Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery, first degree false imprisonment, third degree assault, third degree sexual assault, and carrying a concealed weapon. The parties subsequently entered into a sentencing agreement, pursuant to which Defendant waived his right to appeal. The district court imposed sentences in conformity with the sentencing agreement. Defendant subsequently appealed, arguing that the sentencing agreement was unenforceable because appeal waivers are against public policy. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Defendant’s waiver of his right to appeal entered into as party of the sentencing agreement was enforceable. View "State v. Dye" on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellant, who was not a citizen of the United States, pled guilty to attempted sexual assault in the first degree. After Appellant was released from incarceration he filed a motion to withdraw his plea and vacate the judgment, alleging that not allowing him to withdraw his plea would result in “manifest injustice” because his trial counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. The district court dismissed the motion, determining that Appellant could have brought his Padilla v. Kentucky claim in an earlier postconviction action. Appellant appealed, arguing that postconviction relief was never available to him because he could not have reasonably discovered the factual predicate of his claim while incarcerated, as he did not receive notice of the government’s decision to deport him until after his release. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in the exercise of due diligence, Appellant should have discovered and brought his Padilla claim while incarcerated through a postconviction action; and (2) therefore, the district court properly dismissed Appellant’s claim for manifest injustice relief. View "State v. Mamer" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first degree sexual assault and attempted first degree sexual assault. Before trial, Defendant sought to offer evidence that the complaining witness had an intimate relationship with a third party, arguing that the relationship showed that the complaining witness had a motive to falsely report that she had not consented to sexual activities with Defendant. The district court ruled that the rape shield statute prohibited Defendant from introducing the evidence. The jury found Defendant not guilty of first degree sexual assault but guilty of attempted first degree sexual assault. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that evidence of an intimate relationship, standing alone, is not within the scope of the rape shield statute, the relationship was relevant, the exclusion of the evidence was not harmless. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Lavalleur" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted for driving under the influence, third offense. The court of appeals affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) the court of appeals committed reversible error when it affirmed the district court’s overruling of Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a traffic stop that was based on an anonymous tip, as, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, there was not reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop; and (2) double jeopardy did not preclude a remand for a new trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Defendant, a teacher at a public school, was charged with five counts of sexual assault and child abuse involving four minor girls: T.P., M.K., E.M., and E.A. Three of the girls were Defendant’s students when the conduct occurred, and Defendant tutored the fourth girl, E.A. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the charges involving E.A. but was acquitted of the charges involving the other three girls. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to sever the charges and joining them all in a single trial; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress his cell phone records; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for child abuse and child enticement for an illegal sexual purpose. View "State v. Knutson" on Justia Law

In 1983, when he was sixteen years old, Defendant was convicted of burglary and kidnapping. The court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for the kidnapping and a term of five to twenty years’ imprisonment for the burglary. In 2013, Defendant filed a pro se motion to correct his sentence, arguing that his life sentence was illegal under the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida, in which the Court held that the imposition of life without parole on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide is unconstitutional. The district court dismissed Defendant’s motion for lack of jurisdiction because it was not brought under a recognized procedure under Nebraska law and because the sentence was currently valid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant failed to timely assert his Graham v. Florida claim under the Nebraska Postconviction Act, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Defendant’s motion and did not err in dismissing it without reaching its merit. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine. After Defendant had served the sentence for his offense Defendant filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, asserting that neither the district court nor defense counsel advised him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea and arguing that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea. The district court denied relief, concluding that Defendant’s claims were not based upon an error of fact that could be addressed via a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the failure of a court to advise a defendant of the immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere prior to acceptance of the plea cannot serve as the basis for a writ of error coram nobis. View "State v. Sandoval" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder in connection with the shooting death of an acquaintance of Defendant. Defendant filed three motions to suppress evidence, all of which were denied. Defendant appealed the denials of his motions to suppress and argued that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err when it (1) denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the results of the search of Defendant’s person; (2) failed to suppress evidence found at Defendant’s residence pursuant to a search warrant; (3) did not exclude expert testimony and exhibits concerning the ShotSpotter system, which detected the location of the shots fired the night of the murder; and (4) found the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction. View "State v. Hill" on Justia Law

In 2006, Appellant pled guilty to attempted possession of a controlled substance. In 2012, Appellant filed a motion seeking to withdraw his 2006 plea, alleging that neither his counsel nor the court had advised him of the immigration consequences of his plea prior to entry of the plea. The district court dismissed Appellant’s motion for lack of jurisdiction, concluding (1) the decision in Padilla v. Kentucky did not apply retroactively to Appellant’s 2006 plea and conviction; and (2) the court did not have jurisdiction because Appellant had completed his sentence and was no longer in the State’s custody. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that Padilla v. Kentucky did not apply retroactively to Appellant’s 2006 plea-based conviction; but (2) the district court had jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea under the remedy provided in Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1819.02(2) without regard to whether Appellant had completed his sentence. View "State v. Chojolan" on Justia Law

In 2013, Francisco Rodriguez moved to withdraw his guilty plea and to vacate his 2004 conviction for attempted possession of a controlled substance (Class I misdemeanor). He argued that before entering a guilty plea in the 2004 proceedings, he did not receive the proper advisement under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1819.02(1) (Reissue 2008), and that he currently faced immigration consequences from the resulting conviction. Because Rodriguez moved to withdraw his plea after he had completed his sentence of 2 years’ probation, the district court concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court concluded that the court did have jurisdiction, and reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Nebraska v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law