Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The State appealed superior court orders that granted motions of defendant David McLeod to preclude certain expert testimony and to suppress an audio-recording of a one-party telephonic interception. This "cold" case arose from a fire that occurred at an apartment building in 1989. The fire began in the second floor apartment of Sandra Walker. Walker and several other occupants of the building were unharmed by the fire; however, four members of a family living in the building died of smoke inhalation. In 2010, the State's Cold Case Unit reinvestigated the fire. Prior to the initiation of the new investigation, Walker died and some of the evidence related to the fire was lost or destroyed. The Cold Case Unit hired two experts from the United States Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau (ATF) to review the case. Upon review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the Confrontation Clause is not violated when an expert testifies regarding his or her independent judgment, even if that judgment was based upon inadmissible testimonial hearsay. Therefore, the State's experts' testimony should not have been excluded in this case. With regard to the audio recording, the Court concluded that the State obtained the intercepted information lawfully under RSA 570-A:2, II(d): there was no dispute that the State was investigating, that the party recorded consented to the intercept, and that another orally authorized the intercept based upon reasonable suspicion that evidence of criminal conduct would be derived from the intercept. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's suppression order. View "New Hampshire v. McLeod" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, defendant Daniel Matton, was found guilty on two charges: assault by a prisoner as a class A felony and assault by a prisoner as a class B felony. On appeal, he argued that the Trial Court erred when it refused to give: (1) a mutual combat instruction on the class B felony charge; and (2) a "special" jury instruction that the prior convictions of several of the State's witnesses were relevant to their credibility. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Matton" on Justia Law

Defendant Brendan Bisbee appealed his convictions by jury on five counts of perjury. In 2011, a grand jury returned indictments that charged defendant committed perjury when he testified before the grand jury, on or about March 6, 2009, that: (1) "Kristin Ruggiero had never been to the state of Tennessee"; (2) "he could not remember if he had picked up Kristin Ruggiero at the Oakland [California] Airport on March 20, 2008"; (3) "a police officer did not come to 13 Pinewood Road during the evening of May 4, 2008"; and (4) "Kristin Ruggiero had not used his cell phone to call 679-2225 during the evening of May 4, 2008." Three more indictments charged that defendant committed perjury when he testified in the criminal trial of "State v. Ruggiero," Docket No. 09-S-1290-1302, on or about April 27, 2010, that: (1) "he could not remember if he had picked up Kristin Ruggiero at the Oakland Airport on March 20, 2008"; (2) "a police officer did not come to 13 Pinewood Road during the evening of May 4, 2008"; and (3) "he could not remember if he or Kristin Ruggiero had used his cell phone to call 679-2225 during the evening of May 4, 2008." On appeal, defendant argued that the Superior Court erred in: (1) denying his motion to dismiss the indictments as insufficient; and (2) denying his request for a mistrial following the prosecutor's closing argument. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Bisbee" on Justia Law

Defendant Allen Mercier appealed a superior court decision to deny his motion to suppress evidence that led to his convictions in a jury-waived trial for disobeying a police officer and driving while certified as a habitual offender. In 2011, a state trooper observed a pickup truck, driven by the defendant, with a partially shattered rear window. Based upon his observations of the window, the trooper pulled the vehicle over, leading to the defendant's arrest. The State argued that the police had reasonable suspicion of a violation of RSA 266:58 (2004), and the trial court agreed, that the defendant's truck was not "equipped with safety glass" because the rear window was so "severely fragmented into small pieces . . . that visibility through that window was impossible." Upon review of the statute at issue here, and the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed with Defendant's argument that his vehicle was indeed equipped with safety glass as defined by RSA 259:94. "The statute's specific references to 'glass so treated or combined with other materials' and 'ordinary sheet glass or plate glass' suggest that the legislature was concerned with the composition of the glass used in vehicles rather than its condition once installed. The fact that a panel of safety glass is cracked or otherwise damaged does not mean that it is no longer safety glass." The Supreme Court concluded that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was operating his vehicle in violation of RSA 266:58. Accordingly, the Court reversed the denial of his motion to suppress. View "New Hampshire v. Mercier" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Gribble appealed his convictions for first-degree murder, attempted murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, witness tampering, and conspiracy to commit burglary. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to suppress; (2) denied his motions for a change of venue; and (3) instructed the jury concerning insanity. Finding these arguments to be without merit, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Gribble" on Justia Law

A "substantial number" of post-arrest co-conspirator statements were improperly admitted in the trial of Defendant Hector Rodriguez. He was accused of burglary, conspiracy to commit burglary, first degree assault, accomplice to first degree assault, and conspiracy to commit first degree assault. Following his conviction, the superior court acknowledged its error and attempted to remedy it by vacating the burglary conviction and one of the first degree assault convictions (the one based on the theory that the defendant acted as a principal in the commission of the assault), while allowing the remaining three convictions to stand. Because, after its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the improperly admitted evidence constituted harmless error with respect only to defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit burglary, the Court affirmed that conviction, but reversed his convictions on the accomplice and conspiracy first degree assault charges and remanded the case for a new trial on those charges. View "New Hampshire v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Osahenrumwen Ojo appealed a superior court order that granted Defendants Officer Joseph Lorenzo and the Manchester Police Department's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff was stopped while walking away from his brother's home to after an altercation at the home. Officer Lorenzo arrested Plaintiff after Plaintiff was identified from a photographic line up by a kidnapping victim. The State charged Plaintiff with criminal kidnapping. A grand jury later returned an indictment against him. After Plaintiff spent seventeen months in pretrial custody, the State nol prossed all charged against him because the complaining witness allegedly moved to Germany. Unrepresented by counsel, Plaintiff filed a civil lawsuit against defendants alleging, among other things, that defendants: (1) ignored their duties to fully, reasonably, and prudently conduct their investigation before placing him under arrest (and therefore lacked probable cause to arrest); and (2) employed unnecessarily suggestive, unreliable, and untrustworthy identification procedures. Finding probable cause existed at the time of Plaintiff's arrest, the superior court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendants did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff due to inconsistencies in the alleged victim's description and photographic identification and Plaintiff's actual appearance the day he was arrested. The Court affirmed the superior court with respect to all other issues raised on appeal. View "Ojo v. Lorenzo" on Justia Law

Defendant Kevin Guay appealed his convictions for two counts of unlawful operation of a solid waste facility, and one count of unlawful maintenance of a subsurface septic system. Defendant was a land developer and operated a junk removal business. A neighbor called police to report hazardous materials buried on Defendant's property. Department of Environmental Services (DES) investigators unearthed (among other items): a home heating oil tank, carpeting, old mattresses, foam insulation, a metal stove, shingles, wiring, a hot tub broken into pieces, and paint cans; above-the-ground items included mattresses, appliances, chairs, couches, ceiling tiles, a snowmobile, an oil tank, metal debris, and insulation, the majority of which had been exposed to the elements and were not in usable condition. An investigator observed liquid on top of defendant's septic system and a garden hose attached to a sump pump that channeled untreated brown water from the septic tank, bypassing the leach field, and discharging liquid in the direction of the Turkey River. Based on investigators' observations, the State charged defendant with three misdemeanors. After a week-long trial, a jury convicted him on all counts. On appeal, defendant argued that RSA 485-A:37 did not allow the State to charge him with a misdemeanor because the statutory penalty was civil forfeiture. Furthermore, defendant argued he was entitled to a new trial under the plain error doctrine because certain "[i]nadmissible evidence concerning witness credibility was presented at trial and discussed in closing argument." Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with defendant's interpretation of RSA 485-A:37, and concluded that in light of other evidence admitted at trial, defendant could not demonstrate that the "inadmissible evidence concerning witness credibility" affected the outcome of his case. Accordingly the Court affirmed defendant's convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Guay" on Justia Law

Defendant Robin Lukas appealed a superior court decision that denied her motion to dismiss the indictment against her for theft by unauthorized taking, a class B felony. The only issue on appeal was whether defendant, having been convicted twice of class A misdemeanors in another state, could be charged with a class B in New Hampshire. Defendant argued that her prior out-of-state convictions could not be considered for the purposes of enhancing her New Hampshire conviction. Having reviewed the plain language of the applicable New Hampshire statute, the Supreme Court disagreed with defendant's interpretation and affirmed the superior court having used the out-of-state convictions to enhance her New Hampshire sentence, and for denying defendant's motion to dismiss. View "New Hampshire v. Lukas" on Justia Law

Defendant Matthew Blunt appealed a circuit court order that denied his motion to strike the imposition of class A misdemeanor sentences following his conviction of simple assault and resisting arrest. On appeal to the Supreme Court, defendant argued that the trial court's sentences were unlawful because the complaints under which he was convicted alleged only class B misdemeanors. Specifically, he contended that the trial court was required to treat both complaints as alleging class B misdemeanors because: (1) neither complaint alleged a crime that involved as an element an act of violence or a threat of violence; and (2) the State did not file notice of its intent to seek class A penalties on or before the date of his arraignment on a form approved for this purpose by the judicial branch administrative council. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that neither the simple assault complaint nor the resisting arrest complaint required that an act of violence be involved as an element of the offense. Furthermore, the Court held that merely checking the "class A misdemeanor" box on the standard complaint form did not constitute compliance with statute, and that defendant's two convictions were actually class B misdemeanors. Accordingly, the Court vacated the sentences imposed and remanded the case back to the district division for resentencing. View "New Hampshire v. Blunt" on Justia Law