Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, a defendant was charged with two counts of sexual intercourse without consent and one count of sexual assault, all involving minor victims. The events took place in a home where the defendant lived with his partner and her family. The allegations involved three minors: A.M., K.E., and K.K., who reported inappropriate sexual contact by the defendant on different occasions between 2015 and 2018. K.K., the youngest, disclosed the abuse to her parents shortly after spending the night at the defendant’s home, but during trial, she could not recall the events or her prior statements. The prosecution introduced K.K.’s earlier statements to her parents and a forensic interviewer, which described specific acts of sexual assault.The Eighth Judicial District Court, presiding over Cascade County, denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss one count (involving K.K.), finding that there was sufficient corroborative evidence to support K.K.’s prior inconsistent statements. The corroborative evidence included the immediate and distressed reaction of K.K.’s parents, the timing of K.K.’s disclosures, and the child’s demeanor in her forensic interview. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts. Nearly a year and a half later, the defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that irregularities in the jury selection process violated Montana law. The District Court denied this motion as untimely and found no evidence that the jury was not a fair cross-section of the community or that the selection process had affected the trial’s fairness.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that reliable, independent corroborative evidence supported K.K.’s prior inconsistent statements, satisfying the evidentiary requirements. The Court also held that technical violations in the jury selection process did not render the trial unfair or the jury unrepresentative. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s rulings and the defendant’s convictions. View "State v. French" on Justia Law

A 45-year-old man encountered a 15-year-old girl, T.K., and her friends at a house party in Butte, Montana. Over two occasions, he purchased alcohol for them. On the night in question, after drinking heavily, T.K. and another friend asked the man for a ride to get more alcohol. He drove them to a gas station, bought whiskey, and later drove them back to Butte. T.K. was heavily intoxicated and, after a series of events including sexual activity in the car involving the man and another adult, T.K. was ultimately taken by the man to his hotel. Surveillance footage showed him carrying an unconscious and limp T.K. into the hotel. She woke later, confused, missing clothes, and feeling sore. A hospital exam found injuries and DNA matching the man. T.K. was underage and highly intoxicated.The State of Montana charged the man with sexual intercourse without consent. At trial in the Second Judicial District Court in Butte-Silver Bow County, the prosecution presented evidence of T.K.’s incapacity due to age and intoxication. The jury was given a stipulation regarding the mental state required (“knowingly”) that used an incorrect, result-based definition. The jury returned a guilty verdict, specifically finding that the man was guilty because T.K. was under 16 and because she was incapacitated.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the defendant argued the erroneous jury instruction violated his rights and that his counsel was ineffective for agreeing to it. The Court held that, although the instruction was incorrect, the evidence at trial clearly demonstrated the defendant’s awareness of T.K.’s incapacity. Therefore, he was not prejudiced by the error. The Court declined to exercise plain error review and also rejected the ineffective assistance claim for lack of prejudice. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Davisson" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple felonies, including Incest, Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence, and sixteen counts of Sexual Abuse of Children. He entered a binding plea agreement to plead guilty to four counts of Sexual Abuse of Children in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges and a net sentence of forty years, with twenty suspended. At the plea hearing, the defendant affirmed he understood the agreement, had discussed it with counsel, and was entering his plea voluntarily without coercion. Several weeks later, he sent communications to the court and the State, asserting that his prior counsel had pressured him into accepting the plea.Following these communications, attorney McKittrick formally replaced attorney Martin as defense counsel. The Eighth Judicial District Court held a hearing to address the defendant’s request for substitution of counsel, applying the standards from State v. Johnson, 2019 MT 34. At the hearing, the defendant claimed he had been pressured by his previous attorney, referencing conversations about sentencing risks. McKittrick, present during those discussions, described them as a standard risk-versus-reward analysis, not coercion. The District Court found no actual conflict of interest, irreconcilable conflict, or complete breakdown in communication warranting substitution and denied the request.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying substitution of counsel. Applying the abuse of discretion standard and reviewing the procedures and analysis used below, the Supreme Court found the District Court conducted an adequate inquiry and properly applied settled law. The main holding is that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for substitution of counsel because the concerns raised did not amount to an actual conflict, irreconcilable conflict, or complete breakdown in communication. The decision of the District Court was affirmed. View "State v. Carlin" on Justia Law

Joseph Dwayne Matt was a passenger in Levi Gadaire’s vehicle when it was stopped by law enforcement for erratic driving. Both Matt and Gadaire were probationers, and Matt was flagged as an absconder with an active warrant for his arrest. During the stop, Gadaire admitted to recent methamphetamine use, which led to a search of the vehicle. Officers discovered multiple bags of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in the center console. Matt was charged with criminal possession of a dangerous drug with intent to distribute by accountability, and criminal possession of drug paraphernalia.The case proceeded to trial in the Montana First Judicial District Court, Broadwater County. The State’s evidence included testimony from the reporting driver, law enforcement officers, body cam footage, surveillance video, and phone records. Gadaire, who had given multiple inconsistent statements during the investigation, testified that Matt was present during the drug pick-up but later recanted aspects of his testimony. At the close of the State’s case, Matt moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the State’s evidence was insufficient because it relied on uncorroborated accomplice testimony. The District Court denied the motion, and the jury found Matt guilty of criminal possession of a dangerous drug, but not guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court erred in denying Matt’s motion for a directed verdict due to insufficient corroborating evidence. The Supreme Court held that the State failed to provide independent evidence connecting Matt to the crime, apart from Gadaire’s testimony. Mere presence in the vehicle did not meet the statutory requirement for corroboration. The Supreme Court reversed Matt’s conviction, remanded the case, and ordered the District Court to vacate the judgment and dismiss the charges. View "State v. Matt" on Justia Law

Three men, including Andre Anthony, entered a Family Dollar Store in Hardin, Montana, and over about ten minutes, one of the men fraudulently completed three transactions at the computerized cash register by pressing the “cash received” button without providing payment. Surveillance video showed Anthony standing near the register, at times distracting the store attendant, while the fraudulent transactions occurred. The men left with three gift cards and a bottle of body wash, totaling $1,512.35. Law enforcement later detained the men and found receipts and merchandise matching the transactions in their vehicle. The store attendant misidentified Anthony as the man who pressed the register button, but Anthony was arrested and charged.Initially, Anthony was charged in Hardin City Court with shoplifting, but the charges were amended to unlawful use of a computer by accountability. After posting bail, Anthony returned to Michigan and requested to appear at hearings by video, which was sometimes permitted. At trial, Anthony appeared by video, but the court denied his request to testify by video after the prosecution rested. The City Court found Anthony guilty on all three counts. On appeal, the District Court for the Twenty-Second Judicial District affirmed the convictions and sentence, finding sufficient evidence and no reversible error in the denial of Anthony’s request to testify by video.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. It held that the evidence was sufficient to support Anthony’s convictions for unlawful use of a computer by accountability, as his actions and presence supported a finding that he aided or abetted the offenses. However, the Supreme Court found that the City Court abused its discretion by allowing Anthony to appear by video for trial but then denying his request to testify by video without clear explanation. The Supreme Court reversed Anthony’s convictions and remanded for a new trial on all counts. View "City of Hardin v. Anthony" on Justia Law

The case concerns an incident in which the defendant was accused of engaging in sexual intercourse without consent with the complainant, K.R., who had spent the afternoon and evening drinking at several bars. The two were acquaintances and exchanged messages on Facebook, with K.R. inviting the defendant to her home. K.R. later testified that she did not remember the events after leaving the bar, including her communications with the defendant, driving home, or leaving her door unlocked. She recalled regaining awareness during a sexual encounter at her home, at which point she told the man to stop. The defendant asserted that he did not know K.R. was unable to consent, pointing to her actions and communications as evidence that she appeared functional.The Second Judicial District Court of Montana presided over the trial. The court excluded evidence of K.R.’s past alcohol use and denied the defense’s request to present expert testimony on the effects of regular alcohol consumption. The court also instructed the jury that the defendant could be found guilty if he was aware of a “high probability” that K.R. was unable to consent, rather than requiring actual knowledge. The jury found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to twenty years in prison, with five years suspended.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the district court’s jury instruction on the mental state required for conviction and its exclusion of certain evidence constituted reversible error. The Supreme Court held that the district court erred by giving a result-based instruction for “knowingly,” which lowered the State’s burden of proof and violated the defendant’s due process rights. The court also found no abuse of discretion in excluding evidence of K.R.’s past drinking habits or the expert testimony as offered. The conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Law enforcement in Lewistown, Montana, investigated David Allen Pein for suspected marijuana distribution in 2016, using a confidential informant to conduct controlled purchases. A search of Pein’s residence yielded marijuana, paraphernalia, cash, and other evidence. Pein was charged with nine counts related to possession and distribution of marijuana. In 2017, Pein entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to one count of felony Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs with Intent to Distribute (Count VI), while six other charges were dismissed. Two additional counts—felony Criminal Distribution of Dangerous Drugs (Count IV) and felony Use or Possession of Property Subject to Criminal Forfeiture (Count VIII)—were subject to a deferred prosecution agreement incorporated by reference into the plea agreement.The Tenth Judicial District Court deferred Pein’s sentence on Count VI. After Pein violated the terms of his deferred sentence and deferred prosecution agreement, the State reinstated prosecution on Counts IV and VIII. Pein was convicted by a jury on these counts in 2024 and sentenced to concurrent prison terms. Pein appealed, challenging the validity of incorporating a deferred prosecution agreement into a plea agreement, as well as the classification of marijuana as a Schedule I drug.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that Montana’s plea agreement statute (§ 46-12-211, MCA) does not authorize the incorporation of a deferred prosecution agreement under the pretrial diversion statute (§ 46-16-130, MCA) into a plea agreement. The Court vacated Pein’s convictions for Counts IV and VIII and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed Pein’s conviction on Count VI, rejecting his argument that marijuana is incorrectly classified as a Schedule I drug. The disposition was affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part. View "State v. Pein" on Justia Law

Mark French, representing himself, was convicted of a misdemeanor in the Sanders County Justice Court, which is not a court of record. He appealed the conviction to the Montana Twentieth Judicial District Court for a trial de novo. After Judge John W. Larson assumed jurisdiction over the appeal, French moved to disqualify him, citing perceived injustices related to the rescheduling of the trial. When that motion was denied, French filed an alternative motion for substitution of judge under Montana law.The Montana Supreme Court previously denied French’s motion to disqualify Judge Larson, finding the issue moot because the trial date had been vacated. The Supreme Court also clarified that Judge Larson had jurisdiction to determine the timeliness of French’s subsequent motion for substitution. Judge Larson then denied French’s motion for substitution, relying on precedent from D.H. v. Montana Fourth Judicial District Court, which addressed substitution in a different context. French then petitioned the Montana Supreme Court for supervisory control, arguing that his substitution motion was timely and authorized, that his right to a jury trial was denied, and that the District Court improperly relied on the Justice Court record.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that, when a criminal case is appealed from a justice court that is not a court of record for a trial de novo, the appellant is entitled to one substitution of a district judge under § 3-1-804, MCA, as if the case had originated in district court. The Court reversed the District Court’s denial of French’s motion for substitution and remanded for further proceedings. The Court also found that the Justice Court record was properly transferred and relied upon. French’s request for dismissal of the District Court proceeding was denied. View "French v. 20th Judicial District" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of sexual intercourse without consent in 2017 and sentenced to 40 years in prison, with 20 years suspended. After an appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the conviction due to the improper admission of statistical evidence and remanded for a new trial. While awaiting retrial, the defendant was released on bail, returned to work, and cared for his mother. At the second trial, both parties presented expert witnesses who testified about general behaviors of sexual assault victims, but did not opine on the specific facts of the case. The State’s expert, Dr. Vanino, remained in the courtroom during the defense expert’s testimony, in violation of a witness exclusion order. The District Court allowed Dr. Vanino to be recalled as a rebuttal witness, and the defense was permitted to recall its own expert in response.After the second conviction, a new psychological evaluation indicated the defendant had made progress in treatment and matured. At resentencing, the defendant requested a sentence consistent with a prior plea offer, while the State sought a harsher sentence. The District Court increased the sentence to 50 years with 30 years suspended, citing the defendant’s decision to appeal, retry the case, lack of remorse, and the impact on the victim.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed two main issues. First, it held that the District Court erred in interpreting Montana Rule of Evidence 615 to categorically exempt expert witnesses from exclusion orders, but found the error harmless because both parties’ experts were allowed to rebut each other and neither testified to case-specific facts. Second, the Court held that the increased sentence after retrial violated due process, as it was based on the defendant’s exercise of constitutional rights and not on new, objective information. The Court affirmed the conviction, reversed the increased sentence, and remanded for amendment of the judgment to restore the original suspended term. View "State v. Grimshaw" on Justia Law

A man was involved in a single-vehicle accident in Gallatin County, Montana, where his Jeep left the road, struck a sign, and then drove away. Witnesses reported the incident, and law enforcement traced the vehicle to the man’s residence using the license plate information. Upon arrival, officers observed damage to the Jeep and encountered the man, who exhibited signs of impairment such as bloodshot eyes and a dazed demeanor. The man admitted to purchasing and inhaling a can of Dust-Off, a product containing difluoroethane (DFE), and acknowledged that he had passed out while driving. Field sobriety tests indicated impairment, and a subsequent blood test confirmed the presence of DFE.The Gallatin County Justice Court denied the man’s motions to suppress evidence, which alleged a lack of particularized suspicion, unlawful search and seizure, and a Miranda violation. After a bench trial, the court found him guilty of misdemeanor DUI (third offense). The Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, affirmed the conviction and the denial of the suppression motions, concluding that law enforcement had particularized suspicion, that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the driveway or the exterior of the Jeep, and that no custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings had occurred.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. It held that law enforcement had particularized suspicion to investigate for DUI based on the totality of the circumstances, including the crash, the man’s behavior, and his admissions. The Court found no unlawful search or seizure, as there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas searched, and the man voluntarily provided the Dust-Off can. The Court also determined that no custodial interrogation occurred before arrest, so Miranda warnings were not required. The Court declined to address an unpreserved evidentiary claim and found sufficient evidence supported the DUI conviction. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Ellis" on Justia Law