Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree sexual assault, first degree false imprisonment, strangulation, and third degree domestic assault. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Defendant later filed a motion for return of seized property. At the hearing, the State argued that Defendant had a pending postconviction motion and a pending federal prosecution for child pornography and that many of the items that Defendant pled in his motion were subject to that case. The district court denied the motion to return property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to return seized property; (2) the district judge did not abuse its discretion in failing to parse through the property and determine what portion of the seized evidence would be necessary for the pending proceedings and return the portion that would not be necessary; and (3) Defendant’s arguments that the district court judge was biased were without merit. View "State v. Buttercase" on Justia Law

In two separate cases, Defendant was convicted of two counts of possession of a controlled substance and one count of driving under the influence. In case No. S-16-419, the district court sentenced Defendant to a period of incarceration for twenty months to five years for possession of a controlled substance. In case No. S-16-425, the district court sentenced Defendant to two years’ imprisonment with twelve months of postrelease supervision for possession of a controlled substance and to six months’ incarceration for driving under the influence. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court imposed excessive sentences in both cases. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment in case No. S-16-419; (2) affirmed Defendant’s sentence for driving under the influence in case No. S-16-425; and (3) vacated Defendant’s sentence for possession of a controlled substance in case No. S-16-425 in light of the Court’s application of the doctrine enunciated in State v. Randolph to L.B. 1094. View "State v. Chacon" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to not less than two years nor more than two years in prison for possession of a controlled substance - a class IV felony - and to fifteen to twenty years in prison for possession of a stolen firearm - a Class IIA felony. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively. Defendant appealed his sentences. While his appeal was pending, a legislative bill was enacted that amended Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-2204.02 to provide that an indeterminate sentence shall be imposed for Class IV felonies imposed consecutively or concurrently with a sentence for a Class IIA felony “in accordance with the process set forth in section 29-2204.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s sentence for his Class IV felony was not plainly erroneous and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Defendant’s sentences. View "State v. Artis" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a firearm to commit a felony. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) failing to grant Defendant’s motion to suppress Defendant’s statements made to law enforcement because the statements were not obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona; (2) denying Defendant’s Batson challenge claiming that the prosecution impermissibly struck prospective jurors on the basis of race; and (3) denying Defendant’s motion for mistrial that alleged that the court improperly allowed testimony in violation of Brady v. Maryland. View "State v. Clifton" on Justia Law

When he was seventeen years old, Defendant pled guilty to first degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. Pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, Defendant’s sentence was vacated. After a hearing, Defendant was resentenced to ninety years to life imprisonment. Defendant appealed, alleging, inter alia, that his sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and the principles set forth in Miller and Graham v. Florida. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s sentence did not violate Miller; (2) Defendant’s sentence was not disproportionate; and (3) the district court adequately considered Defendant’s age and age-related characteristics and used adequate procedural safeguards when sentencing Defendant. View "State v. Nollen" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, use of a firearm to commit a felony, and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life sentence for first degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s three convictions and his life sentence for first degree murder but vacated Defendant’s sentence for the use conviction and for the possession conviction, holding (1) the trial court did not commit reversible error when it refused Defendant’s proposed jury instructions; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction for first degree murder; but (3) the district court erred when it ordered Defendant’s sentence for the use conviction to be served concurrently with his sentence for the possession conviction. View "State v. McCurry" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and two counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder conviction. After the denial of Defendant’s first motion for postconviction relief, Defendant filed a second motion for postconviction relief, alleging numerous claims. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that (1) Defendant's claims that certain jury instructions given at trial were reversible error were procedurally barred; (2) Defendant's claim that appellate counsel had a conflict of interest was procedurally barred; and (3) Defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim of evidence tampering and outrageous governmental conduct. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and tampering with a witness. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a fourth amended motion for postconviction relief, alleging, in part, that trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. The district court denied postconviction relief on all grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by not finding trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective; and (2) the district court did not err in not finding Defendant’s constitutional rights were violated because he was allegedly unable to understand one of the court interpreters during trial. View "State v. Alarcon-Chavez" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to kidnapping, a crime he committed when he was sixteen years old. Defendant was initially sentenced to life imprisonment. After the U.S. Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama, Defendant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court determined that Defendant was entitled to relief under Graham and vacated his life sentence. Thereafter, Defendant was resentenced to ninety years to life imprisonment. Defendant appealed that sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sentence was not excessive, nor did it violate the 8th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution or the principles set forth in Graham. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted and sentenced for refusing to submit to a chemical test, refusing to submit to a preliminary breath test, and driving without a license. On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court’s determination that Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,197, the chemical test implied consent statute, was valid, facially and as applied, and constitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and in part vacated and remanded, holding (1) section 60-6,197 is unconstitutional as applied to Defendant for his conviction for refusing to submit to a chemical blood test; and (2) there was no merit to Defendant’s remaining assignments of error. View "State v. McCumber" on Justia Law