Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Paul Choy filed a complaint in district court alleging various tort claims against respondent Ameristar Casinos. According to the complaint, Choy was gambling at the Ameristar Casino Hotel Kansas City when he was handcuffed by casino security guards and his belongings were searched. Ameristar subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that it was not properly named as a party because Ameristar did not own or operate the Ameristar Casino Hotel Kansas City. In his opposition to Ameristar's motion, Appellant sought a continuance under Nev. R. Civ. P. 56(f) to allow discovery before granting Ameristar's motion. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ameristar and denied Choy's request for a continuance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Choy did not comply with rule 56(f) because he did not attach an affidavit explaining why he sought a continuance of the summary judgment motion to conduct further discovery, and therefore, the district court properly denied Choy's request for a continuance; and (2) the district court properly granted Ameristar's motion for summary judgment because Choy failed to present any evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue regarding Ameristar's ownership or operation or Ameristar Casino Hotel Kansas City.

Allen Smith was fatally shot by Daniel Ott after an altercation in the lounge of the Silver Nugget. Smith's Estate filed suit against the Silver Nugget asserting negligence, wrongful death, and loss of consortium. The district court granted summary judgment for the Silver Nugget on the ground that it did not owe Smith a duty of care under Nev. Rev. Stat. 651.015. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the duty element of a negligence cause of action must be determined as a matter of law by considering whether the wrongful act that precipitated the plaintiff's injury was foreseeable; (2) section 651.015's definition of "foreseeable" provides the appropriate framework for conducting this inquiry in the context of innkeeper liability by codifying the common-law approach that was set forth in Doud v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp.; and (3) because the district court properly applied section 651.015 in determining that the act leading to the victim's death was not foreseeable, Silver Nugget did not owe the victim a duty as a matter of law, and the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Silver Nugget.

Appellant Stuard Stephans and a companion stole six bottles of men's cologne from a retail department store. At trial, the State relied on the store's loss prevention officer to prove both theft and value. The officer testified, over the defense's foundation, hearsay, and best evidence objections, that the stolen goods he recovered bore price tags adding up to $477. Neither the price tags nor duplicates of them were offered or admitted. In order to establish grand larceny, the State needed to prove that the stolen goods had a value of $250 or more. A jury convicted Stephans of grand larceny and burglary, both felonies, and conspiracy to commit larceny, a gross misdemeanor. The Supreme Court (1) reversed and remanded for a new trial on the grand larceny charge, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the officer's testimony, and the defense objections to the testimony should have been sustained; and (2) affirmed the judgment of conviction as to conspiracy and burglary.

Appellant Joseph Francis incurred a $2 million debt at Wynn Las Vegas, a casino. When unable to collect on the debt, Wynn sued Francis for, among other things, breach of contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment. When Wynn deposed Francis during discovery, Wynn invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to nearly every question. Wynn eventually filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted after refusing to permit Francis to withdraw his invocation and denying his request to reopen discovery. At issue on appeal was how, in response to a civil litigant's request for accommodation of his Fifth Amendment privilege, the district court should proceed in order to prevent the opposing party from being unfairly disadvantaged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in response to a civil litigant's request for accommodation of his privilege, the district court should balance the interests of the invoking party and the opposing party's right to fair treatment; and (2) after reviewing the particular considerations in the instant case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Appellant to withdraw his invocation or in denying his request to reopen discovery.

Respondent Aaron Hughes faced several criminal charges for allegedly creating three digital videos of himself engaging in sexual intercourse with a seventeen-year-old. The district court granted Hughes' motion to dismiss one of the charges against him for child pornography, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.710, after finding that the statute was vague and that it only applied to production of pornography involving individuals under sixteen years of age. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the term "minor" in the statute is not constitutionally vague because it has a well-settled and ordinarily understood meaning as an individual under eighteen years of age; and (2) under section 200.710, it is unlawful to use a person under eighteen years of age in producing a pornographic performance. Remanded.

Jerome Ford was convicted of pandering of prostitution pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.300(1)(a), which criminalizes the act of soliciting another person with the specific intent that, in response to the solicitation, she become a prostitute or continue to engage in prostitution. Ford appealed, contending that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statute does not criminalize such a substantial amount of protected expressive activity as to be unconstitutionally overbroad, and statute is not impermissibly vague; (2) the statute applies even when the target is an undercover police officer who disavows having been or intending to become a prostitute; but (3) the jury instructions in this case did not adequately describe the specific intent required for pandering, and the error affected Ford's substantial rights. Remanded for a new trial.

After a jury trial, Appellant Ramon Adam was convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance. During trial, Appellant sought a jury instruction on the procuring agent defense, which generally provides that if a defendant is an agent of the purchaser, then the defendant should only be held as culpable as the purchaser. The district court rejected the instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed after reviewing the trafficking statute and prior caselaw, holding that the district court reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reasons, when it refused to instruct the jury on the procuring agent defense. The Court further held (1) the procuring agent defense is inapplicable to trafficking charges, regardless of the theory the defendant is charged under, whether sale, manufacture, delivery, or actual constructive possession; and (2) any prior precedent inconsistent with this opinion was overruled.

Appellant was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence of a controlled substance causing substantial bodily harm. Part of the evidence heard by the jury came from a paramedic who took appellant by ambulance to the hospital. The paramedic testified that appellant confided he had smoked marijuana before the accident. Appellant argued that his statement to the paramedic was inadmissible because it was protected by Nevadaâs doctor-patient privilege. The district court rejected the argument. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the term âdoctor,â as defined in Nev. Rev. Stat. 49.215(2), does not include EMTs or paramedics, and thus the doctor-patient relationship required for the privilege to attach did not arise simply because appellant spoke to the paramedic in confidence. The Court also held that the statement was not privileged under Nev. Rev. Stat. 49.225, which protects communications among the patient and persons âunder direction of the doctorâ because the paramedic was acting as an independent EMT and not under the supervision or direction of a doctor in a doctor-patient relationship with appellant.

Appellant was charged with a felony DUI, pleaded not guilty and went to trial where a jury convicted him. At issue was Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.340, which allows a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a first felony DUI to undergo treatment. The appellant argued that Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.340 is unconstitutional because it impermissibly burdens exercise of the right to a trial and treats defendants differently based on their exercise of that right in violation of due process and equal protection. The district court determined that while there is a fundamental right to a jury trial for serious criminal offenses, there is no fundamental right to participate in an alcohol treatment diversion program. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the possibility of entering an alcohol treatment program is a form of leniency available in exchange for a guilty plea and does not penalize a defendant for exercising the fundamental right to a jury trial; and (2) all defendants charged with felony DUI are given the same protection of the law enjoyed by other classes in like circumstances, and therefore the statute does not violate equal protection.

The district courts reached different conclusions regarding whether inmates were entitled to due process protections related to their parole release hearings. In 2007, Respondent Richard Morrow was certified as not being a "high risk to reoffend" and granted parole. Before being released, the Parole Board's Psychological Review Panel assessed him as a "Tier III" sex offender which precluded Morrow from being released. Due to the new assessment, the Parole Board ultimately decided to defer Morrow's parole for two years. Morrow challenged the Parole Board's procedure by filing a writ of mandamus at the district court seeking a new parole hearing. Morrow argued that the Board violated his due process rights because it did not notify him of the reconsideration, and it denied him access to the documents it relied on when it deferred his parole. The district court granted the writ and directed the Board to schedule a new hearing. The Board appealed that decision. Appellant Brian Kamedula was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. In 2008, the Parole Board denied Kamedula parole, and he appealed to the district court. Kamedula argued that the Board violated his due process rights by denying him the ability to present evidence or cross-examine witnesses during the parole hearing. The Board moved to dismiss the appeal, which the district court granted. Kamedula appealed that decision. In considering the issue on appeal, the Supreme Court noted that no statutory due process protections applied in these particular cases because the possibility of release on parole is not a protectable liberty interest for an inmate. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court in Morrow's case, and affirmed the court in Kamedula's case.