Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner pled guilty to four counts of felony Sexual Intercourse Without Consent and two counts of felony Sexual Assault. On appeal, petitioner challenges the district court's holding that all of petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were either procedurally barred or failed to state a claim. The court concluded that, although petitioner's suppression claims are barred by the procedural and substantive requirements for postconviction petitions, his claims regarding a writ of supervisory control and double jeopardy are not; under the state law when petitioner's trial and appellate counsel defended petitioner, neither provided ineffective assistance regarding the writ of supervisory control and double jeopardy issues; the district court correctly determined that petitioner failed to state a claim for relief in his petition and, as such, did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to hold an evidentiary hearing; and there are no considerations requiring petitioner be appointed counsel in the interests of justice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lacey v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of assault with a weapon and driving while license suspended or revoked. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred when it denied Defendant’s request that the State be ordered to produce a videotaped witness interview based on the claim that it was work product and not exculpatory; and (2) the district court erred in imposing an information technology user surcharge per count and not per user in violation of Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-317(a). Remanded to the district court to determine the appropriate sanctions for the State’s discovery abuse. View "State v. Pope" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony theft. Defendant was sentenced to ten years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing, among several other arguments, that the prosecutor committed plain error requiring reversal by stripping Defendant of the presumption of innocence. Specifically, Defendant challenged the prosecutor’s comment during closing arguments that the presumption of innocence had been removed from Defendant. The Supreme Court agreed with Defendant. The Court reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for a new trial, holding that the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments constituted prosecutorial misconduct and required reversal of Defendant’s conviction. View "State v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with his fifth Partner Family Member Assault (PFMA) felony for conduct occurring in 2014. The State filed a notice to classify Defendant as a persistent felony offender (PFO) based on two previous PFMA convictions. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to a PFMA, a felony, and the State withdrew the PFO notice. Defendant subsequently filed a brief challenging his prior convictions and the constitutionality of Montana’s PFMA statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant waived his right to appeal the constitutionality of the prior PFMA statute. View "State v. Watts" on Justia Law

After the conclusion of a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of aggravated driving under the influence with a breath alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.239. Defendant appealed to the district court and filed a motion to suppress the evidence gathered after the vehicle he was driving was stopped by an officer of the Motor Carrier Services Division, Montana Department of Transportation (MDT). The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the MDT officer acted properly and within the requirements of law in stopping Defendant’s truck, and therefore, the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "State v. Beaver" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony obstructing justice. Defendant appealed, claiming (1) the district court improperly instructed the jury regarding the “knowing” element of obstructing justice, thus violating Defendant’s due process rights; and (2) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to submit a jury instruction defining the statutory term “knowing.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury was properly instructed on all of the elements of the offense even without an instruction defining “knowing” because the word “knowing,” within the stated elements of the offense, fulfilled a limited purpose that was commonly understood by the jurors; and (2) Defendant failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Nuessle" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony assault with a weapon. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the affirmative defense of justifiable force use of force. Specifically, Defendant argued that the instruction was inconsistent and contradictory to another instruction given on the issue of Defendant’s duty to retreat. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based upon all of the evidence Defendant and the State presented at trial, the district court properly instructed the jury on the affirmative defense of justifiable use of force. View "State v. King" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with partner or family member assault (PFMA) for physically assaulting his girlfriend. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the PFMA charge, arguing that the statute under which he was charged violated his right to equal protection because it did not apply to persons in same-sex intimate relationships. The justice court denied the motion, concluding that the statute did not violate Defendant’s right to equal protection because it does not treat similarly-situated individuals unequally. The court then found Defendant guilty. The district court affirmed, concluding that the justice court correctly analyzed Defendant’s equal protection claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the former version of the statute under which Defendant was charged violated equal protection; (2) the unconstitutional provision was unnecessary for the integrity of the law, and severing that provision leaves the remainder of the statute complete in itself; and (3) therefore, Defendant was not entitled to dismissal of his PFMA charge. View "State v. Theeler" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with two counts of theft and two counts of deceptive practices in the City Court of Red Lodge on March 26, 2014. The court ultimately set Defendant’s jury trial for October 31, 2014, nearly one month outside the six-month statutory speedy trial period. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss due to a violation of his statutory speedy trial right. The city court denied the motion, concluding that the speedy trial statute was inapplicable because Defendant had requested a new scheduling order. The court also found good cause. Defendant was subsequently found guilty of one count of deceptive practices. The district court affirmed the city court’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed the city court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that because Defendant moved to vacate the scheduling order, which included the trial date, he may not avail himself of the statutory protections afforded by Mont. Code Ann. 46-13-401(2). View "City of Red Lodge v. Pepper" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute and criminal possession of dangerous drugs/opiates. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle during a search pursuant to a search warrant, arguing that the police lacked particularized suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. The district court denied the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that the stop of Defendant was supported by a particularized suspicion that Defendant’s tail light covers violated Mont. Code Ann. 61-9-204(5). View "State v. Massey" on Justia Law