Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant James Perry was indicted on one count of attempted kidnapping and one count of criminal restraint arising out of a single course of conduct in late 2011. A jury convicted defendant on both counts, but, because the offenses arose out of the same uninterrupted course of conduct, the trial court sentenced defendant only on the attempted kidnapping conviction, while holding the criminal restraint conviction in abeyance pending the outcome of any appeal. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by: (1) admitting the victim’s in-court identification of the defendant when she had not made a prior out-of-court identification; and (2) sentencing him for a class A felony when the indictment failed to allege, and the jury was not instructed to find, a fact necessary for that level offense; namely, that he did not “voluntarily release[] the victim without serious bodily injury and in a safe place prior to trial.” Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s kidnapping conviction, but vacated his sentence, and remanded for sentencing consistent with class B felony standards. View "New Hampshire v. Perry" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Paul Costella on two counts of criminal threatening, and one count of disorderly conduct. Defendant brought his car to Wal-Mart for an oil change. Jane Sylvestre, an employee in the automobile department, drove the defendant’s car into the service bay. While in the defendant’s car, Sylvestre saw a photograph of the defendant and his daughter in front of a red flag with a swastika on it. Sylvestre took offense because the Nazis had killed her uncle, who had been a member of the French resistance. After parking the car in the service bay, Sylvestre returned to the service area, where she told the defendant that she had the right to refuse service to customers with whom she was uncomfortable. In response, the defendant asked Sylvestre if she was a Jew. After the oil change had been completed, a second employee handed the car keys to the defendant. As Sylvestre started to process the invoice, the defendant asked her if she had seen his gun, saying, "It’s a Jew killing killer." He also accused Sylvestre of "wreck[ing]" his car because she was "a stupid Jew that doesn’t know how to drive a car." The defendant then paid his bill. As he was leaving, the defendant declared (to no one in particular, but audibly, and within earshot of Sylvestre) that he was "getting his gun to kill the Jew b***h behind the counter." Defendant was indicted for disorderly conduct and charged with two counts of criminal threatening, one count for his statements to Sylvestre, and the other for his statements to other store employees. Prior to trial, the State notified defendant that pursuant to the hate crime statute it would seek enhanced penalties on the criminal threatening charges. On appeal, defendant argued that the superior court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to dismiss the hate crime enhancement; and (2) excluded the testimony of his daughter that he was not motivated by hostility towards Judaism. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Costella" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in Superior Court defendant, Timothy McKenna was convicted of six counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his statements to the police on the ground that he was subject to a custodial interrogation without being informed of his Miranda rights. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the motion. Defendant appealed. Upon review of the facts in record, the Supreme Court found no evidence in that before or during his interrogation defendant was told that he was free to leave the property or informed of his Miranda rights. Nor was there evidence that the officers informed him that he was free to ask them to leave the property, or that he was not required to answer their questions. As such, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. McKenna" on Justia Law

The respondents were convicted of first degree murder for offenses committed when they were seventeen years old. Accordingly, they each received a statutorily-mandated sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On June 25, 2012, after all of the respondents’ convictions had become final, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)). In this Rule 11 petition, the State appealed the superior court's determination that the rule announced in "Miller" applied retroactively to the respondents. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decisions. View "Petition of New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Bulcroft was charged with kidnapping and rape. The trial court accepted his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and committed him to New Hampshire Hospital for life, unless or until earlier discharged by court order. Defendant was discharged from the hospital in 1979. In late 2012, defendant filed a petition seeking to have his arrest and indictment record annulled because he was found not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" is not the same as a finding of "not guilty" for purposes of RSA 651:5, II, and, therefore, the defendant is not entitled to have his record annulled. This presented an issue of first impression to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. Agreeing with the trial court's reasoning, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "New Hampshire v. Bulcroft" on Justia Law

Defendants Catherine Bailey, Rhylan Bruss, Benjamin DiZoglio, Elizabeth Edwards, Elizabeth Grunewald, Charlene Higgins, William Hopkins, Michael Joseph, Brian Kelly, Matthew Lawrence, Keith Martin, Christian Pannapacker, Tara Powell, Matthew Richards, Katheryn Talbert, and Leah Wolczko, appealed a circuit court ruling that they violated a City of Manchester ordinance establishing a park curfew of 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. In October 2011, defendants were participating in a movement known nationally as "Occupy Wall Street." One defendant explained that "[o]ccupy is a tactic. Occupy means staying in one place until your grievances are addressed." On October 19, shortly after 11 p.m., the Manchester police told the people present in the park that the police would enforce the park curfew ordinance and asked those present to leave. The defendants declined to do so and received summonses for violating Manchester City Ordinance 96.04. Defendants moved to dismiss the charges against them, arguing, in part, that the "application of the criminal law to their protected rights to free speech" violated the New Hampshire and Federal Constitutions. The court denied defendants' motion after a hearing, and found the defendants guilty. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling. View "New Hampshire v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Following his conviction on four counts of sale of a narcotic drug and the Supreme Court's affirmance of his conviction on appeal, defendant Sean Brown filed a motion for new trial in superior court alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. He appealed the Superior Court's decision concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear his claim and, therefore, denying his motion for new trial. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was one of first impression: the proper forum in which a defendant should raise a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. At the hearing on the defendant’s motion for new trial, the State contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide the claim and, therefore, should refrain from deciding it. In response, defendant argued that his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim should be treated in the same manner as ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, which are routinely resolved in superior court. The trial court agreed with the State, adopting the view of a number of courts that such a claim “must be presented to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal.” On appeal, the State’s position was different: it argued that claims should be brought in the original trial court. Thus, both parties urged the Court to adopt the same procedure. Because the Supreme Court agreed that “appellate courts have an interest in avoiding cases which require the Court to perform the unfamiliar task of fact finding,” the Court concluded that such claims should be heard in the trial court. "Because the trial court is better equipped to resolve the factual disputes that frequently underlie assertions of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we conclude that the proper forum for raising such claims is the trial court. Accordingly, we reverse and remand." View "New Hampshire v. Brown " on Justia Law

Defendant Matthew Tsopas faced multiple felony and misdemeanor charges arising out of a single alleged drunk driving incident. The district division set bail initially at $250,000 cash with conditions, but subsequently reduced it to $75,000 cash with conditions. The State asserted, and the defendant did not contest, that this reduction was in response to the defendant's request and over the State’s objection. Defendant thereafter appealed the Superior Court's order denying his third motion to modify bail. He contended on appeal that the trial court erred by: (1) failing to conduct a hearing on the motion or issue written findings of fact pursuant to RSA 597:6-e, II; and (2) unsustainably exercising its discretion by setting an "unreasonably high cash only bail." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Tsopas " on Justia Law

Defendant Heidi Brouillette was charged with one count each of: burglary, second degree assault, and criminal mischief. At the time of her arraignment, defendant applied for appointed counsel. Based upon her financial affidavit, the trial court determined that she was indigent and qualified for appointed counsel. However, prior to February 2013 defendant retained private counsel and appointed counsel withdrew from the case. In that month, defendant stated her intent to plead not guilty by reason of insanity, and filed a motion for services other than counsel requesting funds for an expert psychological evaluation. She attached a financial affidavit to her motion to support her claim of indigence. In denying the defendant's motion, the trial court noted that defendant retained private counsel: "the appearance of current counsel, an ability to pay is presumed." The record did not show that the trial court reviewed the defendant's attached financial affidavit in reaching its conclusion. Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. With the trial court’s approval, defendant then sought interlocutory review of the court's ruling, and the Supreme Court granted her request to answer the question of whether RSA 604-A:6 (Supp. 2013) violated the State and Federal Constitutions' right to assistance of counsel, due process of law and equal protection if an indigent defendant not represented by appointed counsel was not provided with funding for necessary services other than counsel. The Supreme Court concluded that RSA 604-A:6 could not be read as prohibiting a court from authorizing necessary services to indigent criminal defendants who are self-represented, or who have pro bono, reduced fee, or retained counsel. With this conclusion, the Court did not reach whether the statute violated defendant's rights under the State or Federal Constitutions. View "New Hampshire v. Brouillette" on Justia Law

Defendant Stephen Socci appealed a superior court order that denied his motion to suppress evidence that lead to his convictions for manufacturing a controlled drug (marijuana) and possession of a controlled drug with intent to sell. He argued that the trial court erred because the evidence resulted from: (1) an unlawful search of his property; and (2) a subsequent search involuntarily given or tainted by the prior unlawful search. Contrary to the State’s assertions, however, the trial court made no finding that the officers confronted the defendant solely with the odor of marijuana detected in this manner. Although the trial court found that one of the arresting officers "told the defendant that one of the officers could smell marijuana and asked [him] for consent," this statement did not indicate that defendant was also not confronted with other evidence. Because its findings were unclear, the Supreme Court remanded this case for the trial court to determine whether, prior to his consent, defendant was confronted with evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search of the area surrounding his garage, and whether the evidence obtained following defendant’s consent "has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court failed to make particularized factual findings with regard to several critical allegations underlying defendant’s voluntariness argument. The trial court's order was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Socci" on Justia Law