Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Larry Williams was convicted and sentenced in district court for five counts of first degree sexual assault and one count of sexual assault of a child. The Supreme Court affirmed Williams' convictions, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Williams' motion for new trial on the bases that (a) the informations were signed by persons were signed by persons not properly identified as the prosecuting authority, (b) prosecutorial misconduct occurred, and (c) the court erroneously admitted certain evidence; and (2) the district court did not impose excessive sentences, but the court committed plain error when it granted Williams forty-five days of credit for time against each of the five counts. The Court modified the sentencing order to state that Williams was entitled to a credit for time served in the amount of forty-five days against the aggregate of the minimum and the aggregate of the maximum sentences of imprisonment.

Defendant Karnell Burton was convicted of manslaughter, attempted second degree murder, first degree assault, and two counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed Burton's convictions and sentences, holding (1) Burton waived any violation of his right to a speedy trial by not moving for discharge before trial; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Burton's motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct during the state's rebuttal in final argument; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that evidence of gang membership of two of the State's witnesses was not relevant; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing lengthy terms of imprisonment because of the nature of Burton's offenses.

Raad Almasaudi was charged with theft by receiving stolen property pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-517 after various items of stolen property were found in his residence. A jury convicted Almasaudi of the charge. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) Almasaudi was prejudiced by an instruction directing the jury to apply an objective rather than a subjective standard to the knowledge requirement of section 28-517 because such an instruction was contrary to law and failed to conform to the criminal code, and (2) the totality of the evidence was sufficient to sustain Almasaudi's conviction. Remanded for a new trial.

Frederick Skaggs was convicted in California of attempted forcible rape, kidnapping, robbery, and the unlawful taking of a vehicle. After he was paroled, Skaggs eventually moved to Nebraska. The Nebraska State Patrol required Skaggs to register under the Nebraska Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). After Skaggs requested a determination of the applicability of SORA to him, a hearing was held, and a hearing officer determined that Skaggs was required to register. The State Patrol adopted the recommendation of the hearing officer in full. The district court agreed that Skaggs was required to register as a sex offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State Patrola and district court did not err in determining SORA applied to Skaggs, and (2) the district court did not err when it refused to address the issue of whether SORA, as applied to Skaggs, was unconstitutional because it was not properly preserved for judicial review.

Herchel Huff was driving a motor vehicle when he struck and killed a pedestrian. Huff was convicted of several charges in connection with the accident, including manslaughter and motor vehicle homicide. The primary issue on appeal was whether Huff's convictions for manslaughter and motor vehicle homicide violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions because, as Huff argued, manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of motor vehicle homicide. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and in part vacated, holding that, under Blockburger v. United States, unlawful act manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of motor vehicle homicide, and therefore, Huff was subjected to multiple punishments in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court then vacated Huff's conviction and sentence for manslaughter and remanded for resentencing.

Plaintiff Kimberly Cotton was severely injured in an accident that occurred when a pickup crossed the centerline and struck her vehicle. The pickup had been struck by a Ford Mustang driven by a man who was seeking to evade a state trooper. Cotton sued the state of Nebraska under the State Tort Claims Act, which makes the state liable for injuries to innocent third parties proximately caused by vehicular pursuit by a state-employed law enforcement officer. The district court entered judgment in favor of the state, concluding that (1) there was no vehicular pursuit under the statute, (2) Anson's actions were the sole proximate cause of the injuries to Cotton, and (3) Cotton failed to prove that the state trooper's actions were a proximate cause of the accident. Cotton appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it determined that Anson's actions were the sole proximate cause of Cotton's injuries and that the state was not liable under the State Tort Claims Act.

Terence Nero was charged with burglary, a class three felony. Nero waived his right to a jury trial, and a bench trial followed. The district court declined to make a specific finding regarding which felony it determined Nero had intended to commit to support the charge of burglary. The court found Nero guilty of burglary, and Nero appealed the conviction. At issue was whether the state is required to specify the underlying felony it seeks to prove to support a charge of burglary. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) because the state did not specify the underlying felony it sought to prove, Nero was deprived of an opportunity to prepare an adequate defense as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution; (2) because Nero's right to notice was prejudiced, the district court's denial of Nero's motion for a bill of particulars was not harmless error, and therefore the judgment should be reversed; and (3) the totality of the evidence admitted by the district court was sufficient to sustain Nero's conviction, and therefore the Double Jeopardy Clause does not forbid a retrial. Remanded.

Eleazar Oceguera was convicted of DUI and operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. At the sentencing and enhancement hearing the State offered three certified copies of prior convictions, the first of which was for driving under revocation. The district court found the three exhibits were valid prior convictions of DUI. The State agreed that the district court erred and filed a motion for remand, which the court of appeals denied. At issue was whether the Supreme Court should remand the case for sentencing on DUI or remand for a new enhancement hearing. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred when it used a prior conviction for driving under revocation to enhance Oreguera's sentence for DUI; (2) the restrictions of 29-231.01 or 29-2316, which contain a stringent double jeopardy provision, are inapplicable in this case; and (3) because this case is more analogous to habitual criminal cases where the Court has remanded for a new enhancement hearing when the State has failed to produce sufficient evidence of the requisite prior convictions, the same procedure should be used here. Vacated and remanded with directions.

Defendant Roy Ellis was convicted of first-degree murder in connection with the killing of a 12-year old girl. For this, he was sentenced to death. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court. Although many issues were presented on appeal, the primary issue for the Court to decide was whether the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence of Defendant's "prior bad acts," and whether that evidence prejudiced him. Defendant argued that the district court erred by allowing evidence of prior sexual assaults to his stepdaughters, and abused its discretion by denying two mistrial requests when that evidence was ultimately admitted. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and concluded that Defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of the evidence. The Court found no merit to his other claims, and affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence.

In 2008, Appellant Mauro Yos-Chiguil pled nolo contendere to murder and assault charges. The Court of Appeals dismissed his direct appeal as untimely. Appellant unsuccessfully sought relief under the state's immigration advisement statute. Appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court for post-conviction relief. He argued that the district court denied his petition without an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review most of Appellant's claims because they were included in his "untimely" appeal. The only claim the Court could review pertained to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Court believed that claim alleged sufficient facts to warrant an evidentiary hearing. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.