Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Nebraska Supreme Court
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In 1987, Defendant murdered his twelve-year-old sister. Defendant was fourteen years old at the time of the murder. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2013, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that his sentence was cruel and unusual punishment in light of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama. The district court vacated Defendant’s life sentence, finding that the sentence was within the parameters of the holding in Miller, that the rule in Miller applies retroactively, and that Defendant was therefore entitled to postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the relevant sentencing scheme mandated life imprisonment without the possibility for parole, the district court was bound by Miller. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Thieszen" on Justia Law

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Sandrino T. and Remus M. were each charged in the juvenile court with six counts of ATM “skimming.” In each case, the State moved to transfer to county court. The juvenile court granted the motions. Both Sandrino and Remus appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases on appeal for disposition. The Court then dismissed each appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the orders transferring the cases from juvenile court to county court were not final and appealable because the transfer of the cases from juvenile court to criminal court did not affect the substantial rights of Sandrino and Remus. View "In re Sandrino T." on Justia Law

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In 1971, David Rice was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2012, Rice filed a successive petition for postconviction relief. The petition was filed on Rice’s behalf by attorney Timothy Ashford. Ashford also filed on behalf of Rice a motion to appoint counsel on the basis that Rice was indigent. The court did not rule on the motion to appoint counsel prior to denying postconviction relief. Thereafter, the court entered an order finding that Rice should be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis and appointed Ashford as Rice’s counsel. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. Thereafter, Ashford filed an application for the allowance of expenses and fees associated with the appeal. The district court denied the application, concluding that the claims for postconviction relief were frivolous, as was the appeal. Ashford appealed. While the appeal was pending, Rice died. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) no substitution of parties was necessary as a result of Rice’s death; and (2) because the district court appointed Ashford as postconviction counsel, the court was statutorily required to fix reasonable expenses and fees. View "State v. Rice" on Justia Law

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After a hearing, the Mental Health Board of the Fourth Judicial District found that L.T. was a dangerous sex offender under Sex Offender Commitment Act and that inpatient treatment was the least restrictive alternative for him. On appeal, the district court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the Board’s determination and that there was clear and convincing evidence that L.T. could be treated on an outpatient basis. The district court then ordered L.T. unconditionally discharged from commitment as a dangerous sex offender. The State sought to appeal the district court’s order pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 71-1214. L.T. filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, asserting that the State did not follow the proper appeal procedure and, therefore, failed to perfect its appeal. The Supreme Court agreed and dismissed the appeal, holding that the State failed to perfect an appeal under section 71-1214 and Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1912. View "In re Interest of L.T." on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of intentional child abuse resulting in death and intentional child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury in connection with the death of his two-year-old grandson. On Defendant’s first appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial. On retrial, Defendant was again convicted of the crimes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the was sufficient evidence to support both convictions; (2) any error in admitting testimony over Defendant’s objections was harmless; and (3) the district court’s sentences were not an abuse of discretion. View "State v. Draper" on Justia Law

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In 2003, Defendant pled no contest to sexually assaulting J.B., a girl under sixteen years old. A jury trial was subsequently held in a second case, in which Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of another girl under sixteen years old, Heather Guerrero. In 2012, Defendant filed a “Verified Motion for Postconviction Relief and Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis” in the case involving the sexual assault of J.B. After an evidentiary hearing, the * court rejected Defendant’s claims, overruled his motion for postconviction relief, and denied his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in overruling Defendant’s motion for postconviction relief and denying his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. View "State v. Hessler" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) in finding that Defendant was not deaf or hard of hearing under Neb. Rev. Stat. 20-152, and therefore, in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress statements he made to law enforcement; (2) in finding Defendant competent to stand trial at a competency hearing; and (3) in instructing the jury regarding the definition of the term “deliberation” and regarding sudden quarrel manslaughter. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence and refusing to submit to a chemical test. Both convictions were second offenses. Defendant appealed, challenging the county court’s refusal to grant his motion to quash the charge of refusal to submit to a chemical yes and his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of his arrest. Specifically, Defendant argued that criminalizing refusal was a violation of the constitutional rights to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures and that there was not probable cause to support his arrest. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the county court did not err when it overruled Defendant’s motion to quash and his motion to suppress; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. View "State v. Pester" on Justia Law

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After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of knowing and intentional child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury for abusing his girlfriend’s three-year-old daughter. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s conviction and vacated his sentence, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction, and the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction; (2) there was no abuse of discretion in Defendant’s sentence of fifteen to thirty years’ imprisonment; and (3) there was no merit to Defendant’s remaining assignments of error. View "State v. Olbricht" on Justia Law

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Appellant pled no contest pursuant to a plea agreement to distribution of a controlled substance, a Class III felony. After a hearing, the district court imposed four years of probation. On appeal, Appellant challenged the terms of probation, arguing that the district court exceeded its authority by sentencing him to 180 days’ incremental jail time as part of his sentence of probation, contingent upon any potential future violations of the terms of probation. The Supreme Court agreed with Appellant and vacated the disputed portion of his sentence, holding that, at the time of sentencing, the court had no statutory authority to impose jail time, conditional or otherwise, as part of a sentence of probation for Appellant, a felony offender. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Kantaras" on Justia Law