Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a firearm to commit a felony. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the trial court erroneously gave a step jury instruction relating to the charge of first degree murder, and the court erred in refusing to give a "negative element of 'sudden quarrel'" instruction; and (2) his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in using a step instruction, the elements of first degree murder exclude any reference to "sudden quarrel," and the jury's presumed adherence to the step instruction precluded any prejudice regarding the rest of the instruction; and (2) the record was insufficient to address two of Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and Defendant's remaining claims of ineffective assistance lacked merit. View "State v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with first degree sexual assault stemming from his conduct toward his stepdaughter, M.H. During trial, M.H.'s therapist testified, over Appellant's objection, that Appellant's sexual abuse of M.H. caused M.H.'s posttraumatic stress disorder. The court subsequently granted Appellant's motion for a mistrial on the grounds that the therapist's testimony was "over the edge." Appellant then filed a plea in bar, arguing that the State's questioning of the therapist was intended to provoke a mistrial so that the State could have a second change at a more favorable prosecution and thus circumvent the protections of the double jeopardy clause. The trial court denied the plea in bar. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the prosecutor did not intend to goad Appellant into moving for a mistrial, Appellant's plea in bar was properly denied. View "State v. Muhannad" on Justia Law

In 2006, Defendant was found guilty by a jury of first degree murder, and in 2007, Defendant pled guilty to a separate charge of first degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive life sentences for the murders. Defendant subsequently filed motions for postconviction relief in both cases, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. The district court denied Defendant's motions without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for postconviction relief in each case without an evidentiary hearing, as Defendant's motions in the two cases did not allege facts constituting a denial of his constitutional rights, and the record refuted his claims as to his other allegations. View "State v. Baker" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder under a theory of aiding and abetting, criminal conspiracy to unlawfully possess and deliver a controlled substance, and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) Defendant was not prejudiced when the district court allowed his counsel to withdraw prior to counsel and by accepting Defendant's waiver of conflict of interest created by the former counsel's new employment with the county's attorney's office, which was prosecuting Defendant in this case; (2) the district court did not err in allowing evidence of prior bad acts; (3) Defendant's trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness for failing to request jury instructions regarding robbery and attempted robbery as lesser-included offenses of felony murder did not prejudice Defendant; (4) a jury instruction error did not require reversal of Defendant's second degree murder conviction; (5) the convictions were supported by sufficient evidence; and (6) the district court did not impose excessive sentences. View "State v. McGuire" on Justia Law

In 2002, Defendant pled no contest to attempted first degree arson pursuant to a plea agreement. Defendant was discharged from prison in 2003 and was thereafter removed from the United States. In 2012, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea of no contest and vacate his conviction, alleging that his plea and conviction were obtained in violation of his due process rights and that his counsel was ineffective because he did not advise Defendant of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. The district court denied Defendant's motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that neither the postconviction statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1819.02, nor the common-law "manifest injustice" procedure, all of which Defendant attempted to collaterally attack his plea under, provided a basis for relief in this case. View "State v. Osorio" on Justia Law

While serving as county attorney, Defendant established a pretrial diversion program wherein participants paid an enrollment fee and court costs. The fees and costs were deposited into a separate bank account with Defendant as the only authorized signer on the account. After the state auditor's office conducted an audit, Defendant was charged with three counts of theft by unlawful taking, among other charges. The third theft charge was based on a check Defendant wrote on the account of the diversion program to a local trapshooting team. The jury acquitted Defendant of the first two theft counts but convicted him of the third. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court plainly erred in instructing the jury on Defendant's affirmative defense of entrapment of estoppel. Remanded for retrial. View "State v. Edwards" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment of life to life for the second degree murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in giving jury instructions on "sudden quarrel"; (2) did not err in giving a step instruction; (3) did not abuse its discretion in admitting autopsy photographs into evidence, as their potential prejudice did not substantially outweigh their probative value; and (3) did not err in imposing a sentence of life to life for second degree murder. View "State v. Abdulkadir" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced on nine counts involving actual or attempted violence or physical abuse upon persons with intellectual disabilities who required residential care. All counts arose from Defendant's employment at a developmental center and involved three adult residents at that facility. Defendant appealed, arguing primarily that the district court erred in permitting the jury to take into the jury room for use during deliberations the State's "road map," a chart admitted for demonstrative purposes only. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the use of this demonstrative exhibit during jury deliberations without providing adequate limiting instructions or employing any other safeguards against prejudice. View "State v. Pangborn" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree sexual assault, use of a weapon to commit a felony, and robbery. Defendant was determined to be a habitual criminal and sentenced to eighty to 140 years imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) overruling Defendant's two motions for mistrial; (2) overruling Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress the victim's identification of him as her assailant and in admitting her identification testimony at trial over Defendant's objection; (3) overruling Defendant's motion for a directed verdict; (4) determining that Defendant was a habitual criminal and sentencing him accordingly; and (5) sentencing Defendant. View "State v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of several counts of child abuse and sexual assault of a child. Defendant appealed, asserting, among other things, that the district court erred in receiving evidence under Neb. Rev. Stat. 27-414. Before trial, the trial court heard testimony from Defendant's prior victims, compared the testimony to the current charges, and made a conditional ruling of admissibility under 27-414. The court, however, prohibited the State from mentioning or presenting the section 27-414 evidence at trial until after the evidence of the current alleged victims. At trial, the State first presented the current evidence and then, outside the presence of the jury, the State alerted the court of its intent to call a prior victim as a witness, which the court allowed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in receiving evidence under section 27-414; and (2) Defendant's other assignments of error were rejected. View "State v. Valverde" on Justia Law