Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of stealing property of a value of more than $500. As part of the plea agreement, Cooper waived his right to file any future motion for post-conviction relief under Mo. R. Crim. P. 24.035 in exchange for the State recommending a fifteen-year sentence on each count to run concurrently with a suspended execution of the sentences and a five-year probationary term. The circuit court rendered judgment and sentences in accord with the plea agreement. After Defendant violated the terms of his probation, his fifteen-year sentences were ordered executed. Defendant subsequently filed a Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief, alleging that defense counsel was ineffective. The motion court overruled the motion on the merits. The Supreme Court vacated the motion court's judgment, holding that Defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his post-conviction rights. Remanded with instructions to dismiss Defendant's post-conviction motion.

The State filed a felony complaint charging Melvin Davis, a registered sex offender, with violating Mo. Rev. Stat. 566.150 for knowingly being present within 500 feet of a public park that contains playground equipment or a public swimming pool. Davis moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that section 566.150 was unconstitutional as applied to him because it violated the prohibition against retrospective laws in Mo. Const. art. I, 13. The trial court dismissed the complaint against Davis, holding that because the statute was not enacted until after Davis's original guilty plea, the statute placed a new disability on Davis based on a prior conviction and, therefore, was unconstitutionally retrospective in operation. On appeal, the State argued the constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws in art. I, 13 did not apply to section 566.150 because it was criminal in nature and the prohibition applied only to civil statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State's issue on appeal was not properly preserved for appellate review.

William Foster was convicted of capital murder, first-degree robbery, and armed criminal action. Many years later, the department of corrections informed Foster that any funds deposited into his prison account to pay for college correspondence courses or an attorney would be subject to seizure by the state, pursuant to the Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act (MIRA). Foster filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that MIRA could not be applied to require reimbursement from him for the cost of his incarceration because the criminal acts that resulted in his incarceration were committed prior to the law's enactment. The trial court dismissed Foster's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts alleged in Foster's petition were not developed sufficiently to give rise to a ripe controversy because the petition did not allege that Foster would receive sufficient assets to trigger the state's authority to seek reimbursement under MIRA.

Appellant Daniel Primm was convicted of four counts of second-degree statutory rape, three counts of second-degree statutory sodomy, and three counts of misdemeanor second-degree child molestation. Each count related to the acts appellant committed against his grandniece, T.B.. Appellant appealed, arguing (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting, over objection, evidence that appellant had committed uncharged sex crimes against T.B. and another grandniece, R.C., and had given R.C. marijuana; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support appellant's conviction for one count of second-degree statutory rape. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence, and (2) there was sufficient evidence of penetration, taken together with the reasonable inferences therefrom, to support each count of statutory rape.

Defendant Maura Celis-Garcia was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree statutory sodomy. The defendant appealed, asserting that (1) the trial court violated her constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict because, although the state presented evidence of multiple, separate acts of hand-to-genital contact committed against her two minor daughters, the verdict directors failed to require the jury to agree to the specific acts she committed to find her guilty of a single count of statutory sodomy against each daughter; and (2) the trial court erred by overruling her objections to certain testimony by two expert witnesses because the testimony improperly vouched for the credibility of the victims, thereby invading the province of the jury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the trial court failed to instruct the jury it had to agree on the same act or acts of hand-to-genital contact the defendant committed in finding her guilty of statutory sodomy, her right to a unanimous jury verdict was violated. Because the defendant's conviction was reversed on the basis of her first point, the Court did not address her second point. Remanded.

Plaintiffs Michelle Schaefer, Cindy Brandt, and Dale Price were charged with intoxication-related driving offenses, and each plaintiff had prior convictions for intoxication-related driving offenses. The plaintiffs filed a consolidated petition for a declaratory judgment, asserting that the provisions of Mo. Rev. Stat. 577.023 that pertain to enhanced penalties for individuals with multiple prior convictions for intoxication-related driving offenses violate the Missouri Constitution. The circuit court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, each plaintiff had an adequate remedy of law. The Court concluded that an alternative remedy to a declaratory judgment action for each plaintiff would be litigating the constitutional issues in each separate criminal case.

Appellant Anthony Brown appealed his convictions for firearms charges and second-degree murder. At trial, Appellant claimed self-defense. During closing arguments, the trial court permitted the State to use a âpropâ gun to rebut Appellantâs self-defense argument. The State used the gun to show that the victim could not have carried and drawn the gun as Appellant had asserted. There was no evidence that the gun that was used as an exhibit in the Stateâs closing argument was similar in size or shape to the victimâs gun. During deliberations, the jury asked to see the âprop.â The trial court denied the request because the prop was not evidence. Upon review of the trial records, the Supreme Court found that the State âshould not have been able to bypass normal evidentiary limitationsâ by showing the gun to the jury: âthe Stateâs closing argument demonstration was necessarily speculative and carried with it the distinct possibility of misleading the jury . . . Under these circumstances, there is a substantial likelihood that the juryâs decision was influenced by the improper demonstration.â Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial courtâs judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

A jury found Appellant Donald Nash guilty of capital murder for the 1982 killing of Judy Spencer. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole or probation for 50 years. Appellant argued on appeal that he was wrongly convicted under a section of state law that had been repealed in 1983, and that no other statute replaced it that criminalized the murder for which he was charged. Furthermore, Appellant argued that he was convicted on insufficient evidence at trial, because the trial court excluded his evidence that someone else committed the murder. The Supreme Court was not persuaded by Appellantâs interpretation of the statute in question, finding that âthe apparent purpose of the 1983 enactment of the new section . . . was to make clear that an offense committed in 1982 should be charged and prosecuted according to the laws existing in 1982â and not after the changes were enacted. The Court also found that the evidence presented at Appellantâs trial was sufficient to support the jury verdict against him. The Court affirmed Appellantâs conviction and sentence.