Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to a 2012 driving under the influence (DUI) charge. During a sentence enhancement hearing, the evidence showed Defendant had previously been convicted of DUI in 2003, 2001, and 1999. Defendant argued that the 1999 and 2001 convictions were the same convictions referred to in the 2003 enhancement hearing, and because those convictions did not result in enhancement of the 2003 charge, the State was collaterally estopped from using them for enhancement of the 2012 charge. The trial court found Defendant guilty of fourth-offense DUI, holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar the use of two prior convictions for the purpose of sentence enhancement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that collateral estoppel did not bar the use of Defendant’s 1999 and 2001 DUI convictions as two of the three prior convictions necessary to enhance his 2012 conviction to fourth offense. View "State v. Bruckner" on Justia Law

After an infant boy died in the care of Plaintiff, a daycare provider, Plaintiff was charged with felony child abuse resulting in death. The charge was later dropped after two forensic pathologists retained by Plaintiff concluded that the infant’s cause of death was sudden infant death syndrome. Plaintiff subsequently sued the pathologist whose autopsy report was used to bring the criminal charges against Plaintiff and the pathologist’s wholly owned corporation (collectively, Defendants). The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Defendants where differing reasonable inferences could be drawn as to whether the pathologist knowingly provided false or misleading information to law enforcement in his autopsy report. View "McKinney v. Okoye" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the State did not have probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of his vehicle based on the odor of marijuana emanating from his person or on a police officer’s alleged knowledge that there were needles used for methamphetamine in Defendant’s vehicle. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) standing alone, the fact that Defendant smelled of burnt marijuana did not provide probable cause to search Defendant’s vehicle; and (2) the officer’s alleged knowledge of the needles in Defendant’s car was based solely on testimony that should be disregarded as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals should have given deference to the district court’s finding of fact that the officer was told about the needles prior to the search; and (2) probable cause existed for the search based on the combined facts that Defendant smelled of burnt marijuana and that he admitted prior to the search of his vehicle to having needles in the vehicle. View "State v. Dalland" on Justia Law

Rick Wheeler had two liability insurance policies with American Family Mutual Insurance Company. Both Rick and his son Ryan were insureds under the policies. Both policies provided personal liability coverage and included exclusions for abuse and intentional injury. Both policies also contained a severability clause, which required that the insurance be applied separately to each insured. Joshua and Maren McCrary sued Rick and Ryan for Ryan’s alleged sexual assault of the McCrarys’ minor daughter. American Family filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a judgment that its policies did not provide liability coverage to Rick. The district court granted summary judgment to American Family. At issue on appeal was whether the severability clause changed the effect of, or rendered ambiguous, the exclusions that would otherwise bar coverage for Rick. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the severability clause did not affect the unambiguous language of the policies’ exclusions, which barred coverage for Rick. View "Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 2008 Appellant was convicted of attempted third degree sexual assault of a child, a Class I misdemeanor. In 2011, Appellant applied for a permit to carry a concealed handgun.The Nebraska State Patrol denied Appellant’s application pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 69-2433(5), which provides that a permit will be denied an applicant convicted a “misdemeanor crime of violence” within the ten years preceding the date of application. On appeal, Appellant contended that his conviction for attempted third degree sexual assault of a child was not a “crime of violence” within the meaning of section 69-2433(5). The district court affirmed the State Patrol’s denial of Appellant’s application for a concealed handgun permit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court and State Patrol did not err in finding that Appellant’s conviction of attempted third degree sexual assault of a child was a crime of violence under section 69-2433(5) and disqualified him from receiving a concealed handgun permit. View "Underwood v. Neb. State Patrol" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of abuse of a vulnerable adult based on the financial exploitation of a relative and sentenced to three years’ probation. The district court subsequently revoked Defendant’s probation and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment, finding that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation by committing assault. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the district court erred when it received into evidence hearsay statements of an unavailable witness at the probation revocation hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Sixth Amendment confrontation guarantee and Crawford v. Washington rights do not apply to probation revocation proceedings because probation revocation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, but a probationer is entitled to due process and an opportunity to controvert the evidence against him or her; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to revoke Defendant's probation. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of several felonies for which he was serving probation. When Defendant’s probation officer conducted an investigation of Defendant's residence, the officer discovered an extensive knife and sword collection lining the walls of Defendant’s bedroom. After a subsequent search of Defendant’s residence by law enforcement officers, Defendant was charged with and convicted of violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-1206, possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person, and sentenced to two years’ probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant lacked standing to assert that section 28-1206 was vague because his conduct clearly violated the statute; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (3) the district court did not err in not instructing the jury on the offense of entrapment; (4) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial; and (5) sufficient evidence supported Defendant’s conviction. View "State v. Green" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with assault while being incarcerated and of being a habitual criminal. Approximately one year later, Defendant filed his first motion to discharge on speedy trial grounds. The district court overruled the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a second motion to discharge on speedy trial grounds. The district court overruled Defendant’s motion, concluding that the State had twenty-eight days remaining to bring Defendant to trial. The court of appeals affirmed. The State petitioned for further review, contending that additional days should be excluded from the speedy trial calculation because of Defendant’s allegedly frivolous motion to discharge. The Supreme Court held that Defendant waived his statutory right to a speedy trial by filing unsuccessful motions to discharge that necessitated continuing trial beyond the statutory six-month period. View "State v. Mortensen" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict of guilty on the charge of felony murder; (2) the district court did not err in sustaining the State’s motion in limine and excluding evidence of prior unlawful conduct by a key witness; and (3) the district court did not err when it gave a flight instruction to the jury. View "State v. Ely" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) the district court did not err in admitting evidence regarding the content of certain text messages because the text message evidence satisfied the authentication requirement; (2) the district court did not commit plain error when it overruled Defendant’s motions for a directed verdict; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions. View "State v. Elseman" on Justia Law