Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Nebraska Supreme Court
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In November, 2003, Guitron was reported missing. Guitron’s remains were discovered in April 2010, under a woodpile on an abandoned farm in rural Kimball County. The cause of death was determined to be two gunshot wounds; a bullet recovered from Guitron’s skull was fired from a pistol purchased by Ash’s sister. Guitron’s death was found to have occurred on October 15, 2003. In August 2003, Ash and his 15-year old girlfriend, whom Ash later married, began living with Guitron in Fort Collins, Colorado. The three were methamphetamine users. After several weeks, Ash and Meehan moved out and began living in a tent near Grover, Colorado. Ash was ultimately convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. The Nebraska Supreme Court remanded because the court erred in denying Ash’s request for a continuance after the state disclosed, on the brink of trial, that a codefendant would be testifying pursuant to a plea agreement. Ash again was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to life. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, finding Ash’s claim of insufficient evidence to support the verdict without merit; that none of Ash’s claims of trial court error had merit; and that any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was either affirmatively disproved by the record or not sufficiently presented for review. View "State v. Ash" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and use of a deadly weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The State filed a motion to deny an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s motion, and the district court granted the State’s request. Thereafter, the district court denied postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by denying an evidentiary hearing where Defendant’s motion did not allege any prejudice due to his trial counsel’s alleged deficient performance; and (2) the district court did not err by denying postconviction relief. View "State v. Abdulkadir" on Justia Law

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Bryant Irish was convicted of driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury. Dillon Fales was the victim of Irish’s crime. Before the court sentenced Irish, Fales sued Stanton County alleging that he was an innocent third party injured by the vehicular pursuit of Irish by Michael Unger, the Stanton County Sheriff. Unger petitioned for a public records writ of mandamus compelling the partial disclosure of Irish’s presentence report containing any statements made by Fales. The district court dismissed Unger’s petition, concluding that Irish’s presentence report was not a public record. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Unger’s petition for a public records writ of mandamus because Irish’s presentence report is not a public record. View "State ex rel. Unger v. State" on Justia Law

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After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a firearm to commit a felony. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that Defendant killed the victim in an attempt to perpetrate a robbery and that he used a firearm to do so; and (2) therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions. View "State v. Dortch" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of driving a commercial motor vehicle without obtaining a commercial driver’s license (CDL). Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that the conviction was contrary to law because the combination power unit and hay grinder that he was driving was not a commercial motor vehicle requiring a CDL. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the power unit and hay grinder operated by Defendant was a commercial motor vehicle under the Motor Vehicle Operator’s License Act, and therefore, Defendant’s conviction conformed to the law and was supported by competent evidence. View "State v. Neisius" on Justia Law

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Defendant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon. At issue before the district court was whether a “Stiletto” knife measuring three and three-quarters inches long that Defendant had in his possession when he was arrested constituted a deadly weapon under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-1202. The district court concluded that the knife was a deadly weapon per se under section 28-1202 and found Defendant guilty of carrying a concealed weapon. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, given the amendment to section 28-1202 and the amendment to the term “knife” as defined in Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-1202(5), any knife with a blade over three and a half inches in length is a deadly weapon per se, and the manner or intended use of such deadly weapon is not an element of the crime charged. View "State v. Nguyen" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of three counts of first degree murder, three counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and one count of possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting Defendant’s out-of-court statements to several witnesses in the weeks following the murders under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay statements of one witness, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Britt" on Justia Law

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Appellant was convicted of two counts of attempted robbery and was sentenced to concurrent terms of fifteen to twenty-five years in prison. Appellant later filed a petition for postconviction relief. Along with his petition, Appellant filed a motion for leave to file the petition out of time, alleging that he was unable to file his petition for postconviction relief within the applicable one-year limitation period because the prison where he was being housed was locked down for a period of time, and he was not allowed access to the prison law library for five weeks. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely, finding that the lockdown did not prevent Appellant from filing his petition within the one-year limitation period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that any impediment created by the lockdown did not, as a matter of law, prevent Appellant from filing his postconviction action. View "State v. Shannon" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of murder in the second degree and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions and sentences. Appellant’s first petition for postconviction relief was unsuccessful. Appellant then filed a second motion for postconviction relief, claiming that his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated when he received a sentence of the functional equivalent of life for an offense he committed when he was a juvenile. The district court denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, determining that Appellant’s motion was barred by the limitation period found in the Nebraska Postconviction Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit for different reasons, holding that Appellant’s second motion for posconviction relief was barred as untimely under 29-3001(4)(d). View "State v. Goynes" on Justia Law

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Defendant was found guilty in county court of driving under the influence and was sentenced to six months’ probation. Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the police did not act reasonably in stopping Defendant, and therefore, the stop was unconstitutional under Brown v. Texas. The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for further review. The Court then reversed, holding that the stop was reasonable under Brown, and the court of appeals erred in its balancing of the Brown factors. View "State v. Woldt" on Justia Law