denied post-conviction relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Yeatman's petition for a writ of certiorari. Because, by statute, the fine for simple assault on a law-enforcement officer was a maximum of $1,000, the Supreme Court vacated the $5,000 fine imposed on Yeatman for that crime, and remanded that case to the trial court for a determination of whether the criminal information in cause number 2006-0327-CR charged Yeatman as a habitual offender. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Yeatman v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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Alisha Vanwey pled guilty in 2007 to three counts of selling hydrocodone, and the trial court sentenced her as a habitual offender to eleven years on each count, to run concurrently, in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Vanwey filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) arguing, inter alia, that one of the two prior predicate felonies listed in her indictment alleging habitual-offender status did not meet the requirements of Section 99-19-81. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision based on the finding that Vanwey's motion was procedurally barred as a successive writ and time-barred. After its review, the Supreme Court found Vanwey waived whatever contention she might have had with her habitual-offender status when she failed to challenge the sufficiency or validity of her two prior felony convictions and sentences at her plea hearing and then voluntarily and intelligently entered her guilty plea to three counts of selling hydrocodone as a habitual offender. View "Vanwey v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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Frank Gideon Whitaker IV and Cynthia Ann Grantham were involved in a car accident. The Circuit Court found Whitaker guilty of aggravated driving under the influence pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 63-11-30(5), sentenced him to twenty-five years and ordered Whitaker to pay Grantham $25,000. Whitaker argued two issue on appeal, in both, contending a blood sample taken from Whitaker following the collision while he remained unconscious should not have been admitted into evidence. The majority of the Supreme Court concluded that Whitaker failed to raise any issue of merit: his blood was not drawn pursuant to the Mississippi Implied Consent Act, and he failed to satisfy his burden of showing that the evidence was tampered with or substituted, defeating his chain-of-custody argument. Furthermore, the Court found Whitaker failed to present any evidence supporting his claim that the blood sample was not properly authenticated. View "Whitaker v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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Edward Myers appealed his conviction for the armed robbery of Gabriel Lewis. Upon review of the trial court record, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of a defense witness where there was no evidence of a willful discovery violation. Accordingly, the Court reversed Myers’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. On remand, the Court directed the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether Myers’s right to a speedy trial was violated. View "Myers v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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Carey Witten was convicted in Sacramento County, California, of oral copulation and rape of a person “. . . unconscious of the nature of the act . . .” in violation of the California Penal Code. Witten was granted five years’ probation, and he received an order of dismissal after successful completion of his probation. Witten relocated to Mississippi and filed a petition for relief from the duty to register in Mississippi Code. At the hearing on the matter, Witten argued that his order of dismissal from California satisfied the requirements of Mississippi Code Section 45-33-47(4), such that Witten should have been relieved of the duty to register as a sex offender in Mississippi. The assistant district attorney agreed with Witten. The trial court also agreed and subsequently entered an order relieving Witten of the duty to register as a sex offender in Mississippi. R. Steven Coleman, on behalf of the Mississippi Department of Public Safety, Criminal Information Center, Sex Offenders Registry, filed a Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion to set aside and render as void the trial court’s order relieving Witten of the duty to register, based on Mississippi and California statutes that were not presented to the trial court at the hearing and that had bearing on whether or not Witten was required to register as a sex offender. The trial court ultimately granted the motion to set aside and render as void the earlier judgment. Witten appealed the Supreme Court, arguing the trial court erred as a matter of Mississippi law in its assessment of Mississippi Code Sections 45-33-23 and 45-33-47(4). The Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, finding that Witten’s conviction had not been set aside or dismissed in accordance with Mississippi Code Section 45-33-47(4) and that Witten was required to continue registration as a sex offender in the State of Mississippi. View "Witten v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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Caleb Corrothers was convicted of two counts of capital murder, with the underlying felony of robbery, for the murders of Frank Clark and Taylor Clark. He was convicted on a third count of aggravated assault for the shooting of Tonya Clark. The jury sentenced Corrothers to death for the two counts of capital murder and to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the aggravated assault. The trial court denied Corrothers’s post-trial motions. He appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Corrothers’s convictions and sentences. View "Carothers v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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Because Rudy Quilon was homeless following his release from prison, defendant Harvill Richardson permitted Quilon to move into his home while he got back on his feet. Over the next five months, Quilon "became increasingly unwelcome" as he bragged about having been convicted for murder and armed robbery, his previous experiences as a gang member, and killing a “snitch” in prison. On numerous occasions, Richardson attempted to persuade Quilon to leave the home, but Quilon claimed that he could not leave because he had no transportation or place to go. The situation culminated when Quilon, who had begun watching pornography on Richardson’s computer, stated that he wanted to have sex with Richardson’s wife. Despite having been asked to leave, Quilon refused and walked out to a shed behind the home where Richardson kept axes and other tools that could be used as weapons. Richardson armed himself with a pistol. As Quilon returned from the shed, he approached Richardson in a threatening manner, with one arm concealed behind his back. Quilon kept coming toward him, so Richardson shot Quilon in the stomach. Richardson was prodecuted for murder. The trial judge ruled in limine that Richardson would not be allowed to support his self-defense claim with evidence of the victim’s prior bad acts, including a violent criminal history. Because Richardson's knowledge of this evidence would be highly probative of the reasonableness of his conduct and fear of the victim, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Richardson v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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Defendant Joe Cotton was convicted of murder for the shooting death of Fannie Lee Burks. He appealed his conviction, challenging the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Cotton v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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Roger Gillett was convicted of two counts of capital murder for which he was sentenced to death. Gillett petitioned for post-conviction relief, raising six issues for the Supreme Court's review: (1) the underlying capital-murder aggravator of robbery was improperly expanded; (2) conviction of capital murder under the “continuous-action doctrine” was unconstitutional; (3) Gillett’s trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate Gillett’s background and to present an adequate mitigation case; (4) Gillett’s trial counsel were ineffective in failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct during the sentencing portion of his trial; (5) Gillett’s due-process rights were violated when the Mississippi Supreme Court reweighed the aggravating and mitigating factors; and, (6) cumulative error. Upon review of the briefs submitted by Gillett and the state, the Supreme Court found issues one and two were without merit; however, under issue five, Gillett’s due-process rights were violated in sentencing. Therefore, the Court granted Gillett’s petition in part and denied in part, vacated his death sentences and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new sentencing hearing. View "Gillett v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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Timothy Pryer sought from the circuit court: “the Order givin[g] Carol Gates the Office of Judge de facto or pro tempore and the order givin[g] Carol Gates authority to appoint indigent counsel for December 2, 2004 [hearing] and the names of the 40 plus souls and their addresses according to the record.” The Itawamba County Circuit Court issued an order “denying Pryer records and construing a request for records as a petition for Post-Conviction Relief (PCR)." Pryer then filed a petition for writ of mandamus to the Supreme Court, requesting that it direct the circuit judge to enter an order on a “Motion to Show Cause.” The Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of mandamus, and the circuit court proceeded to enter an order that denied Pryer’s motion, explaining that the documents requested were “not contained with the Circuit Clerk’s file” and that “[t]his motion contains the exact same requests as the previously filed motions.” The court continued, “the Motion to Show Cause contains completely unfounded and slanderous allegations against several court officials.” The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Itawamba County Circuit Court, holding that “we have no reason to believe that any such documents do exist. It further appears that Pryer is merely on a ‘fishing expedition’ for grounds upon which to attack his conviction and sentence.” Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Pryer v. Mississippi" on Justia Law