Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana upheld the decision of the Montana First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, committing the appellant, C.M., a youth, to the custody of the Department of Corrections for placement in a state youth correctional facility until the age of 18. The appellant was charged with sex offenses against three of his high school classmates and he appealed the decision on the grounds that he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to make objections to the admission of various hearsay statements.The court concluded that the appellant's counsel's failure to object to the admission of hearsay statements did not result in substantial prejudice. The court noted that the state presented sufficient admissible evidence to the jury that proved the same facts as the prior consistent statements and bus records. Furthermore, the court found that the appellant's counsel vigorously challenged the complaining witnesses' testimony by highlighting inconsistencies and gaps in their testimony, as well as aspects of the investigation. As a result, the court found that the appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficient performance by his counsel and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Matter of C.M" on Justia Law

In the case, Jose Martinez Jr. was convicted by a jury in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, for two counts of incest, criminal distribution of dangerous drugs, solicitation to commit tampering with witnesses or informants, and three counts of criminal contempt. This case arose from allegations by Martinez's stepdaughter, S.M., that he had been sexually abusing her since she was 10 years old. The trial court allowed the admission of statements made by S.M. to a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) and a physician, despite Martinez's objection that their admission violated his right of confrontation as S.M. was not present to testify at the trial.The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed Martinez's conviction. It held that S.M.'s statements to the physician were nontestimonial and made for purposes of medical treatment, and thus, were admissible under Montana Rule of Evidence 803(4). However, the court found that S.M.'s statements to the SANE were testimonial and their admission violated Martinez's right to confrontation. Nevertheless, the court ruled that this error was harmless given other evidence produced at trial and because the SANE's testimony was cumulative.The court's decision reflected the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements in the context of the right to confrontation, and the admissibility of statements for purposes of medical treatment under the rules of evidence. The court also demonstrated the application of the harmless error doctrine in the context of a Confrontation Clause violation. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

This case involves an appeal by Bryce Caleb Hamernick, against his conviction for Sexual Intercourse Without Consent (SIWOC) in the Fourth Judicial District Court. The Supreme Court of Montana considered whether the District Court erred in instructing the jury that to find Hamernick guilty, it needed to determine that he was simply aware of the high probability that the victim did not consent to the sexual intercourse.The court's decision mainly revolved around the interpretation of the term "knowingly" used in the Montana Code Annotated (MCA) to define the mental state required for the crime of SIWOC. The District Court had used two different definitions of "knowingly" for the two elements of the crime. For the act of sexual intercourse, the court used the "conduct-based" definition, that Hamernick must have been aware of his conduct. For the element of "without consent," the court instructed that Hamernick must have been aware of a high probability that the sexual intercourse was without consent, which the appellant argued lowered the state's burden of proof.The Supreme Court of Montana found that the District Court erred in its instruction. It held that the crime of SIWOC is a conduct-based offense, necessitating an "awareness of conduct" mental state. The court stated that the crime does not consist of sexual intercourse with a high probability the other person does not consent; rather, it is sexual intercourse with the awareness that it is without that person’s consent. The Supreme Court of Montana thus reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "State v. Hamernick" on Justia Law

In the State of Montana v. Sky M. Little Coyote, the Supreme Court of Montana dealt with an appeal by Little Coyote, who had been incarcerated and was appealing the revocation of his suspended sentence. Little Coyote argued that his time served had been incorrectly calculated and that, when correctly accounted for, his sentence had already expired before the State filed its revocation petition. The State argued that Little Coyote was bound by an agreement he had entered into regarding the time served.The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for dismissal of the State's Petition for Revocation. The court found that Little Coyote's time served had indeed been inaccurately calculated. It ruled that the parties involved had been operating under a mutual mistake regarding the time Little Coyote had served. The court held that, when correctly calculated and credited, Little Coyote's sentence had expired nearly three months before the State filed its revocation petition. Thus, the disposition imposed on Little Coyote was deemed illegal as the lower court had lacked the authority to revoke or impose a disposition after the expiration of his sentence. View "State v. Little Coyote" on Justia Law

The case involves Tylor Buttolph who appealed his conviction of stalking. Buttolph had been charged with eight counts of felony stalking, allegedly occurring between October 17, 2019, and April 6, 2020. For each count of stalking, the State listed only one act of misconduct. However, the stalking statute requires a "course of conduct" involving two or more acts. The State used evidence of prior, uncharged conduct to prove the "course of conduct" element.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the conviction. The court held that Buttolph's constitutional right to due process was violated when the State used an act not charged in the information to prove "course of conduct" for the offense of stalking. The court reasoned that the State cannot shift its theory of criminality on the day of trial without violating Buttolph's fundamental right to due process. The charging document was silent as to the second act constituting the course of conduct element of the offense, and thus, there was no "statement of facts constituting the offense charged". View "State v. Buttolph" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the defendant, Joshua Richard Larson, appealed the revocation of his suspended sentence by the Fourth Judicial District Court. Larson argued that the revocation proceeding should have been dismissed with prejudice due to his first appearance in court occurring sixty-six days after his arrest, exceeding the statutory 60-day limit. The District Court acknowledged the delay but dismissed the revocation petition without prejudice, leading to the State refiling the petition, Larson admitting the allegations, and the court revoking his suspended sentence.The Supreme Court of Montana sided with the lower court, affirming its decision. It held that Larson’s initial appearance before the Justice Court on the same day he was served with the warrant fulfilled the requirements of the statute. Although this appearance was not before the District Court, the justices ruled that this didn't materially affect Larson's substantial rights. Therefore, the delay in his appearance before the District Court didn't violate his due process rights. The Supreme Court also concluded that Larson wasn't prejudiced by the delay, and so the District Court didn't err in refusing to dismiss the petition with prejudice. View "State v. Larson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment entered by the district court following a jury trial in which Defendant was found guilty of criminal mischief and sentenced to six days in jail but with a deferred sentence conditioned upon successful completion of probation and payment of restitution over four years, holding that the district court erred in the determination of the amount of restitution to be imposed.A jury found Defendant guilty of criminal mischief for breaking and damaging parts of vehicles belonging to Douglas Nelsen and Keith Nelsen. After a sentencing hearing, the district court ordered restitution in the amount of $11420.13, including $1,222 for the Dakota and Sentra, $5,219.98 for the Ford Mustang, $1,850 for the Astro, $3,125 for the Grand Prix, and $105.15 in costs for a rental car. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err by concluding that restitution could be imposed for all the damage that was alleged under the single count of criminal mischief; but (2) erred in the determination of the amount of restitution to be imposed for damage to the Mustang. View "State v. Arthun" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and order transferring jurisdiction of this matter involving H.R. from youth court to district court, imposing a Department of Corrections (DOC) commitment, auditing two years of supervision to the disposition, and requiring H.R. to register as a sex offender, holding that there was no error.The youth court revoked H.R.'s probation and committed him to the DOC for placement. Upon turning eighteen, H.R. was released, and the State sought to transfer jurisdiction from youth court to district court and to order the supervisory responsibility to transfer from juvenile probation services to adult probation services. The youth court transferred jurisdiction to the district court and supervisory responsibility to adult probation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the youth court exceeded the bounds of its authority under Mont. Code Ann. 41-5-208 because it imposed a new disposition on H.R. in addition to the transfer of jurisdiction and supervision agency because such a new disposition was not available under section 41-5-208. View "State v. H.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant, holding that the district court did not err in determining that there was probable cause Defendant committed a crime that allowed the State to withdraw from the plea agreement and relieved the State's obligation to make a particular sentencing recommendation.Defendant pled guilty to assault with a weapon, criminal endangerment, and theft pursuant to a plea agreement. The State recommended a twenty-year sentence with no time suspended and treatment of Defendant as a persistent felony offender (PFO). Prior to sentencing, the State informed Defendant that it would withdraw from its plea agreement recommendation based on alleged crimes Defendant committed while in custody. The district court ultimately permitted the State to diverge from its sentencing recommendation in the plea agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that Defendant waived his right to challenge the timeliness of the PFO notice; and (2) did not err in determining that Defendant had breached the plea agreement and that the State was entitled to withdraw from the guilty plea and recommend a harsher sentence. View "State v. Claus" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's felony sentence imposed in connection with his conviction for felony driving under the influence (DUI) per se, holding that the presentence investigation report (PSI) in this case did not constitute competent proof if its accuracy is challenged.The district court found Defendant guilty of DUI per se and filed a PSI. The district court relied on the PSI and ordered a felony sentence of five years' incarceration with three years suspended. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for resentencing, holding that Defendant's sentence was unlawful because the district court erred by taking the disputed PSI, without further of Defendant's prior convictions, as competent proof of Defendant's prior convictions. View "State v. Letherman" on Justia Law