Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Roger Thorson was indicted in 1987 and charged with the capital murder of Gloria McKinney, his ex-girlfriend, during the commission of a kidnapping. On Thorsonâs direct appeal of his capital-murder conviction and sentence of death, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court on all issues except a 'Batson' issue, and the case was remanded to the trial court to conduct a Batson hearing. On remand, the trial court found no Batson violation, holding that Defendant was not entitled to a new trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the trial court had committed reversible error in allowing the State to peremptorily strike a member of the jury venire based solely on her religious affiliation, in violation of Article 3, Section 18 of the Mississippi Constitution and Mississippi Code Section 13-5-2. The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial. After another jury trial, Defendant was again convicted for the crime of capital murder and sentenced to death by lethal injection, and on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed both the conviction and sentence. The United States Supreme Court denied Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari. Defendant subsequently filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with this Court, seeking an 'Atkins' hearing pursuant to 'Atkins v. Virginia.' Once all briefs had been submitted, the court entered an eight-page order thoroughly discussing the issue before him and finding that Defendant was not mentally retarded under 'Atkins.' Upon entry of this order denying his petition for post-conviction relief under Atkins, Defendant appealed again to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Defendant was not mentally retarded.

In July 2001, eight-year-old Jane Doe and thirteen-year-old Lisa Roe were playing unsupervised at the Presidential Hills Park, a public park built, operated, and maintained by the City of Jackson (the City). While playing in the park, the two children were approached by Andrew Lawson, a convicted sex offender, who fondled Lisa Roe and sexually battered Jane Doe. Lawson was convicted for his criminal acts against the girls. Two girls sued the City. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from suit. The trial court denied the motion. Because the City's operation of the park was a discretionary function, the Supreme Court granted the City's petition for interlocutory appeal and reversed the trial court and rendered judgment for the City.

On May 11, 2010, a Tishomingo County jury found Defendant Cliff Hensley guilty of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of Mississippi Code. Defendant was sentenced as a habitual offender to a term of twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). In this appeal, Defendant asserted his sentence of twenty years was an improper sentence under the governing statutes. Because Defendant was properly sentenced under Mississippi Code, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence.

Defendant Kenneth Hugh Knight was convicted in the Pearl River County Circuit Court for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute while in possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed, raising three issues: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) the denial of his motion for a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and (3) the denial of his motion for a new trial. Because the record was not sufficient to address Knight's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court dismissed the claim without prejudice. The Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment on the remaining issues.

In October 2006, Defendant Rachel Nelson was involved in an automobile collision. The City of Richland charged her with driving under the influence. In November Defendant pled ânolo contendereâ in the Municipal Court of Richland. Later that month, Defendant filed a notice of appeal in the Rankin County Circuit Clerkâs office stating that a sufficient cash appeal and cash bond had been posted, and requesting a jury trial in county court de novo. The trial date was set for April 2, 2007. On March 27, 2007, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on writ of procedendo and to return the cause of action to the Municipal Court of Richland for imposition of sentence. On the same day, the Rankin County Court granted Defendantâs Motion to Dismiss and ordered the matter back to the Municipal Court of Richland on writ of procedendo. On March 30, 2007, a Richland city prosecutor filed a motion to set aside the order of dismissal, to reinstate Defendantâs appeal, and to stay the proceedings. Defendant argued to the Supreme Court that: (1) the county court had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of dismissal and remand on writ of procedendo; and (2) double jeopardy was invoked because the county court ânolle prossedâ the charge after the appeal was taken. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the decision to hear the cityâs arguments on the motion to dismiss in this case was within the county courtâs sound discretion: âthe entry of a nolle prosequi does not bar another prosecution for the same offense under a new indictment . . [Here, Defendant] did not claim she had been twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. Rather, she contended that she may be prosecuted in the future for felony DUI. Therefore, the question of whether the municipal court proceedings would bar a subsequent prosecution under double-jeopardy considerations was not ripe for determination.â The Court affirmed the county courtâs decision.

Appellant Jeremy Davis was convicted of aggravated assault on a law-enforcement officer, escape, burglary and possessing a firearm as a felon. Appellant's attorney filed an appeal, the briefs to which provided only generalized assertions that the State had violated Appellant's constitutional rights by exercising all of its six peremptory strikes against African-American jurors. After reviewing the briefs and the trial court's record, the Supreme Court found no error and upheld the trial court's decision and Appellant's convictions.

Defendant Chad Booker was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. Defendant unsuccessfully appealed his sentence to the Court of Appeals. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued multiple errors at the trial court entitled him to a new trial. The majority for the Court of Appeals found no merit in Defendant's arguments. Though it affirmed the appellate court's holding, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to expand upon points in the Court of Appeals' discussion on "Weathersby v. State" and whether the "Weathersby Rule" was correctly interpreted by the lower courts in Defendant's case. In sum, the rule applies where a defendant or his witnesses are the only eyewitnesses to the homicide: "Their version, if reasonable, must be accepted as true unless substantially contradicted in material particulars by a credible witness or witnesses for the state, or by the physical facts of the common knowledge." In Defendant's case, the Weathersby rule was inapplicable because Defendant's own version of the incident satisfied the elements of manslaughter. Furthermore, Defendant's version was substantially contradicted "in material particulars" by witnesses presented at trial. The Supreme Court found that the trial judge correctly found Weathersby inapplicable and properly permitted this case to go to the jury.

A caller informed Claiborne County Sheriff's deputies that Wendell Barnes was in Port Gibson driving a car with Texas plates. Officers knew Barnes had three warrants against him. They happened upon a vehicle matching the caller's description and initiated an investigatory stop. A deputy searched and arrested the driver, Defendant Terrance Eaddy, for possession of cocaine and weapons. Defendant moved to suppress evidence of the drugs and gun discovered in the search. At the suppression hearing, on cross-examination of the arresting deputy, defense counsel pointed out that the deputy's report contained a different version of events that took place at the time of Defendant's arrest than his testimony. In ruling on Defendant's motion, the court recognized the deputy's report differed from his testimony, but that "an arrest report does not represent the officer's entire description of the arrest." Accordingly, the court denied Defendant's motion to suppress. A jury convicted Defendant of the charges against him. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence presented at trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the deputies did not have reasonable grounds to justify the investigatory stop and subsequent search and seizure of evidence from Defendant. Accordingly, the Court vacated Defendant's conviction.

Defendant Curtis Gause was indicted on capital murder charges in addition to burglary, and aggravated assault. A jury found him guilty of manslaughter and burglary, and not guilty of assault. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to twenty years for manslaughter and twenty-five years for burglary, with sentences to run consecutively in the state Department of Corrections. Defendant appealed, arguing multiple errors at trial. Principal among them, Defendant contended the trial court erred when it allowed the jury to consider a verdict on burglary. Upon careful consideration of the trial court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by granting the burglary jury instruction. The Court found that burglary was not a "lesser-included" offense to capital murder, and only Defendant could have asked for the "lesser-included" instruction. The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction on manslaughter, but reversed his conviction on burglary. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

A grand jury indicted Vanessa Decker under the state Vulnerable Adults Act of 1986 for using her elderly mother's money "without her consent." But at trial, the evidence established that Ms. Decker did obtain her mother's consent to use the money. The State requested a jury instruction that allowed the jury to find Ms. Decker guilty, even if her mother had given consent. The judge granted the State's request. Subsequently, Ms. Decker was convicted by the court and sentenced to four months' imprisonment. Additionally, Ms. Decker was sentenced to pay restitution, fines and court costs. Ms. Decker appealed her conviction. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court found that the trial judge gave a jury instruction that materially changed the charge made by the grand jury in the indictment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's conviction and sentence. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.