Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Nebraska Supreme Court
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John G. Strawn entered a plea agreement to plead no contest to two counts of third-degree assault. The State agreed not to mention any sexual contact in the factual basis for the charges. However, the county court found that Strawn had subjected a victim to sexual contact based on information in the presentence investigation report (PSR) and ordered him to register as a sex offender under Nebraska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA).Strawn appealed to the district court, arguing that the county court erred in requiring him to register as a sex offender because the factual basis provided by the State did not include any evidence of sexual contact. He also contended that the county court should have made a specific credibility finding and that he was denied procedural due process. Additionally, Strawn challenged the county court's advisement that his conviction might result in a federal firearms prohibition. The district court rejected Strawn's arguments and affirmed the county court's judgment.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found no merit in Strawn's arguments. The court held that SORA does not require evidence of sexual contact to be present in both the factual basis and the PSR; it is sufficient if such evidence is found in the record, which includes both the factual basis and the PSR. The court also determined that the county court was not required to make an express credibility finding and that there was sufficient evidence in the PSR to support the finding of sexual contact. The court concluded that Strawn was afforded procedural due process, as he was given notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding SORA registration. Finally, the court noted that the county court's advisement about the potential federal firearms prohibition did not impose any prohibition itself. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "State v. Strawn" on Justia Law

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Keloni Jones was involved in an altercation outside a bar in Omaha, Nebraska, where she shot and killed a security guard. She was initially charged with second-degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Under a plea agreement, the charges were amended to manslaughter and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, to which Jones pled no contest.The District Court for Douglas County initially sentenced Jones to 20 to 20 years for manslaughter and 20 years plus 1 day for possession of a deadly weapon, to be served consecutively. However, the court later realized the manslaughter sentence was invalid as it did not comply with statutory requirements. The court reconvened and modified the manslaughter sentence to 19 years 364 days to 20 years, while keeping the possession of a deadly weapon sentence unchanged.Jones appealed, arguing that the district court erred in modifying the sentence and that the sentences were excessive. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the district court had the authority to modify the invalid sentence before it was entered into the court's records. The court also found that the sentences were within statutory limits and not an abuse of discretion, considering the nature of the crime and the benefits Jones received from the plea agreement.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the modified sentences. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

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The case involves the defendant, who was convicted of first and third degree sexual assault of his stepdaughter. The assaults allegedly occurred between December 1, 2021, and February 24, 2022, in Grand Island, Hall County, Nebraska. The victim, a minor, reported the assaults to her boyfriend, who then informed school authorities, leading to the defendant's arrest. The victim testified that the assaults included both nonpenetrative and penetrative acts, with the latter occurring shortly before she disclosed the abuse.In the District Court for Hall County, the defendant filed a praecipe for a subpoena duces tecum to have a doctor testify about a medical report indicating the victim reported a sexual assault occurring approximately four months prior to March 25, 2022. The court quashed the subpoena and barred the evidence, citing a discovery violation and failure to follow proper procedures for obtaining privileged medical records. The court also denied the defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of prior sexual assaults outside the charged timeframe.The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the defendant failed to preserve the issue of the discovery sanction for appeal by not renewing the offer of proof at trial. The court also found no prejudice from the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, as the defendant did not specifically assign as error the failure to make an offer of proof at trial or to question the victim about her statement to the doctor.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the defendant adequately preserved the issue of the discovery sanction through his offer of exhibit 2 and the evidence adduced at trial. However, the court found that any error in excluding the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the defendant was able to confront the victim with similar inconsistent statements during cross-examination. The court also concluded that the defendant could not establish prejudice from the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, as the exclusion of the evidence did not materially influence the outcome of the case. View "State v. Aquino" on Justia Law

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Detron L. Perry was convicted of driving under suspension and operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. Officer Molly Coon of the Bellevue Police Department stopped Perry's vehicle after observing it driving slowly and discovering that the owner had a suspended license. Coon also noticed that the vehicle's left rear turn signal was not working properly. During the stop, Perry fled the scene, leading to his arrest later.The district court for Sarpy County denied Perry's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the stop, finding that the stop was justified based on the malfunctioning turn signal. Perry was found guilty of both charges. At sentencing, Perry was sentenced to probation, but the court did not impose a mandatory 2-year license revocation as required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-905(3)(b).The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of Perry's motion to suppress, finding that the stop was reasonable based on the observed traffic violation. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Perry's convictions for driving under suspension and operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court committed plain error by not imposing the mandatory 2-year license revocation or impoundment as required by § 28-905(3)(b).The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed Perry's convictions but vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing to include the mandatory 2-year license revocation or impoundment. View "State v. Perry" on Justia Law

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The appellant was charged with first-degree sexual assault and false imprisonment after an incident involving a 17-year-old victim, A.S., who alleged that the appellant, while intoxicated, forcibly removed her clothes and penetrated her vaginally. The incident occurred after a Fourth of July party at the home of the appellant's then-fiancée, who is also A.S.'s cousin. A.S. reported the assault the next day and underwent a forensic medical examination.The District Court for Hamilton County admitted evidence of the appellant's prior sexual assault conviction involving a 13-year-old victim, M.Z., under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-414, which allows evidence of prior sexual offenses to prove propensity. The court found similarities between the two incidents, including the ages of the victims, the use of force, and the presence of alcohol. The court also admitted a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) report prepared during A.S.'s examination, which included statements made by A.S. for medical diagnosis and treatment.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the prior sexual assault conviction, as the probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court also found that the SANE report was admissible under the business records exception and the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule. The appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the SANE report was rejected, as any objection would have been meritless.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the appellant's convictions for first-degree sexual assault and false imprisonment. View "State v. Swartz" on Justia Law

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Law enforcement officers responded to a minor two-vehicle accident and suspected that Charmayne R. Strong, an occupant of one of the vehicles, was intoxicated. After Strong refused a preliminary breath test, she was arrested and transported to law enforcement headquarters. Officers obtained a search warrant for a chemical blood test and informed Strong that refusal to submit to the test was a separate crime. Strong initially consented but later refused at the hospital, leading officers to determine she had refused the test.The State charged Strong in county court with refusal to submit to a chemical test under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197. Strong filed a motion to suppress evidence related to her arrest, which the county court overruled. Following a stipulated bench trial, the county court found Strong guilty and sentenced her to six months' probation, a 60-day license revocation, and a $500 fine. Strong appealed to the district court, arguing that one cannot be convicted of refusal to submit to a chemical test if the test is sought pursuant to a search warrant. The district court rejected her arguments and affirmed her conviction. Strong then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197(3) criminalizes the refusal to submit to a chemical blood test when the test is sought pursuant to a search warrant. The court found no constitutional barrier to Strong’s conviction, as the blood test was lawful and supported by a valid search warrant. The court affirmed Strong’s conviction. View "State v. Strong" on Justia Law

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Katrell M. Nelson was charged in two separate criminal cases with possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. He entered no contest pleas and was sentenced to identical prison terms in each case, to be served concurrently. Nelson had been in custody for a total of 241 days before sentencing, with 9 days related only to the first case and 232 days related to both cases.The district court sentenced Nelson to 6 to 10 years in prison for each case, to be served concurrently. The court applied all 241 days of jail credit to the first case and refused to apply any credit to the second case. Nelson appealed, arguing that the court erred by not applying the 232 days of credit to the second case.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court clarified that when multiple sentences are imposed contemporaneously, whether consecutively or concurrently, all available credit for time served under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,106(1) should be applied just once, to the aggregate of all terms imposed. The court found that the district court's sentencing orders were inconsistent with this principle, as they applied all available credit to only one of the concurrent sentences.The Nebraska Supreme Court modified the sentencing order in the second case to state that Nelson is entitled to 241 days of credit for time served against the aggregate of all terms imposed in both cases. The court directed the district court to modify the commitment accordingly. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

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Brant A. Geller pled no contest to three counts of possession of a controlled substance and one count of attempted possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. The district court orally pronounced his sentences and issued a written sentencing order. A few hours later, the district court issued an amended sentencing order. Geller appealed, challenging his sentences, arguing that the amended sentencing order was contrary to the oral pronouncement and that his sentences were excessive.The district court initially sentenced Geller to 6 months’ imprisonment and 12 months’ post-release supervision for each possession charge, and 18 months’ imprisonment and 12 months’ post-release supervision for the weapon charge. The court stated that the sentences for the possession charges would run concurrently, but the weapon charge would run consecutively. The written sentencing order reflected this, but the amended order clarified that the post-release supervision for the weapon charge would also run consecutively.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that when an orally pronounced sentence is ambiguous, a subsequent written sentencing order can clarify the ambiguity. The court found that the district court’s oral pronouncement was contradictory regarding whether the post-release supervision terms were to run concurrently or consecutively. The amended sentencing order clarified this ambiguity, stating that the post-release supervision for the weapon charge would run consecutively to the other charges.The court also reviewed Geller’s argument that his sentences were excessive. It found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Geller, as the sentences were within statutory limits and the court considered the appropriate factors. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "State v. Geller" on Justia Law

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The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. The incident involved the shooting death of Barbara Williams in front of an apartment complex in Omaha, Nebraska. The shooter, identified by some witnesses as the defendant, arrived in a white sedan, fired multiple shots, and fled the scene. The defendant's primary defense was an alibi, claiming he was at a barbecue at the time of the shooting. Several witnesses and photographs supported this alibi, but the State argued he could have committed the crime and arrived at the barbecue shortly after.The trial court admitted cell phone data showing the defendant searched for news about the shooting shortly after it occurred. The defendant's motion to suppress this evidence was denied. On direct appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision, finding the search warrant for the cell phone data was supported by probable cause and sufficiently particular.The defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on several grounds, including failure to object to the printouts of cell phone data, failure to adequately cross-examine witnesses, failure to challenge the investigation of an alternative suspect with dreadlocks, and failure to call a key alibi witness. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, reasoning that the defendant did not suffer prejudice from these alleged deficiencies.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the defendant's allegations, even if true, did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. The court noted that defense counsel had effectively cross-examined witnesses, challenged the State's evidence, and presented a cohesive alibi defense. The court also held that the failure to call the alibi witness, Richard, did not constitute ineffective assistance, as his testimony would not have significantly altered the evidentiary picture presented to the jury. View "State v. Goynes" on Justia Law

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Chad R. Clausen was charged with violating Nebraska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) after an investigation revealed he had been intermittently staying at his fiancé’s house without notifying authorities. Clausen was registered under SORA at an address in Douglas County, Nebraska, but law enforcement received an anonymous tip that he was residing at a Washington County address. Evidence showed that Clausen had been staying at his fiancé’s residence in Washington County for several months. Clausen admitted to staying there for three days and then returning to his registered address for three days. The district court found Clausen guilty of violating SORA, determining that he had established a habitual living location and temporary domicile at his fiancé’s house without registering.Clausen appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, arguing that the State failed to prove he established a habitual living location or temporary domicile and that the definitions of these terms were unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, interpreting the definitions in line with a federal district court decision in Doe v. Nebraska, which required a person to stay at a location for three consecutive weekdays to establish a temporary domicile. The Court of Appeals found that Clausen’s admission of staying at the Washington County residence “most nights” allowed a rational trier of fact to conclude he stayed there for three consecutive weekdays.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ interpretation. The Supreme Court held that “working days” in the context of SORA refers to Mondays through Fridays, excluding legal holidays. The Court found that there was insufficient evidence to prove Clausen stayed at the Washington County residence for three consecutive weekdays or more than three consecutive days. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed Clausen’s conviction and vacated his sentence, concluding that the State failed to prove he violated SORA’s registration requirements. View "State v. Clausen" on Justia Law