Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of theft by unlawful taking, more than $500 but less than $1500, a class IV felony. The conviction was based on the accusation that Defendant unlawfully took two items belonging to Hymark Towing: a vehicle and a combine trailer. Defendant was charged with one Class III felony under the theory that the values of the vehicle and the combine trailer could be aggregated because they were “pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct.” The jury found Defendant guilty of unlawfully taking both items but found that the items were not taken pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a finding of “one scheme or course of conduct” is not an essential element of the crime of theft, regardless of whether the State is attempting to aggregate amounts pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-518(7), and therefore, the district court was correct in determining, based on the jury verdict, that Defendant was guilty of a Class IV felony theft offense; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction. View "State v. Duncan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of discharging a firearm at an inhabited house, occupied building, or occupied vehicle and use of a weapon to commit a felony. The court of appeals affirmed on appeal. Thereafter, Defendant filed a verified motion for postconviction relief, alleging that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance. The district court denied relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for postconviction relief, as Defendant failed to show he was entitled to relief on his claims; and (2) did not err in failing to allow Defendant to amend his pleadings postjudgment or utilize an improper procedure. View "State v. Robertson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. In this appeal, Defendant's third appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that he was denied due process by the State’s knowing use of fabricated evidence to obtain his convictions and that his trial counsel acted under an actual conflict of interest during Defendant’s trial and the pendency of his direct appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of relief, holding that the district court did not err in (1) finding that the State did not knowingly use fabricated evidence to obtain Defendant’s convictions; and (2) finding that Defendant’s trial counsel did not operate under a conflict of interest. View "State v. Edwards" on Justia Law

In 1985, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2015, Appellant filed a second postconviction motion to set aside the conviction and sentence and/or a writ of error coram nobis. The district court denied Appellant’s error coram nobis request and overruled his motion for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in overruling Appellant’s motion for postconviction relief because the motion was not timely filed; and (2) the district court properly denied Appellant’s request for a writ of error coram nobis, as Appellant only asserted errors of law, and a writ of error coram nobis is not available to correct errors of law. View "State v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to obstructing government operations for interfering the prosecution of a city employee in order to prevent the employee from being fired. The county court found Defendant guilty, sentenced him to thirty days in jail, and ordered him to pay $55 in court costs. The district court affirmed and conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) affirming the county court’s findings that there was sufficient factual basis to support the conviction; (2) finding that the amended complaint was adequate; and (3) finding that Defendant’s sentence was not excessive. View "State v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment from five to fifteen years. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding (1) the district court did not err in allowing the State to present on rebuttal extrinsic evidence of a prior incident in order to impeach Defendant’s testimony which he presented in his own defense; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction; and (3) the district court did not impose an excessive sentence. View "State v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding, among other things, that the trial court did not err by (1) denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (2) admitting into evidence journal entries written by Defendant while incarcerated for another crime; (3) not excluding the testimony of certain witnesses on the grounds that Defendant was presented with a “Hobson’s choice” of either conducting effective cross-examination that would bring to light other bad acts or not conducting an effective cross-examination; and (4) giving Defendant a life sentence. View "State v. Oldson" on Justia Law

The victim testified that a man she knew (Abejide's brother) invited her over as she walked by his group, on the sidewalk drinking beer. The victim briefly talked and drank beer with them. As the victim was leaving, Abejide pulled her into an alley, where he started choking her and stated he was going to “knock [her] out.” The victim testified that she thought that Abejide was going to kill her and was trying to rape her. She screamed; a police officer arrived and handcuffed Abejide. The officer testified that he saw woman’s pants pulled down and Abejide’s penis exposed; the woman appeared “fearful” and said, repeatedly, “‘He’s trying to rape me.’” Two officers testified that Abejide appeared to be intoxicated. Abejide did not present any defense during his trial for first-degree sexual assault and terroristic threats. The court refused Abejide’s proposed instructions: to include attempted third-degree sexual assault as a lesser-included offense; to require the jury's unanimous agreement regarding whether Abejide acted with the intent to terrorize or whether he acted in reckless disregard of the risk of causing terror; and setting forth an intoxication defense. The court instructed the jury that it could not consider Abejide’s voluntary intoxication in deciding whether he had the required intent. The jury found Abejide guilty. He had three prior convictions, including for sexual assault and violation of the Sex Offender Registration Act. The court sentenced Abejide to imprisonment for 10-20 years for attempted sexual assault and for 10 years for terroristic threats, to be served consecutively. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting challenges to the jury instructions and the sentence. View "State v. Abejide" on Justia Law

The Nebraska Constitution confers on the Legislature the authority to define crimes and fix their punishment and on the Parole Board “power to grant paroles after conviction and judgment, under such conditions as may be prescribed by law, for any offenses committed against the criminal laws of this state except treason and cases of impeachment.” A statute provides: Every committed offender shall be eligible for parole when the offender has served one-half the minimum term. Because it is impossible to determine when an offender has served one-half of a life sentence, the section has been interpreted to mean that an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for parole until the Board of Pardons commutes the sentence to a term of years. Adams, an inmate serving two sentences of life imprisonment, challenged the statute as an unconstitutional usurpation of the Board's authority. The district court dismissed and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the commutation requirement was a “condition” prescribed by the Legislature within the meaning of the constitution’s “conditions clause,” which “reserves to the Legislature the ability to add to or subtract from the [Board’s] power to grant paroles in all cases except in cases of treason or impeachment.” View "Adams v. State" on Justia Law

Shurigar submitted a “Nebraska Concealed Handgun Permit Application” and acknowledged that one year earlier, he had been found to be in possession of a loaded pistol in Oklahoma and had pled guilty to “Transporting Loaded Firearm in Motor Vehicle, Misdemeanor.” Because of this prior conviction, the State Patrol denied Shurigar’s application. The district court affirmed the denial, finding that Shurigar’s conviction disqualified him from obtaining a permit under Section 69-2433(8): An applicant shall: Not have had a conviction of any law of this state relating to firearms, unlawful use of a weapon, or controlled substances or of any similar laws of another jurisdiction within the ten years preceding the date of application. Shurigar argued that his conviction was not similar to Neb. Rev. Stat. 37-522, which provides: “It shall be unlawful to have or carry, except as permitted by law, any shotgun having shells in either the chamber, receiver, or magazine in or on any vehicle on any highway.” The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, stating that the Legislature deemed a person to be a risk for violating Section 37-522, which makes it unlawful to transport a loaded shotgun on a highway in Nebraska; there is no reason why a person violating another jurisdiction’s law against transporting a loaded pistol on a highway would be less of a risk of committing future crimes than a person transporting a loaded shotgun. View "Shurigar v. Nebraska State Patrol" on Justia Law