Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

David Miller was convicted of six sexual offenses against his minor daughter and was sentenced to terms of imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment with respect to Miller's convictions for first-degree statutory sodomy, deviate sexual assault, and first-degree child molestation, holding (1) there was insufficient evidence Miller committed the charged offenses of first-degree statutory sodomy and deviate sexual assault during the charged period of December 3, 2004 through December 3, 2005, and thus Defendant's double jeopardy rights were implicated; and (2) the circuit court plainly erred in submitting a verdict director to the jury allowing the jury to find Defendant guilty of the crime of first-degree child molestation for an act that was not criminal during the charged period. Affirmed in all other respects. Remanded.

During Defendant's trial for assault and armed criminal action she and the State jointly proffered a defense-of-others instruction to the trial court that was submitted to the jury. Defendant sought reversal of her conviction, claiming that the submission of the erroneous instruction to the jury was plain error. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) Defendant waived appellate review by proffering the instruction she complained of; and (2) the Court declined to use plain error review because there was no sua sponte duty for the trial court to correct Defendant's faulty proffered instructions.

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree robbery and armed criminal action. Defendant timely filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief, claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for not calling his codefendant in the crime (Codefendant) at trial, alleging Codefendant would have testified that Defendant did not act as Codefendant's accomplice in the robbery. The motion court granted Defendant's motion for post-conviction relief. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call Codefendant as a witness, and therefore, the motion court's judgment was not clearly erroneous.

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, forcible rape, and armed criminal action and sentenced to death on the first-degree murder charge. Defendant's subsequent motion for post-conviction relief was overruled. The Supreme Court affirmed the motion court's denial of post-conviction relief, holding that the motion court did not (1) err in overruling Defendant's motion to disqualify the trial judge, who sentenced Defendant to death, from presiding over Defendant's post-conviction relief proceeding, as Defendant failed to establish disqualifying bias or prejudice on the part of the judge; (2) clearly err in denying Defendant's eight claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (3) err in denying an evidentiary hearing on Defendant's claim that Missouri's death penalty was unconstitutional.

This was the fifth action to come before the Supreme Court involving murders committed in 1996 by Carman Deck. Deck filed this Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15 post-conviction proceeding, asserting (1) his counsel at the penalty phase of his capital murder trial was ineffective for failing to call certain witnesses and for other alleged deficient performance, and (2) the motion court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Rule 29.15 relief and the denial of Deck's request for a new trial, holding (1) the motion court did not clearly err in finding that counsel was not ineffective; and (2) Deck was not entitled to a new trial based on the trial court's alleged destruction of juror questionnaires.

After a bench trial, Elton Norfolk was found guilty of one count of unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon and one count of possession of marijuana. Norfolk appealed, arguing that the circuit court clearly erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence and his objections to the admission of evidence seized because the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him and check for a weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that Forfolk's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, the evidence seized was properly admitted, and there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions.

Zane Valentine pleaded guilty to one count of child molestation in the first degree and three counts of statutory sodomy in the second degree. The plea agreement provided that Valentine would be placed in the Sex Offender Assessment Unit (SOAU), and the circuit court stated it would retain jurisdiction over Valentine for 120 days while he was assessed. The circuit court then sentenced Valentine. The SOAU later recommended the circuit court grant Valentine probation. More than 120 days after Valentine was sentenced the circuit court entered an order denying Valentine's release on probation. On reconsideration, the circuit court found that Valentine had not completed a "program" as defined in Mo. Rev. Stat. 559.115, and therefore, the court had authority to deny Valentine probation after the statutory time limits set forth in the statue had passed. The Supreme Court granted Valentine a writ of mandamus and ordered the circuit court to release Valentine on probation, holding (1) the SOAU is a 120-day program under section 559.115; and (2) therefore, the circuit court abused its discretion by denying Valentine's release on probation when the order was entered beyond the statutory time limits set forth in section 559.115.

Respondent Danny Vaughn was charged with one count of burglary and one count of harassment. Both charges contained harassment elements. Upon a motion by Respondent, the motion court dismissed both counts, concluding that Mo. Rev. Stat. 565.090.1(5) and 565.090.1(6) were vague and overbroad. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) section 565.090.1(5) criminalizes communication protected by the First Amendment and is unconstitutionally overbroad; but (2) as construed, section 565.090.1(6) is not overly broad, provides a reasonable notice of the conduct it prohibits, and provides a sufficiently concrete standard so as to mitigate the potential for arbitrary enforcement.

After a jury trial, Vincent McFadden was found guilty of first-degree murder and armed criminal action. Consistent with the jury's recommendation, McFadden was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in limiting the testimony of a defense witness; (2) McFadden was not subjected to double jeopardy; (3) the trial court did not err in striking a venireperson for cause or in denying McFadden's Batson challenge as to a venireperson; (4) the trial court did not plainly err during the guilt phase of McFadden's trial in admitting certain testimony; (5) the trial court properly instructed the jury; (6) the State did not violate McFadden's due process rights during all phases of the trial; (7) the trial court did not improperly admit hearsay into evidence; and (8) the imposition of the death penalty met the statutory requirements.

David Liberty was convicted of one felony count of first-degree promoting child pornography and eight felony counts of first-degree possession of child pornography. Liberty alleged that the evidence the State presented to insufficient to convict him of the charges. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Liberty's conviction for promoting child pornography and one of his convictions for possession of child pornography, as the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict; but (2) reversed the remaining convictions for possession of child pornography, holding that the imposition of eight separate sentences for one instance of possession violated Liberty's constitutional protections against double jeopardy, as Mo. Rev. Stat. 573.037 did not ambiguously permit separate prosecutions for each image a defendant simultaneously possessed. This holding, however, did not preclude the State from retrying Liberty on the reversed charges, as double jeopardy principles did not bar Liberty's retrial. Remanded.