Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this opinion, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on the applicability of NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(2), a statutory provision that divests a juvenile court of jurisdiction over a person who commits a class A or B felony between 16 and 18 years of age but is not identified until after reaching 21 years of age. Defendant Gregory Barren was seventeen years old when he allegedly kidnapped and secually assaulted a woman in 2005. Police identified Defendant from DNA evidence left from bodily fluids at the scene. Defendant was twenty-one when police made the DNA match. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that this statutory provision governs jurisdiction over any proceedings initiated after the provision went into effect on October 1, 2009, regardless of when the offense was committed. Because NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(2) was in effect when the State initiated proceedings against Defendant, the Court concluded that the district court, not the juvenile court, had jurisdiction over his criminal case.

Petitioner Jonathon Whitehead pleaded guilty to DUI causing death and DUI causing substantial bodily harm and subsequently filed a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. A panel of the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Whitehead's petition as untimely. Whitehead filed a petition for rehearing, which the panel denied. Whitehead subsequently petitioned for en banc reconsideration. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that reconsideration was warranted, holding (1) a judgment of conviction that imposes restitution but does not set an amount of restitution, in violation of Nevada statutes, is not final and therefore does not trigger the one-year time limit for filing a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus; and (2) Whitehead's post-conviction petition was timely under this analysis.

Charles Huebler was convicted, pursuant to a guilty plea, of lewdness with a child under fourteen years of age. Huebler subsequently filed an untimely post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he had good cause for his delay in filing the petition because the State improperly withheld surveillance videotapes that were exculpatory, which rendered his guilty plea involuntary. The district court granted relief to Huebler. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State is required under Brady v. Maryland to disclose material exculpatory evidence within its possession to the defense before the entry of a guilty plea; (2) a defendant may challenge the validity of the guilty on the basis of the State's failure to make the required disclosure, but to succeed, the defendant must demonstrate the three components of a Brady violation in the context of a guilty plea; (3) as to the materiality component, the test is whether there is a reasonable probability that but for the State's failure to disclose the evidence the defendant would have refused to plead guilty and would have gone to trial; and (4) Huebler failed to demonstrate that the evidence was material under the materiality component.

After a seven-day jury trial, Kevin Rodriguez was found guilty of multiple criminal counts. Rodriquez appealed, arguing that the district court erred (1) in overruling his objection to the admission of twelve text messages because the State failed to authenticate the messages and the messages constituted inadmissible hearsay, and (2) in overruling his objection to the admission of DNA nonexclusion evidence because the evidence was irrelevant without supporting statistical data. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion in admitting ten of the twelve text messages because the State failed to present sufficient evidence corroborating Appellant's identity as the person who sent the ten messages, but the error was harmless; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by admitting the relevant DNA nonexclusion evidence because, so long as it is relevant, DNA nonexclusion evidence is admissible because any danger of unfair prejudice or of misleading the jury is substantially outweighed by the defendant's ability to cross-examine or offer expert witness evidence as to probative value.

Appellant Beau Maestas pleaded guilty to several charges, and a jury sentenced him to death for first-degree murder. Appellant subsequently sought a new penalty trial based on allegations of juror misconduct and bias, but the district court denied the motion. In these consolidated appeals, Appellant challenged the judgment of conviction and the order denying the motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding principally that (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.556 does not violate the Eighth Amendment because the relevant jurisprudence focuses on whether a capital sentencing scheme sufficiently channels the sentencer's discretion to impose a death sentence and does not afford the district court the discretion to impose a death sentence; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's motion for a new trial because no misconduct or bias was proved.

Appellant Donald Bigpond was charged with battery constituting domestic violence. Before trial, the State filed a motion to admit evidence of prior incidents of domestic violence involving Bigpond and the victim. The district court reserved judgment on the State's motion until trial. During direct examination, the victim recanted her previous statements. The district court decided to admit the victim's prior allegations of domestic violence against Bigpond, determining that they were relevant to explain the relationship between the victim and Bigpond and provide a possible explanation for her recantation. Bigpond was convicted as charged. At issue on appeal was whether evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or acts" may be admitted for a nonpropensity purpose other than those listed in Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.045(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the disputed evidence, as the victim's pretrial accusations against Bigpond placed their relationship in context and provided a possible explanation for the recantation, which assisted the jury in evaluating the victim's credibility.

Michael Pohlabel pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.360. In doing so, he reserved the right to argue on appeal, as he did unsuccessfully in the district court, that his conviction violated the right to keep and bear arms secured by the state and federal constitutions. At issue on appeal was whether Pohlabel, despite his felon status, had a constitutional right to possess a black powder rifle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 202.360(1)(a) does not violate either the state or federal constitutions; (2) while federal law currently permits felons to possess black powder rifles, that does not mandate that Nevada follow suit; and (3) the Legislature used the word "citizen" in Nev. Const. art. I, 11(1) to refer to those persons who are members of the political community, and thus, unpardoned felons are not included among those to whom the Nevada Constitution guarantees the right to keep and bear arms.

Appellant Anthony Toston pleaded guilty to first-degree kidnapping and robbery. Toston subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging, inter alia, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by misadvising him about the right to appeal from a judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea and failing to file an appeal when Toston expressed dissatisfaction at the sentencing hearing. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) counsel's affirmative misinformation about the right to appeal from a judgment of conviction from a guilty plea may fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and therefore be deficient; (2) trial counsel has a duty to file an appeal when, based on the totality of the circumstances, the defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in challenging his conviction or sentence; and (3) because Toston's allegations in his petition were not belied by the record and would entitle Toston to relief if true, Toston was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his appeal-deprivation claims. Remanded.

After real party in interest Bobby Armstrong's vehicle collided with another vehicle, the State charged Armstrong with driving under the influence causing death and/or substantial bodily harm. A single blood sample was taken from Armstrong more than two hours after the collision. The district court granted Armstrong's motion to exclude the blood alcohol test in part, concluding that the retrograde extrapolation that the State would have to use to determine Armstrong's blood alcohol level at the time was driving would be unfairly prejudicial in this case. The State subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to admit the excluded evidence. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) although retrograde extrapolation evidence is relevant in a prosecution for driving under the influence, under certain circumstances such evidence may be unfairly prejudicial and therefore inadmissible; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in excluding the retrograde extrapolation.

Appellant was convicted of three counts of sexual assault and three counts of sexual assault with the use of a deadly weapon causing substantial bodily harm. Appellant was sentenced to six sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for three of the counts, with each sentence to be served consecutively. Appellant subsequently filed an untimely petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his sentences and the manner in which they were imposed amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The district court (1) granted the petition in part, determining that the petition was procedurally barred because the petition was untimely filed, but that new caselaw applied retroactively and provided good cause to excuse the procedural default; and (2) imposed three consecutive life sentences with the possibility of parole after ten years had been served. The Supreme Court reversed in part the district court's partial denial of Appellant' petition, holding that the court abused its discretion in failing to appoint counsel to assist Appellant in the post-conviction proceeding given the severity of the consequences, Appellant's indigency, and the difficulty of the issues presented related to the applicability and scope of the holding in Graham v. Florida. Remanded.