Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case centers on a defendant who was accused of touching a minor inappropriately during a trip to the store in October 2021. Two months after the alleged incident, the victim made a separate allegation against her father, claiming he had broken her half-sister’s leg, based on a social media post. This accusation was later determined to be false after investigation, with the victim’s mother and a counselor concluding the report was made due to the victim’s misunderstanding and feelings toward her father. The defendant was indicted on multiple counts of sexual assault and simple assault, with events alleged to have occurred in Gilford and Laconia.The Superior Court (Attorri, J.) presided over the trial. Before trial, the defendant sought to cross-examine the victim about her false accusation against her father, arguing it was relevant to her credibility. The initial ruling permitted this, but upon the State’s motion for reconsideration, the court excluded the evidence, finding it not probative of the victim’s character for truthfulness because she believed the accusation was true when made. At trial, the State introduced limited evidence regarding the defendant’s alcohol consumption on the day of the alleged assaults. When the jury inquired about the locations of the alleged offenses, the court declined to provide the indictments, instructing the jury to rely on its recollection of the evidence.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding cross-examination on the false allegation, as it lacked sufficient probative value and risked confusing the jury. The court also ruled that the trial judge’s response to the jury’s question was proper and that any error in admitting evidence of the defendant’s alcohol consumption was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The convictions were affirmed. View "State v. Hodgdon" on Justia Law

The defendant owned a house on Farm Island, New Hampshire, near a summer camp with which he had a history of disputes. After hearing a group outside his house at night, he yelled at them and, when unable to reach the police, left a voicemail for the camp, using profane language and stating, “you better get them the f**k out of here or I will shoot them.” He also accused the group of damaging his property. The State charged him with harassment, alleging that his communication constituted a threat to the life or safety of another, made with the purpose to annoy or alarm.The Superior Court of Carroll County held a jury trial. During trial, the State introduced the voicemail, evidence of the contentious relationship between the defendant and the camp, and testimony from camp staff and police. Over the defendant’s objections, the court admitted testimony from a camp director about security measures the camp undertook in response to the message, including ceasing use of part of the island and enhancing security. The defendant moved to dismiss for insufficient evidence of the required mental state; the court denied the motion. The jury convicted the defendant, and he appealed.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant acted with the purpose to annoy or alarm and that the communication constituted a true threat as defined by federal law. However, the court found that admitting testimony about the camp’s security response was error under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 403, as its limited probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. This error was not harmless. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire therefore reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Owen" on Justia Law

After a traffic collision, the defendant exited his vehicle—leaving his ten-year-old child alone inside, where a loaded but unchambered firearm was holstered in the front seat—and confronted the other driver. The defendant smashed the other driver’s window with a baton, then struck and kicked him multiple times after the driver exited his vehicle and fell to the ground. Several motorists witnessed the altercation and contacted authorities. The defendant departed before police arrived, but later called 911 and was arrested. During the arrest, he disclosed the presence of both his child and the firearm in his vehicle.The Superior Court (Edwards, J.) presided over the ensuing jury trial, in which the defendant was convicted of reckless conduct (for leaving his child unsupervised in a car with a gun), second degree assault (for striking with a baton), two counts of simple assault (for kicking), and criminal mischief. The defendant appealed three of these convictions, contending: that there was insufficient evidence for reckless conduct; that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on self-defense for the second degree assault charge; and that the court wrongly refused a specific unanimity instruction for the simple assault charge.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It determined that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the reckless conduct conviction, as no rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk to his child. The court held that the self-defense instruction for second degree assault improperly directed the jury regarding the element of deadly force and thus constituted reversible error. Finally, it found that the court's refusal to give a specific unanimity instruction on the simple assault charge was also reversible error. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the convictions for reckless conduct, second degree assault, and simple assault, and remanded the latter two for further proceedings. View "State v. Price" on Justia Law

A man was stopped by police while walking along a road after a report of a violent incident involving a vehicle and a fleeing suspect. The man matched the description of the person who fled the scene. Without first giving Miranda warnings, an officer handcuffed him and questioned him briefly at the roadside, where he made limited admissions about a fight. Hours later, at the police station, different officers gave him Miranda warnings, obtained a signed waiver, and questioned him further. During this interview, the man made additional incriminating statements. He was later indicted for two forms of second degree murder based on the death of the other individual involved in the incident.The Superior Court partially granted and partially denied the defendant’s motion to suppress his statements. It suppressed the initial roadside statements, finding a Miranda violation, and also suppressed statements made after the defendant invoked his right to remain silent. However, the court found that the post-Miranda statements made at the police station were voluntary and admissible. At trial, the jury convicted the defendant of reckless second degree murder and acquitted him of knowing second degree murder. The defendant also objected to the admission of certain recorded jail calls, arguing they were irrelevant.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court erred in admitting the post-Miranda interview statements and the jail calls. The court held that the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s post-Miranda statements were voluntary was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, considering the circumstances and the break between interviews. Regarding the jail calls, the court held that even assuming error in admitting certain portions, any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to overwhelming evidence of guilt. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Sleeper" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted on criminal charges and released on bail. His counsel raised concerns about his competency to stand trial, prompting the trial court to order a competency evaluation as provided by statute. The appointed evaluator, the Office of the Forensic Examiner, informed the court that it could not complete the evaluation within the ninety-day statutory period. The State requested an extension, which the court granted for an additional ninety days. When it became clear that the evaluation would still not be completed on time, the State sought a second extension or appointment of a different evaluator. The court denied the second extension and dismissed the charges, finding that the statutory timeframe was mandatory and permitted only one extension per party.After the trial court (Superior Court) dismissed the case, the State moved for reconsideration, which was denied. The State then appealed, arguing that the statute did not impose a mandatory, jurisdictional deadline for competency evaluations and that dismissal was not required when the deadline was missed, especially if extensions had been granted.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the statutory language and found that RSA 135:17, I(a) does not set a mandatory deadline for completion of competency evaluations. The Court reasoned that the statute’s use of “shall” is modified by the phrase allowing either party to request an extension, and nothing in the statute limits the number of extensions a court may grant. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court was not legally required to deny the State’s second extension request or to dismiss the charges for missing the extended deadline. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Cormiea" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was indicted in 2022 on two charges in the northern judicial district of Hillsborough County, New Hampshire. While serving a separate sentence in Pennsylvania in 2023, a detainer was lodged against him for these charges. On December 21, 2023, the defendant signed a request under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) for final disposition of his pending New Hampshire charges. This request was sent by the Pennsylvania correctional facility to both the Hillsborough County Attorney’s Office and the Superior Court in Nashua (Hillsborough-South), rather than the Superior Court in Manchester (Hillsborough-North), where the charges were pending. The State delayed processing the paperwork, and the defendant was not brought to trial within the IAD’s 180-day period.The Superior Court (Messer, J.) initially granted the State’s motion for a 120-day extension but, upon reconsideration, found the State lacked good cause for the delay. The court determined that the defendant’s request had been adequately served and attributed the delay to the State’s inaction. As a result, the court dismissed the indictments with prejudice after concluding the State failed to bring the defendant to trial within the required period. The State’s subsequent motion to reconsider was denied as untimely.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the 180-day period under the IAD began when the defendant’s request was delivered to Hillsborough-South instead of Hillsborough-North. The court held that under New Hampshire law, service on any superior court within the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction is sufficient to trigger the IAD timeline. The court found that the defendant had complied with the IAD, and affirmed the dismissal of the indictments with prejudice. View "State v. Laforest" on Justia Law

Police responded to a hotel after receiving a report about a missing juvenile. Upon arrival, they found a juvenile matching the description, apparently unclothed under the covers, with visible red marks and empty alcohol containers in the room. The defendant, a 24-year-old man, was present and admitted to meeting the juvenile at a bus stop and consuming alcohol with her, believing she was over eighteen. The officers arrested the defendant for allegedly providing alcohol to a minor and seized his cell phone during a search incident to arrest. Subsequent investigation revealed that the juvenile, who was fourteen or fifteen, had met the defendant online, disclosed her age, and described sexual activity with him. Police obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s cell phone, which led to the discovery of explicit messages and images, resulting in multiple charges.The Rockingham County Superior Court held a hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress the cell phone evidence, during which the State conceded that the arrest was unlawful. The court assumed the arrest and seizure of the phone were unlawful but denied the motion to suppress, finding that the evidence was obtained through an independent source: the search warrant based on information from the juvenile and the missing person investigation, not the arrest itself. The defendant was convicted on all charges after a bench trial on stipulated facts.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that, even assuming the arrest and seizure were unlawful, the evidence from the cell phone was admissible under the independent source doctrine. The search warrant was supported by information independent of the unlawful arrest, and the police did not exploit the illegality to obtain the evidence. Therefore, the exclusionary rule did not require suppression of the cell phone evidence. View "State v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant who was charged with multiple offenses, including second degree assault – domestic violence, kidnapping – domestic violence, criminal threatening, and simple assault – domestic violence, following an incident with his spouse in August 2020. The couple had a tumultuous relationship marked by financial disputes and prior altercations. During the charged incident, the defendant physically assaulted and threatened the complainant, leading her to obtain a restraining order the next day. While incarcerated, the defendant later attempted to contact the complainant in violation of that order.Before trial in the Superior Court, the State sought to introduce evidence of a prior assault by the defendant in July 2020, the complainant’s acquisition of a restraining order, and the defendant’s subsequent violation of that order. The defendant objected, but the Superior Court (Schulman, J.) admitted all three pieces of evidence, reasoning they were relevant to the defendant’s intent and the context of the relationship. At trial, the jury acquitted the defendant on one count of simple assault but convicted him on all other charges.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court erred in admitting the evidence under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b). The Supreme Court held that the probative value of the July 2020 incident was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and that the evidence of the restraining order and its violation improperly relied on propensity inferences. The Court further found that these errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given their potential impact on the jury’s assessment of the complainant’s credibility. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Moses" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault and sexual assault based on conduct that occurred when the victim was between fifteen and seventeen years old. The defendant, who was significantly older than the victim, met her when she was nine and became a father figure and religious leader in her life, especially as her relationship with her biological father became distant. The victim spent considerable time with the defendant and his family, referred to him as “dad,” and worked for him. The alleged assaults occurred over several years in various locations, but the charges did not include an initial incident in Manchester when the victim was fifteen.In the Superior Court, the defendant moved to prevent the State from arguing that his roles as a father figure and religious leader constituted a “position of authority” under the relevant statute, and to exclude evidence of the uncharged Manchester incident. The court denied both motions, allowing the State to present its arguments and evidence. After a twelve-day jury trial with twenty-one witnesses, the jury found the defendant guilty on nine counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault and eight counts of sexual assault.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that the statutory term “position of authority” does not require a formal or official relationship, and that roles such as father figure or religious leader can qualify. The court found sufficient evidence that the defendant’s role as a father figure gave him authority over the victim, which he used to coerce her. Even assuming error in admitting evidence of the Manchester incident or in allowing arguments about religious authority, the court concluded any such error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt based on the father figure relationship. The convictions were affirmed. View "State v. Reed" on Justia Law

The defendant, a visiting nurse, was charged with two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) and four counts of misdemeanor sexual assault (MSA) based on events that allegedly occurred while he was providing care to the victim. The charges included allegations under RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) (sexual assault by medical provider) and I(i) (sexual assault by surprise). The victim was over the age of 13 at the time of the alleged assaults.The defendant notified the court of his intention to assert a consent defense under RSA 626:6, I. The State moved to preclude this defense, leading to substantial pre-trial litigation. The trial court directed the parties to prepare an interlocutory appeal statement, which was approved and transferred to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed three questions: whether consent is a defense under RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1); whether RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; and whether consent is a defense under RSA 632-A:2, I(i). The court held that consent is not a defense under RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) because the Nurse Practice Act (NPA) prohibits sexual conduct between nurses and patients, making such conduct professionally unethical or unacceptable. The court also found that RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) is not unconstitutionally vague.Regarding RSA 632-A:2, I(i), the court concluded that consent cannot be a legal defense because if the defendant admitted to causing sexual contact through concealment or surprise, it would inherently mean the victim did not consent. However, the defendant may present evidence of the victim's consent to support his theory of the case, allowing the factfinder to evaluate the credibility of the evidence.The court answered all three questions in the negative and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Allore" on Justia Law