Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Nebraska Supreme Court
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After a bench trial on stipulated facts, Defendant was found guilty of refusal of a chemical test in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,197. Defendant appealed, arguing, primarily, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the traffic stop was conducted without reasonable suspicion and that section 6-6,197.09 and related statutes are unconstitutional because they are void for vagueness. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (2) section 60-6,197.09 is not unconstitutionally vague; and (3) Defendant was not denied due process when he was denied probation. View "State v. Arizola" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of intentional child abuse resulting in death. Defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for eighty years to life. Defendant appealed, assigning numerous errors addressed to the grand jury process and trial rulings. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding that the district court did not commit prejudicial error when it (1) overruled Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of probable cause; (2) overruled Defendant’s motion to quash the indictment due to errors relating to the special prosecutor; (3) overruled Defendant’s motion in limine to prohibit the State from presenting evidence regarding DNA testing of certain evidence; and (4) overruled Defendant’s motions for mistrial. View "State v. Chauncey" on Justia Law

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In 2001, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Appellant was sixteen years old when he committed the crimes leading to his convictions. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder conviction. In 2013, Appellant filed a motion for postconviction relief seeking resentencing on his murder conviction pursuant to Miller v. Alabama. The district court granted postconviction relief. After a resentencing hearing, Appellant was sentenced to ninety to ninety years’ imprisonment on the first degree murder conviction. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court imposed an excessive sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence within the statutory limits and supported by the record, and there was no merit to Appellant’s claim that his sentence was excessive. View "State v. Garza" on Justia Law

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In 1994, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the commission of the acts leading to his convictions. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder conviction. Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief. The motion was granted and Defendant’s life sentence was vacated and the cause remanded. Upon resentencing, Defendant was sentenced to ninety years’ to ninety years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the sentence imposed upon Defendant on resentencing was not erroneous; and (2) the sentencing court properly considered Defendant’s youth and used adequate procedural safeguards when sentencing him. View "State v. Mantich" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction on direct appeal. In 2009, Defendant filed a motion under the DNA Testing Act for retesting of biological material related to Defendant’s prosecution. After a hearing, the district court overruled the 2009 motion for DNA testing. Defendant’s appeal from that order was summarily dismissed by the court of appeals. In 2015, Defendant filed another motion for DNA testing under the Act. The State objected to the motion on the ground of res judicata. The district court dismissed the DNA motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err in dismissing Defendant’s successive motion for DNA testing on the ground that it was governed by the determinations made under the 2009 motion. View "State v. Marrs" on Justia Law

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At issue in this case was whether a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute underlying a judgment is permitted in a habeas corpus proceeding after the judgment becomes final. In 2011, Petitioner was convicted of unlawful discharge of a firearm under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-1212.04 and use of a firearm to commit a felony. Petitioner was sentenced to ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment on each conviction, to run consecutively. The court of appeals affirmed. Petitioner later filed a habeas petition in district court making a facial challenge to the constitutionality of section 28-1212.04. The district court dismissed Defendant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when used to challenge a final conviction and sentence, habeas corpus is a collateral attack; (2) therefore, habeas corpus is not a proper remedy to challenge a petitioner’s detention pursuant to a final conviction and sentence on the basis that the statute underlying the conviction is unconstitutional; and (3) therefore, a final conviction and sentence entered upon an allegedly facially unconstitutional statute is not absolutely void, but is voidable only, and may not be attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding. View "Sanders v. Frakes" on Justia Law

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In 1987, Defendant murdered his twelve-year-old sister. Defendant was fourteen years old at the time of the murder. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2013, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that his sentence was cruel and unusual punishment in light of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama. The district court vacated Defendant’s life sentence, finding that the sentence was within the parameters of the holding in Miller, that the rule in Miller applies retroactively, and that Defendant was therefore entitled to postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the relevant sentencing scheme mandated life imprisonment without the possibility for parole, the district court was bound by Miller. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Thieszen" on Justia Law

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Sandrino T. and Remus M. were each charged in the juvenile court with six counts of ATM “skimming.” In each case, the State moved to transfer to county court. The juvenile court granted the motions. Both Sandrino and Remus appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases on appeal for disposition. The Court then dismissed each appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the orders transferring the cases from juvenile court to county court were not final and appealable because the transfer of the cases from juvenile court to criminal court did not affect the substantial rights of Sandrino and Remus. View "In re Sandrino T." on Justia Law

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In 1971, David Rice was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2012, Rice filed a successive petition for postconviction relief. The petition was filed on Rice’s behalf by attorney Timothy Ashford. Ashford also filed on behalf of Rice a motion to appoint counsel on the basis that Rice was indigent. The court did not rule on the motion to appoint counsel prior to denying postconviction relief. Thereafter, the court entered an order finding that Rice should be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis and appointed Ashford as Rice’s counsel. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. Thereafter, Ashford filed an application for the allowance of expenses and fees associated with the appeal. The district court denied the application, concluding that the claims for postconviction relief were frivolous, as was the appeal. Ashford appealed. While the appeal was pending, Rice died. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) no substitution of parties was necessary as a result of Rice’s death; and (2) because the district court appointed Ashford as postconviction counsel, the court was statutorily required to fix reasonable expenses and fees. View "State v. Rice" on Justia Law

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After a hearing, the Mental Health Board of the Fourth Judicial District found that L.T. was a dangerous sex offender under Sex Offender Commitment Act and that inpatient treatment was the least restrictive alternative for him. On appeal, the district court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the Board’s determination and that there was clear and convincing evidence that L.T. could be treated on an outpatient basis. The district court then ordered L.T. unconditionally discharged from commitment as a dangerous sex offender. The State sought to appeal the district court’s order pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 71-1214. L.T. filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, asserting that the State did not follow the proper appeal procedure and, therefore, failed to perfect its appeal. The Supreme Court agreed and dismissed the appeal, holding that the State failed to perfect an appeal under section 71-1214 and Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1912. View "In re Interest of L.T." on Justia Law