Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted defendant Craig Sanborn on two counts each of manslaughter and negligent homicide as the result of an explosion that killed two employees at his gunpowder factory. The court sentenced him to consecutive terms in the state prison on the manslaughter convictions only. On appeal, defendant challenged, among other things, the manner in which the jury was selected, the sufficiency of the evidence, the verdict, and the sentences. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Sanborn" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Christopher Palermo on one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault, one count of criminal trespass, and two counts of simple assault. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by: (1) ruling that the State sufficiently authenticated certain Facebook messages; (2) admitting evidence of his prior incarceration, parole status, and civil lawsuit against the New Hampshire State Prison; and (3) allowing the State to introduce a photograph of him. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Palermo" on Justia Law

Defendant Marianne King was convicted by jury on one count of theft by unauthorized taking. At trial, defendant argued that it was error to instruct the jury that “if there is a conflict between witnesses who offer direct evidence concerning certain facts, you must decide which witness to believe.” She argued that this instruction, which, for the purposes of this appeal (“the Germain direct-evidence instruction”), was “misleading” because it conflicted with the State’s burden to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court overruled defendant’s objection to the instruction. After review, the Supreme Court made a slight adjustment to the wording of the instruction that the trial court repeated verbatim, but otherwise affirmed the judgment and conviction. View "New Hampshire v. King" on Justia Law

Defendant Lisa Tagalakis Fedor was convicted by jury of knowingly keeping or maintaining a common nuisance. Defendant lived in Manchester with her boyfriend and her two children. In January 2013, the boyfriend approached defendant about allowing Robert Doane to move in with them. Doane was an acquaintance of the boyfriend’s from whom the boyfriend had purchased heroin. Defendant agreed to allow Doane to move into a spare bedroom. Defendant knew that Doane sold drugs and allowed him to continue to do so after he moved in, but asked him not to sell drugs inside the house. After moving in, Doane began selling heroin on the street outside of the residence. Inside the residence, Doane installed a padlock on his bedroom door, but defendant had witnessed Doane in his bedroom, packaging heroin into “individual baggies.” Doane, despite being a convicted felon, also obtained a stolen firearm that he kept in the house. Defendant was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit the sale of a controlled drug and one count of knowingly keeping or maintaining a common nuisance. Defendant moved for JNOV, or, in the alternative, to set aside the verdict. The trial court denied her requests for relief, and this appeal followed. Defendant argued on appeal that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied her motion for JNOV, specifically, that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove that her residence was “used for the selling of the controlled drug heroin” because “drugs were not sold from inside the residence”; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that she “maintained a common nuisance under RSA 318-B:16” because she “did not control or ‘maintain’ Doane’s padlocked room.” The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict was supported by the evidence at trial, and did not constitute an unsustainable exercise of discretion. View "New Hampshire v. Fedor" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, defendant Samuel Pennock, appealed his conviction by a jury of felony simple assault, and the superior court’s denial of his post-conviction motion to vacate his sentence and for a new trial. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by: (1) substantively admitting the victim’s pretrial oral and written statements under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule (N.H. R. Ev. 803(2)); (2) denying his motion to dismiss the simple assault charge; (3) denying his post-conviction motion to reduce that charge to a class B misdemeanor and to resentence him accordingly; and (4) denying his post-conviction motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Pennock" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, defendant James Houghton was convicted on 23 charges of possession of child pornography. On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) 15 of the charges involved depictions of individuals under the age of 18; and (2) one of the charges involved a depiction of “sexually explicit conduct.” After review, the Supreme Court concluded that, as to nine of the charges, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individuals depicted in the photographs were under the age of 18. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. View "New Hampshire v. Houghton" on Justia Law

Defendant was a Michigan-based company that “assists corporations in complying with regulations associated with the conduct of corporate business by supplying annual corporate consent documents” by way of direct mail. Defendant mailed solicitations to potential customers. Its New Hampshire mailing address was “a private mailbox used as a clearinghouse to receive and bundle orders from New Hampshire customers.” According to defendant, as a result of these direct mailings, it made sales in New Hampshire totaling $12,625. A grand jury indicted defendant on 27 felony violations of the Consumer Protection Act, encompassing three sets of nine charges, all stemming from defendant’s allegedly deceptive use of the New Hampshire mailing address in 2013. The State appealed a Superior Court order dismissing the 27 indictments, ruling that the indictments were defective because they alleged that the defendant acted with the mental state of “knowingly,” and not “purposely.” Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. View "New Hampshire v. Mandatory Poster Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant James Perry was indicted on one count of attempted kidnapping and one count of criminal restraint arising out of a single course of conduct in late 2011. A jury convicted defendant on both counts, but, because the offenses arose out of the same uninterrupted course of conduct, the trial court sentenced defendant only on the attempted kidnapping conviction, while holding the criminal restraint conviction in abeyance pending the outcome of any appeal. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by: (1) admitting the victim’s in-court identification of the defendant when she had not made a prior out-of-court identification; and (2) sentencing him for a class A felony when the indictment failed to allege, and the jury was not instructed to find, a fact necessary for that level offense; namely, that he did not “voluntarily release[] the victim without serious bodily injury and in a safe place prior to trial.” Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s kidnapping conviction, but vacated his sentence, and remanded for sentencing consistent with class B felony standards. View "New Hampshire v. Perry" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Paul Costella on two counts of criminal threatening, and one count of disorderly conduct. Defendant brought his car to Wal-Mart for an oil change. Jane Sylvestre, an employee in the automobile department, drove the defendant’s car into the service bay. While in the defendant’s car, Sylvestre saw a photograph of the defendant and his daughter in front of a red flag with a swastika on it. Sylvestre took offense because the Nazis had killed her uncle, who had been a member of the French resistance. After parking the car in the service bay, Sylvestre returned to the service area, where she told the defendant that she had the right to refuse service to customers with whom she was uncomfortable. In response, the defendant asked Sylvestre if she was a Jew. After the oil change had been completed, a second employee handed the car keys to the defendant. As Sylvestre started to process the invoice, the defendant asked her if she had seen his gun, saying, "It’s a Jew killing killer." He also accused Sylvestre of "wreck[ing]" his car because she was "a stupid Jew that doesn’t know how to drive a car." The defendant then paid his bill. As he was leaving, the defendant declared (to no one in particular, but audibly, and within earshot of Sylvestre) that he was "getting his gun to kill the Jew b***h behind the counter." Defendant was indicted for disorderly conduct and charged with two counts of criminal threatening, one count for his statements to Sylvestre, and the other for his statements to other store employees. Prior to trial, the State notified defendant that pursuant to the hate crime statute it would seek enhanced penalties on the criminal threatening charges. On appeal, defendant argued that the superior court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to dismiss the hate crime enhancement; and (2) excluded the testimony of his daughter that he was not motivated by hostility towards Judaism. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Costella" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in Superior Court defendant, Timothy McKenna was convicted of six counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his statements to the police on the ground that he was subject to a custodial interrogation without being informed of his Miranda rights. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the motion. Defendant appealed. Upon review of the facts in record, the Supreme Court found no evidence in that before or during his interrogation defendant was told that he was free to leave the property or informed of his Miranda rights. Nor was there evidence that the officers informed him that he was free to ask them to leave the property, or that he was not required to answer their questions. As such, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. McKenna" on Justia Law