Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant was charged by three indictments with multiple felony counts regarding crimes of a sexual nature against children. Appellant requested access to information about the racial composition of the three grand jury pools that indicted him. The district judge denied Appellant’s request. After a subsequent jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of several counts. Appellant appealed, contending that he had the right to challenge the grand jury selection under the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution and that the district violated his constitutional rights by obstructing his ability to challenge the racial composition of the grand juries that indicted him. The Supreme Court held that Appellant was entitled to the information so that he may assess whether he had a viable constitutional challenge. Remanded. View "Afzali v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged and convicted of sexual assault and incest for the rape of his daughter, with whom he fathered two children. Defendant appealed, arguing that because incest requires mutual consent and sexual assault is, by definition, nonconsensual, the two crimes were mutually exclusive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) incest condemns sex between close relatives without regard to whether the intercourse was consensual; and (2) the jury instructions, which did not make mutual consent an element of incest, were not in error, and Defendant’s convictions for both incest and sexual assault did not violate double jeopardy. View "Douglas v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with a felony DUI after he was pulled over for driving a vehicle with a cracked windshield. Defendant filed a motion to suppress on the ground that Deputy Wendy Jason, the investigating officer, made a mistake of law that invalidated the investigatory traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, Jason testified that she stopped Defendant because his cracked windshield violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 484D.435. The district court granted Defendant’s motion because section 484D.435 does not prohibit operating a vehicle with a cracked windshield, even though the cracked windshield could violate another statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a police officer’s citation to an incorrect statute is not a mistake of law that invalidates an investigatory stop under the Fourth Amendment if another statute nonetheless prohibits the suspected conduct. Remanded. View "State v. Cantsee" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged by information with aggravated stalking, a felony. Defendant filed a motion to suppress text messages retrieved from his cell phone as a result of his arrest, arguing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when law enforcement retrieved Defendant’s GPS coordinates from Defendant’s cell phone service provider in order to locate Defendant. The district court denied the motion. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated stalking. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated because law enforcement procured a valid arrest warrant before requesting Defendant’s phone’s GPS coordinates; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s request to withdraw from self-representation because his motion was made with an intent to delay the proceedings. View "Meisler v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of domestic battery, felony possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of sale, felony possession of a controlled substance, and other crimes. The district court determined that the habitual criminal enhancement applied based on Defendant’s five prior felony convictions and sentenced Defendant accordingly. The Supreme Court (1) reversed Defendant’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance because the conviction was a lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of sale, and Defendant could not be punished for both crimes; and (2) affirmed the remainder of the judgment of conviction, including the adjudication of Defendant as a habitual criminal. View "LaChance v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder by child abuse following the death of an infant, Tristen Hilburn. Tristen was the victim of multiple injuries. Appellant argued that the injuries were inflicted by Crystal Gaynor, Tristen’s mother, or others associated with her, and that Appellant was innocent. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction, holding that the district court, in applying Nev. Rev. Stat. 51.345, the statement-against-interest exception to the hearsay bar, abused its discretion by refusing to permit two defense witnesses to testify about admissions made by Gaynor concerning a methamphetamine explosion and resulting burns to Tristen’s body. View "Coleman v. State" on Justia Law

Randall Angel, then an inmate, filed a civil rights complaint against corrections officer Michael Cruse, in his individual capacity, alleging that Cruse violated his civil rights by filing a disciplinary charge against him and by having him placed in administrative segregation in retaliation for Angel’s attempt to file a grievance against Cruse. The district court granted summary judgment to Cruse, finding that the evidence demonstrated that Angel had actually threatened Cruse, and in the alternative, Cruse was entitled to qualified immunity because he could not have known that the adverse action violated Angel’s constitutional rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to each of the disputed elements of the retaliation claim and with regard to Cruse’s entitlement to qualified immunity. Remanded. View "Angel v. Cruse" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of battery with use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his proposed instructions regarding self-defense. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to self-defense instructions because there was competent evidence of self-defense; (2) Defendant’s proposed jury instructions did not misstate Nevada law; (3) Defendant’s justifiable battery theory was not substantially covered by other instructions; and (4) the district court’s rejection of Defendant’s proposed jury instructions was not harmless and constituted reversible error. Remanded for a new trial. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of a crime and given a suspended prison sentence and placed on probation. When Defendant completed his probationary period, he was subject to a special sentence of lifetime supervision. After commencing lifetime supervision, Defendant filed a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus, requesting that the district court release him from lifetime supervision or strike the lifetime supervision requirement. The district court denied Defendant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a person who is subject only to lifetime supervision may not file a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his judgment of conviction or sentence because that person is no longer under “sentence of death or imprisonment” as required by Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.724(1). View "Coleman v. State" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with murder and other crimes, charging the murder count as willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and, alternatively, as felony murder in the perpetration of burglary. During the jury trial, Appellant’s theory of defense was that the felony-murder rule did not apply because the underlying felony, burglary, was complete before the killing happened, and thus, the death did not occur “during the perpetration or attempted perpetration” of a felony under Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.030(1)(b). Appellant was subsequently convicted of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, aggravated stalking, and burglary. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction even though the killing in this case occurred after the offense of burglary was complete because section 200.030(1)(b) holds felons strictly responsible for killings that result from their felonious actions. View "Sanchez-Dominguez v. State" on Justia Law