Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in New Hampshire Supreme Court
New Hampshire v. Maga
Defendant Bryan Maga appealed his conviction for driving with an alcohol concentration of .02 or higher, while he was under the age of twenty-one (DUI). On appeal, he argued that the circuit court erred when it: (1) admitted into evidence a certificate from a state crime laboratory employee attesting that the breathalyzer machine used by the Salem Police Department was in working order; and (2) ruled that the police had probable cause to arrest him. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.
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New Hampshire v. Jur
Following a jury trial, defendant Thomas Jur, was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while certified as a habitual offender. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred by denying his pretrial request for an interpreter, thus violating his right to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel under both the State and Federal Constitutions. In the alternative, defendant argued that the trial court’s failure to appoint an interpreter at trial sua sponte was error. Defendant was from Sudan, and his primary language is Dinka. He stated he had difficulty understanding the English language. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court was satisfied that the record showed defendant did have a sufficient command of English. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion in failing to appoint an interpreter during the trial.
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New Hampshire v. Collins
Defendant Gregory Collins appealed a superior court order that denied his motion for a new trial on three counts of pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), four counts of AFSA by individual acts, and one count of misdemeanor sexual assault, based upon the court's conclusion that his trial attorney's performance was not constitutionally deficient. Defendant challenged his counsel's failure to object to improper expert witness opinion testimony by the complainant's therapist, Robert Fusco. On direct examination, without objection, Fusco testified that the complainant's behaviors "fit perfectly into the same kind of behavioral symptoms that we would see for a child who had been sexually abused." Fusco testified that, as a result of the complainant's January 2008 disclosure to him about the 2007 sexual assaults, he realized that "we were no longer dealing with . . . a major depressive disorder," but rather "a post[-]traumatic stress disorder on a child who had – who – who allegedly had been sexually abused." The trial court stated that it could not conclude that it was objectively reasonable to allow Fusco to so opine. The trial court explained that "Fusco's testimony is the type of expert testimony that the Supreme Court has held may not be offered to prove that a particular child has been sexually abused." The trial court was correct. Defense counsel failed to object to Fusco's testimony that the fact that the complainant's disclosure "came out of the blue . . . added to its credibility." Such testimony "cross[ed] the line into the impermissible realm of vouching for the [alleged] victim's credibility." Counsel's failures to object, in the Supreme Court's view, "were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." View "New Hampshire v. Collins" on Justia Law
New Hampshire v. Blesdell-Moore
Defendant Hillman Blesdell-Moore appealed his convictions for possession with intent to distribute marijuana and psilocybin (mushrooms), arguing that the Superior Court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence seized during a stop for a motor vehicle violation. Enfield police stopped defendant's truck for defective taillights. The officer did not observe an erratic behavior to suggest that defendant was driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The officer allowed defendant to step out of his truck to attempt to fix the taillights while he conducted a license check in his cruiser. Upon returning to defendant's truck, the officer asked to see defendant's tongue to see if it was coated consistent with marijuana use. While defendant initially denied smoking marijuana that day, he admitted he had smoked the day before. Concerned that defendant was becoming agitated, the officer obtained consent to perform a pat-down search. That search netted two wads of cash in defendant's pockets. The officer was about to conclude the stop when he hesitated and asked defendant one last question: whether defendant had marijuana in his truck. Defendant denied that he did, and the officer's subsequent request to search the vehicle. The officer stated that defendant was free to leave, but then asked whether a drug canine would indicate whether there were drugs in the vehicle. At this point, defendant looked to the ground and replied that he did not think so. The officer dispatched a canine unit to search defendant's truck. Ultimately the canine discovered drugs in defendant's vehicle. Defendant was arrested for possession with intent to distribute. He moved to suppress evidence of drugs the canine found, which the trial court denied. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Asking to examine defendant's tongue impermissibly expanded the scope of the initial traffic stop. Therefore, the trial court erroneously denied suppression of all evidence obtained following the unlawful expansion of the stop. View "New Hampshire v. Blesdell-Moore" on Justia Law
New Hampshire v. Pyles
Defendant david Pyles was convicted by jury on three counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements allegedly obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions.
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New Hampshire v. Sulloway
Defendant Dennis Sulloway appealed his conviction by jury of pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred in admitting the
testimony of the thirteen-year-old victim's examining doctor and the victim's stepfather. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Sulloway " on Justia Law
New Hampshire v. Zubhuza
Defendant Tariq Zubhuza was convicted by jury of criminal restraint, and criminal threatening with a firearm all connected with his involvement with a home invasion. He argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss those charges. Finding the evidence sufficient to support those convictions, and finding no reversible error in the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction.
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New Hampshire v. Addison
Defendant Michael Addison moved to disqualify the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office from further participation in his case, and moved for the appointment of a special prosecutor. Defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in 2008. In August 2009, Attorney Lisa Wolford, who had been employed by the New Hampshire Public Defender for approximately seven years, began working with the New Hampshire Appellate Defender. When Wolford began her rotation, the appellate defender office was preparing a brief regarding the standards applicable to our mandatory review of the defendant’s sentence. In early 2010, Wolford was reassigned from the defendant’s defense team. In March 2012, she submitted her resume to the attorney general’s office, requesting consideration for a position with the criminal justice bureau’s appeals division. Wolford was offered a position with the attorney general’s office; she began employment there in early July 2012. The defendant argued to the Supreme Court that it should "follow a line of cases that requires per se disqualification of an entire prosecutor’s office from a defendant’s case when (a) the defendant’s attorney switches sides and joins the prosecutor’s office in the middle of the case and (b) the defendant does not waive the conflict." The Supreme Court found Wolford had no involvement in the defendant’s case at the pre-trial or trial stages and participated in a limited aspect at one preliminary phase of the defendant’s multi-phased appeal approximately three years before joining the attorney general’s office. As such, the Court rejected defendant's per se argument, and further concluded defendant suffered no prejudice as a result in Wolford's change of employment. Accordingly, the Court denied defendant's motion to disqualify the Attorney General's office. View "New Hampshire v. Addison" on Justia Law
New Hampshire v. Ojo
Defendant Osahenrumwen Ojo appealed after a jury convicted him of theft by deception in Superior Court. The conviction followed a previous jury trial for a related charge, which ended in a mistrial based upon a hung jury. On appeal, he argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the New Hampshire Constitution barred the second trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.
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New Hampshire v. Wells
Defendant Adam Wells was indicted on four counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault and one count of felonious sexual assault against his minor daughter. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss one of the indictments alleging aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA). Defendant appealed his convictions on the remaining three AFSA charges and the charge alleging felonious sexual assault (FSA). On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred by: (1) failing to grant a mistrial after the child testified to uncharged acts; and (2) admitting testimony regarding out-of-court disclosures made by the child. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed.
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