Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to DUI per se. Defendant appealed the municipal court’s denial of her motion to suppress blood test results on the ground that, by remaining silent, she did not voluntarily consent to the blood test. The district court affirmed, ruling that Defendant consented to the blood draw pursuant to Montana’s implied consent law, Mont. Code Ann. 61-8-402(1), and that the municipal court did not err by finding that she did not withdraw that consent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s passive compliance to the blood test was insufficient to constitute a withdrawal of her implied consent; and (2) therefore, the municipal court correctly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress her blood test results. View "City of Great Falls v. Allderdice" on Justia Law

After responding to a 911 call, a police officer spoke to Bridge Rogers, who told the officer that Rick Strobel, her husband, hit her in the face and tried to force her into a pickup truck. The City of Helena charged Strobel with partner or family member assault (PFMA). At trial, Rogers recanted her prior statement to the police. The municipal court denied Strobel’s motion to dismiss the charges for insufficient evidence and convicted him. The district court affirmed the conviction, concluding that sufficient evidence existed to support a finding that Strobel was guilty of PFMA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the municipal court reasonably could have found every element of the crime of PFMA beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore, the district court did not err in affirming Strobel’s conviction. View "City of Helena v. Strobel" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with sexual abuse of children and sexual assault. The jury found Defendant guilty of sexual abuse of children but hung on the charge of sexual assault. At a second trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of the sexual assault charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by denying Defendant’s requests for substitution of counsel; (2) did not violate Defendant’s confrontation rights by excluding evidence pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-511(2); (3) did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Juror No. 5 in the second trial; and (4) properly instructed the jury when it utilized the pattern unanimity instruction from the Montana Pattern Jury Instructions. View "State v. Aguado" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to felony possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute, felony possession of dangerous drugs, and misdemeanor possession of dangerous drugs. The district court sentenced Defendant to 100 years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court violated his right to due process by impermissibly considering an unproved allegation of rape in making its sentencing decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the jailhouse rape allegation did not form the basis for Defendant’s sentence, and therefore, Defendant failed to meet his burden of showing that the court premised its sentencing decision on “materially inaccurate or prejudicial” information. View "State v. Sherman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of deliberate homicide under the felony murder rule. Defendant was sentenced to life without parole. The district court also sentenced Defendant to pay costs of defense, prosecution, and jury selection. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but reversed the sentence to pay costs, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior acts under Mont. R. Evid. 404(b) and 403; but (2) the district court erred in sentencing Defendant to pay costs of assigned defense, prosecution, and jury selection based on purely speculative information about his ability to pay. View "State v. Madplume" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with deliberate homicide in the death of her infant daughter. Defendant moved to suppress the results of a police interrogation, asserting that her admissions that she had shaken her daughter were not voluntary. The district court denied the motion to suppress. A jury found Defendant not guilty of deliberate homicide but guilty of felony assault on a minor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based upon the totality of the circumstances, the district court erred by concluding that the interrogation was not unduly coercive or manipulative and by concluding that Defendant was “fully cognizant” of her situation; and (2) therefore, the State failed to meet its burden of proving that Defendant’s admissions were voluntary, and the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress. View "State v. Eskew" on Justia Law

On February 13, 2009, Defendant was charged with motor vehicle offenses. On May 21, 2009, the justice court issued a warrant for Defendant’s arrest for failing to appear. On April 13, 2012, Defendant was arrested on the warrant. Defendant pled not guilty, and trial was set for August 23, 2012. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him for lack of a speedy trial. The justice court concluded that while there was a lengthy delay of 1288 days between the initial charges and the trial date, Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial had not been violated. Defendant then pled guilty to driving with a suspended license. The district court upheld the justice court’s determination that Defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, Defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial. View "State v. Eystad" on Justia Law

On August 3, 2013, Defendant was charged with criminal endangerment, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and other offenses. On March 12, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges for lack of a speedy trial. The trial court denied the motion. On April 20, 2015, Defendant’s trial commenced. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial where (1) while the State bore some responsibility for the days of delay beyond the 200-delay threshold, the primary responsibility for this delay lay with Defendant; and (2) the overall balancing clearly weighed against Defendant’s claim. View "State v. Stewart" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of deliberate homicide. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion by instructing the jury on justifiable use of force in defense of a person; (2) did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant’s motions to change venue based on pretrial publicity; (3) did not abuse its discretion when it declined to remove a prospective juror for cause based on her marriage to a former police officer; (4) did not abuse its discretion when it admitted rebuttal evidence of Defendant’s bad character to rebut evidence of Defendant’s good character; and (5) abused its discretion when it allowed lay opinion testimony regarding blood spatter evidence, but the error was harmless. View "State v. Kaarma" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of securities fraud. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied his right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Montana Constitution and that the district court erred when it refused his proposed jury instructions, which included language regarding exemptions to the statutes under which he was charged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial; and (2) did not err in denying Defendant a new trial on the basis that the jury was not properly instructed. View "State v. Reynolds" on Justia Law