Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Bradford Dalton was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI)-third offense, following a bench trial. He appealed his convictions based on his contention the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain evidence. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Dalton" on Justia Law

Police searched defendant's vehicle and found a .40 caliber semi-automatic pistol adjacent to a loaded magazine in the vehicle's glove compartment. The pistol did not have a cartridge in the chamber or a magazine in the magazine well. The State charged the defendant with a class A misdemeanor for "knowingly carry[ing] a loaded pistol . . . in a vehicle without a valid license . . . ." Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that "[t]he firearm at issue was not loaded and therefore no license was required and no crime was committed." The trial court found RSA 159:4 "potentially ambiguous" and transferred the question to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the definition of a ‘loaded pistol or revolver' [under RSA 159:4 (2002)] did not encompass a firearm with no cartridge in the firearm, and no magazine in the magazine well, or with a loaded magazine located next to it and easily accessible. View "New Hampshire v. Dor" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Noucas appealed his conviction as an accomplice for armed robbery. He argued that the evidence presented against him was insufficient to sustain the conviction. He also argued multiple errors at trial warranted dismissal of the charges. Finding the evidence sufficient and no errors, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Noucas" on Justia Law

Defendant Wayne Dorrance appealed his conviction for second degree assault on a police officer. He argued the evidence presented against him was insufficient to sustain the charges. After review, the Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient to support defendant's conviction and affirmed it. View "New Hampshire v. Dorrance" on Justia Law

Defendant William Ploof was convicted by jury of aggravated felonious assault and conspiracy to commit felonious aggravated assault. On appeal, he argued that the evidence presented against him at trial was insufficient to convict him, and that the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial during the victim's testimony. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a rational jury could have found Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the denial of a mistrial was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. View "New Hampshire v. Ploof" on Justia Law

Petitioner Justin Czyzewski appealed a Superior Court ruling that denied his request for a declaration that although he was convicted of attempted sexual assault, he was not required to register as a sex offender under New Hampshire law. Although the record did not contain the details of his conviction for attempted sexual assault, the trial court noted that the petitioner "engaged in conduct in an online chat room with an undercover police detective, whom [he] believed to be a 13-year old female." The petitioner lived in Pennsylvania but, as the trial court stated, "was required to register as a sex offender [there] because he would be required to register in New Hampshire." Upon review, the Supreme Court could not " subscribe to the petitioner's statutory interpretation," and affirmed the Superior Court's ruling. View "Czyzewski v. New Hampshire Department of Safety" on Justia Law

Defendant Todd Leavitt appealed his convictions by jury on two counts of simple assault on a police officer. In 2010, the defendant called 9-1-1 and told the dispatcher that he was suicidal and needed an ambulance. Because the defendant said he was uninjured, the dispatcher sent the police to his residence. The defendant became agitated when the police arrived instead of an ambulance, "screaming and shouting" and asserting that he did not want them to be there. The police offered to drive him to the hospital, but he refused, and he began walking in the direction of the hospital. The police then decided to take him into protective custody, and, in the ensuing struggle, he kicked Officer Nicholas Alden in the leg. He again kicked Officer Alden after they arrived at the hospital. The defendant was indicted on two counts of simple assault. The charging documents were worded identically in every respect except as to the "Charge ID" number and the designation as either "Count 1" or "Count 2." The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the jury could not "differentiate what evidence goes to which [indictment]," in violation of double jeopardy principles. The trial court denied his motion and, after a trial, a jury returned guilty verdicts on both indictments. The Supreme Court agreed with the State that defendant's convictions did not violate the federal Double Jeopardy Clause, and affirmed defendant's convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Leavitt" on Justia Law

The State appealed superior court orders that granted motions of defendant David McLeod to preclude certain expert testimony and to suppress an audio-recording of a one-party telephonic interception. This "cold" case arose from a fire that occurred at an apartment building in 1989. The fire began in the second floor apartment of Sandra Walker. Walker and several other occupants of the building were unharmed by the fire; however, four members of a family living in the building died of smoke inhalation. In 2010, the State's Cold Case Unit reinvestigated the fire. Prior to the initiation of the new investigation, Walker died and some of the evidence related to the fire was lost or destroyed. The Cold Case Unit hired two experts from the United States Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau (ATF) to review the case. Upon review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the Confrontation Clause is not violated when an expert testifies regarding his or her independent judgment, even if that judgment was based upon inadmissible testimonial hearsay. Therefore, the State's experts' testimony should not have been excluded in this case. With regard to the audio recording, the Court concluded that the State obtained the intercepted information lawfully under RSA 570-A:2, II(d): there was no dispute that the State was investigating, that the party recorded consented to the intercept, and that another orally authorized the intercept based upon reasonable suspicion that evidence of criminal conduct would be derived from the intercept. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's suppression order. View "New Hampshire v. McLeod" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, defendant Daniel Matton, was found guilty on two charges: assault by a prisoner as a class A felony and assault by a prisoner as a class B felony. On appeal, he argued that the Trial Court erred when it refused to give: (1) a mutual combat instruction on the class B felony charge; and (2) a "special" jury instruction that the prior convictions of several of the State's witnesses were relevant to their credibility. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Matton" on Justia Law

Defendant Brendan Bisbee appealed his convictions by jury on five counts of perjury. In 2011, a grand jury returned indictments that charged defendant committed perjury when he testified before the grand jury, on or about March 6, 2009, that: (1) "Kristin Ruggiero had never been to the state of Tennessee"; (2) "he could not remember if he had picked up Kristin Ruggiero at the Oakland [California] Airport on March 20, 2008"; (3) "a police officer did not come to 13 Pinewood Road during the evening of May 4, 2008"; and (4) "Kristin Ruggiero had not used his cell phone to call 679-2225 during the evening of May 4, 2008." Three more indictments charged that defendant committed perjury when he testified in the criminal trial of "State v. Ruggiero," Docket No. 09-S-1290-1302, on or about April 27, 2010, that: (1) "he could not remember if he had picked up Kristin Ruggiero at the Oakland Airport on March 20, 2008"; (2) "a police officer did not come to 13 Pinewood Road during the evening of May 4, 2008"; and (3) "he could not remember if he or Kristin Ruggiero had used his cell phone to call 679-2225 during the evening of May 4, 2008." On appeal, defendant argued that the Superior Court erred in: (1) denying his motion to dismiss the indictments as insufficient; and (2) denying his request for a mistrial following the prosecutor's closing argument. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Bisbee" on Justia Law