Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant, Matthew Clark, is charged with a felony count of criminal threatening with a deadly weapon. The complainant recorded a conversation with the defendant without his consent, in which he made potentially incriminating statements. The complainant later reported the incident to law enforcement and provided them with the recording.The defendant moved to suppress the recording, arguing it was made without his consent in violation of RSA chapter 570-A, which he claimed required suppression of any such recording. The State objected. The Superior Court denied the motion, concluding that suppression under RSA 570-A:6 is required only for felony violations of the Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Law. The court determined that the complainant's recording constituted a misdemeanor violation since she was a party to the communication, and thus, suppression was not warranted.The defendant moved for reconsideration, reasserting his argument that any violation of RSA chapter 570-A requires suppression. The trial court denied the motion and certified three interlocutory questions to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. The Supreme Court held that suppression under RSA 570-A:6 is required only when the information is part of or derived from a communication intercepted in violation of the felony provision of the Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Law. The court clarified that a one-party recording can be either a misdemeanor or a felony depending on the mental state of the person making the recording. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine whether the complainant's recording constituted a felony violation due to her subsequent disclosure to law enforcement. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

In the early morning of September 12, 2020, Brookline Police Officer Torrisi encountered a vehicle stopped in the roadway. Upon approaching, he noticed signs of intoxication in the driver, Roy Rogers, whose license was suspended. After administering field sobriety tests, Torrisi determined Rogers was impaired and attempted to arrest him. Rogers resisted, leading to a prolonged encounter involving another officer and a friend of Rogers who arrived at the scene. Despite resistance, Rogers was eventually handcuffed and taken to the police station, where he agreed to a breathalyzer test, which showed a result of .07. Rogers was initially given a hand summons for operating after suspension and allowed to leave.The Circuit Court (Derby, J.) found Rogers guilty of driving under the influence and five counts of resisting arrest but not guilty of negligent driving. Rogers moved to dismiss all charges, arguing that the officers had promised not to prosecute if his breathalyzer result was under .08. The court denied the motion, stating there was no enforceable agreement and that enforcing such an agreement would be against public policy. Rogers was convicted on the remaining charges, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court held that there was no enforceable agreement not to prosecute, as there was no meeting of the minds between Rogers and the officers. Additionally, the court addressed Rogers' double jeopardy claim, concluding that the unit of prosecution for resisting arrest is each discrete volitional act of resistance. The court affirmed Rogers' conviction for driving under the influence and two counts of resisting arrest but vacated three of the resisting arrest convictions, determining they constituted a single continuous course of conduct. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "State v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Three retired New Hampshire State Police troopers challenged their inclusion on the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES), claiming their placement was based on outdated and misinterpreted conduct. Approximately twenty years ago, the troopers inflated traffic stop records in their activity logs to meet mandated quotas. An internal investigation led to their discipline but not termination. Initially placed on the "Laurie List," their names were later removed, only to be reinstated on the EES over a decade later.The Superior Court dismissed the troopers' complaint, finding their conduct potentially exculpatory and their placement on the EES appropriate. The court also ruled that the troopers had received adequate due process. The troopers appealed, arguing that their conduct was not fraudulent and that the age of the conduct diminished its relevance.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case, focusing on whether the troopers' conduct was "potentially exculpatory" under RSA 105:13-d. The court noted that "potentially exculpatory evidence" includes evidence that could be material to guilt or punishment, including impeachment evidence. The court emphasized that factors such as the age and nature of the conduct should be considered in determining its relevance.The court concluded that the limited record did not establish whether the troopers' conduct was potentially exculpatory, as it could have been a result of a mistaken interpretation of reporting requirements rather than dishonesty. Therefore, the court reversed the Superior Court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the potential exculpatory nature of the conduct, considering its admissibility and relevance in future criminal cases. View "Doe v. N.H. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

On August 2, 2021, the defendant drove through a red light at high speed in Manchester, New Hampshire, hitting three vehicles and causing significant damage. His car flipped over and landed on another vehicle, leading to a multi-car collision. A paramedic found the defendant unconscious with symptoms suggesting opioid use and administered Narcan. At the hospital, a police officer observed the defendant's lethargy and pinpoint pupils, indicative of opioid influence.The defendant was charged with multiple offenses, including second-degree assault and reckless conduct. Before trial, he moved to exclude testimony from a paramedic and a victim about signs of opioid use, arguing it was inadmissible expert testimony. The Superior Court allowed the testimony, provided it was based on the witnesses' observations. The jury convicted the defendant on five counts of reckless conduct but acquitted him of disobeying a police officer. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to merge the reckless conduct charges for sentencing, resulting in five separate sentences.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that any error in admitting lay witness testimony about opioid use was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's reckless conduct. The court also found that the defendant's argument against the State's closing argument references to opioid use was not preserved for appeal. However, the court agreed with the defendant that the reckless conduct charges should be merged for sentencing, as the statute focuses on the defendant's conduct rather than the number of persons endangered. The court affirmed the convictions but reversed the trial court's decision on sentencing and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Van Uden" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of three counts of domestic violence simple assault following a jury trial. The incidents occurred during two altercations between the defendant and the complainant on October 12 and October 15, 2019. The complainant recorded a video of the October 12 altercation on her cell phone. The defendant moved to exclude excerpts of this video, arguing that he had not received the entire video despite multiple discovery requests. The trial court granted this motion.Before the trial began, the State intended to have a detective testify about the content of the excluded video excerpts. The defendant objected, arguing that this would undermine the court’s prior ruling. The trial court allowed the detective’s testimony and instructed the jury that it could consider the absence of the rest of the video in determining whether the State had met its burden of proof. The jury convicted the defendant on the October 12 charges but acquitted him on the October 15 charge.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in admitting the detective’s testimony about the excluded video excerpts. The court held that this ruling was inconsistent with the trial court’s prior decision to exclude the video excerpts and that the inconsistency prejudiced the defendant’s case. The court noted that the detective’s testimony corroborated the complainant’s account and bolstered her credibility, which was crucial in a case that hinged on the complainant’s credibility.The Supreme Court concluded that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the erroneously admitted testimony likely influenced the jury’s verdict. Therefore, the court reversed the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Voight" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of five counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) involving a minor, including two counts of cunnilingus, two counts of vaginal intercourse, and one count of a pattern of sexual assaults causing severe mental anguish or trauma. The assaults occurred between December 2017 and December 2020, and the victim disclosed them in April 2021. The defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for the pattern sexual assault charge and errors in the trial court's handling of certain records.The Superior Court conducted a jury trial in November 2022. The trial court reviewed the victim's DCYF and counseling records in camera, disclosing some DCYF records but none of the counseling records. The defendant's motion to dismiss the indictments for insufficient evidence was denied, and the jury found him guilty on all counts.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court first addressed the sufficiency of the evidence, particularly regarding the "extreme mental anguish or trauma" element of the pattern AFSA charge. The court found that the victim's testimony about her emotional distress, nightmares, and difficulty trusting people, along with her demeanor during testimony and interviews, provided sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find extreme mental anguish or trauma. Thus, the court concluded there was no plain error.The court also reviewed the trial court's handling of the in camera review of the victim's records. It determined that the trial court applied the correct standard and that its decisions regarding the disclosure of the records were not clearly unreasonable or untenable. Consequently, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the trial court's decisions and the defendant's convictions. View "State v. Hodges" on Justia Law

The defendant, Otto Keller, was involved in a car accident after falling asleep while driving, resulting in a collision with an unoccupied car and a house. He admitted to using heroin and being involved in a methadone clinic. A blood test revealed multiple drugs in his system. Keller was charged with aggravated driving while intoxicated (ADWI) for causing a collision resulting in serious bodily injury, specifically a broken right humerus.The Superior Court denied Keller's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Colleen Scarneo, the State’s expert in human performance forensic toxicology, and his motion to dismiss the ADWI charge for insufficient evidence of serious bodily injury. The court found Scarneo’s methodology reliable under RSA 516:29-a and Daubert standards. At trial, Scarneo testified that Keller exhibited signs of impairment consistent with the drugs found in his system. The jury found Keller guilty of ADWI.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in admitting Scarneo’s testimony because her methodology was not sufficiently reliable. The court found that her methodology had not been tested, subjected to peer review, had no known error rate, and was not generally accepted in the scientific community. Additionally, the court determined that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Keller’s broken arm constituted a serious bodily injury as defined by RSA 625:11, VI.The Supreme Court reversed Keller’s ADWI conviction due to insufficient evidence of serious bodily injury and the prejudicial admission of unreliable expert testimony. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion, specifically for a new trial on the lesser-included charge of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol (DWI). View "State v. Keller" on Justia Law

The defendant, Benjamin Sargent, was the chief of the Litchfield Police Department (LPD) and was convicted of official oppression for violating the sexual harassment policies of LPD and the Town of Litchfield. The conviction stemmed from his communications with a probationary police officer on December 31, 2021, and January 1, 2022, during which he made suggestive comments, expressed romantic interest, and implied that she could advance in her career if she "stuck with him."The Circuit Court (Derby, J.) found Sargent guilty, concluding that he sought to benefit himself by obtaining emotional support and validation from the complainant. The court also denied Sargent's motion to dismiss, which argued that the statute was void for vagueness and overbreadth.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the trial court had interpreted the phrase "to benefit himself" too broadly. The Supreme Court concluded that the term should be understood to mean seeking a specific advantage or gain, rather than a momentary personal, emotional, or psychological benefit. The court found that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sargent sought such a specific benefit in his communications with the complainant.As a result, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court's interpretation of "to benefit himself" was incorrect and that the evidence did not support the conclusion that Sargent acted with the purpose of obtaining a specific benefit as required by RSA 643:1. View "State v. Sargent" on Justia Law

The defendant, Gabriel Chalpin, was convicted of first-degree assault, enhanced for manifesting exceptional cruelty or depravity, and second-degree assault for recklessly causing bodily injury under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life. The incidents occurred on February 2, 2018, when Chalpin assaulted the victim, his romantic partner, causing multiple injuries including collapsed lungs, fractured ribs, a broken nose, and a fractured spine.The Superior Court (Brown, J.) held a jury trial in March 2019, where the jury convicted Chalpin on multiple counts of first and second-degree assault. The court sentenced him on two counts of enhanced first-degree assault and two counts of second-degree assault – extreme indifference. Chalpin moved to dismiss all but one charge based on double jeopardy, which the court initially denied. However, after further motions, the court reconsidered and found that the events could be divided into two separate assaults, reducing the convictions to one count of enhanced first-degree assault and one count of second-degree assault – extreme indifference.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court's jury instruction on the definition of "cruelty" was sustainable. The court also found sufficient evidence to sustain both the enhanced first-degree assault and second-degree assault – extreme indifference convictions. Additionally, the Supreme Court determined that there was sufficient evidence to support four separate assault convictions, reversing the trial court's unit of prosecution ruling. The case was remanded for entry of the four convictions and reinstatement of the original sentences. View "State v. Chalpin" on Justia Law

The defendant, Avram M. Niebling, was arrested for driving under the influence. During the arrest, the officer conducted a pat-down search and removed a wallet from the defendant's pocket. The wallet was not searched at the scene but was placed in an evidence bag and taken to the police station. At the station, during the booking process, the officers counted the cash in the wallet and looked inside for the defendant's driver's license. In doing so, they discovered two white pills identified as oxycodone. The defendant was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled drug.The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the wallet, arguing that there was no applicable exception to a warrantless search of the wallet during the booking process. The Superior Court denied the motion, finding that the search of the wallet constituted a search incident to arrest. The defendant appealed, arguing that the warrantless search of his wallet was neither conducted incident to arrest nor conducted pursuant to a neutral inventory policy, and was therefore unreasonable and unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that a search that may be made at the time and place of arrest also may be legally conducted when the arrested individual later arrives at a place of detention. The court found that because the defendant's wallet was seized during a lawful arrest, the officer was permitted to search it at the police station during the booking process without a warrant. The court distinguished this case from others where the property was searched at the officer's convenience after passage of appreciable time and was at all times under the exclusive control of the arresting officer. In this case, the arresting officer obtained possession of the defendant's wallet during a lawful arrest and looked inside it at the time of the defendant's booking at the police station while the defendant was present. Therefore, the court held that the trial court did not err in determining that the search of the wallet fell within the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. View "State v. Niebling" on Justia Law