Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Logan Schulz appealed his convictions for being an accomplice to possession of cocaine, and an accomplice to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He argued that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the search warrant for his home was unconstitutional both on its face and in its execution. In 2010, a Haverhill Police officer went to the home that Defendant shared with his mother to serve her with a notice against trespass and harassment. While lawfully inside the home, the officer saw three long guns near a staircase. Knowing that the defendant's mother was a convicted felon and prohibited from possessing firearms, the officer sought a warrant to search the home. Early in the search, they learned that the three guns near the staircase were, in fact, "BB" guns and were not unlawful for the defendant's mother to possess. The officers then continued the search and asked the defendant whether there were any additional guns in the house. The defendant informed them that he had a muzzle loader rifle and took them to his bedroom to show it to them. In the room, the officer observed a lock box large enough to contain a handgun but too small to contain a long gun, and told the defendant to open it, noting that the officers could open it by force if necessary. Both the defendant and his mother protested on the grounds that the police had no reason to believe they had a handgun. The defendant's mother then became upset and admitted that the lock box contained cocaine and money. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the police were required to discontinue their search after discovering that the guns they had believed to be firearms were, in fact, BB guns. The warrant contained no other facts upon which the police might have relied in continuing to believe that the search was justified. As a result, the officers' continued search of the defendant's home under authority of the warrant was unconstitutional. View "New Hampshire v. Schulz" on Justia Law

Defendant Jonathan Ball appealed his conviction following a bench trial on stipulated facts one felony count of possessing child sexual abuse images (child pornography). On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence derived from the search of his home computer. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Ball" on Justia Law

The State appealed a superior court order that dismissed charges filed against Defendant Burton Hollenbeck, Jr. because it determined that the statute upon which they were based violated Defendant's state and federal substantive due process rights. Defendant was a licensed psychologist who provided services to the complainant in 2007. Less than a year after the therapy ended, the two became sexually involved. In April 2010, defendant was charged with thirty counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) for engaging in sexual penetration with the complainant between February 1, 2008, and December 9, 2008. The indictments alleged that by engaging in sexual penetration with the complainant "within one year of the termination of their therapeutic relationship," defendant "act[ed] in a manner which is not professionally recognized as ethical," thereby violating RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1). In December 2010, defendant moved to dismiss the indictments, arguing, inter alia, that RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) violated his state and federal rights to substantive due process because it "criminalizes the private sexual conduct of consenting adults." The trial court agreed, and this appeal followed. Because defendant did not meet his burden of proving that RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose in all circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded after its review of the case that his facial challenge failed. The Court reached the same result under the Federal Constitution as it did under the State Constitution because the Federal Constitution offers the defendant no greater protection than does the State Constitution under these circumstances.

Defendant Saad Moussa appealed his convictions, and sentences on three counts of stalking entered following a jury trial in Superior Court. In 2005, the Rockingham County grand jury returned three indictments against the defendant, each alleging a separate incident of stalking the victim, to whom he had been married for approximately eleven years. According to the victim's testimony, they were divorced at the time of trial. Each charged incident involved the defendant allegedly sending a letter to the victim "after having been served with or otherwise provided notice of a protective order issued by the Salem Family Court on 12/10/04, that prohibited him from having contact with [her]." The defendant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in: (1) requiring him to choose between self-representation and representation by a lawyer he wanted to dismiss; (2) making certain evidentiary rulings; (3) denying his request for counsel at sentencing; and (4) imposing felony sentences. Finding no error in the Superior Court record, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Defendant Josiah Davies appealed a district court order that partially denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate his conviction. Defendant was charged with two counts of false imprisonment and one count of simple assault following a single incident of alleged domestic violence. On June 1, 2009, he appeared pro se for arraignment on the three class A misdemeanor charges. Prior to his arraignment, he spoke with the prosecutor regarding a potential plea agreement. During this discussion, Defendant indicated his intention to plead guilty, and then signed the acknowledgement and waiver of rights form that the prosecutor provided him. At this time, he was nineteen years old and had a GED and some technical college experience. The scheduled arraignment then went forward as a plea hearing. On appeal, Defendant argued that he did not enter a valid guilty plea because he was not advised of the essential elements of the simple assault charge. He contended, therefore, that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent as required by Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion, and no violation of his constitutional rights, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions to deny Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.

Following a jury trial in Superior Court Defendant, Bryan Alwardt was convicted of second degree assault and criminal restraint based on accomplice liability principles. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to dismiss the assault charge due to insufficient evidence; (2) failing to dismiss the criminal restraint charge as against the weight of the evidence; (3) not ordering disclosure of all of the victim’s counseling records; and (4) prohibiting cross-examination of the victim regarding certain drugs found in her boyfriend’s apartment. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed.

D.B. appealed the Manchester Family Division's finding of delinquency based on misdemeanor sexual assault. D.B. was accused of inappropriately touching and subsequently threatening the female complainant while the two rode home on the school bus. On appeal, D.B. challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the complainant’s direct testimony indicated that D.B. put his hand down her shirt and touched her breasts. She further stated that the he put his hand down her pants and “ran it” down to her ankle. This evidence failed to describe in what way the juvenile overcame her with the actual application of physical force. Nor did the surveillance video from the bus support the State’s position. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to charge D.B. with misdemeanor sexual assault within the meaning of RSA 632-A:2, I(a). The Family Division's judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal of a superior court order denying the State's request to compel Defendant Gary E. Marchand, to undergo a psychological evaluation by the State's expert. There were two issues presented to the Court: (1) does the right against self-incrimination prevent the State from compelling a defendant to undergo a psychological or psychiatric examination when he raises an insanity defense; and (2) if such examinations may be compelled, what procedures should trial courts use when ordering them? The Court answered the first question in the negative, and provide a procedural framework for courts to follow. Accordingly, the Court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant William Town was convicted after a jury trial of one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault which occurred sometime between 1990 and 1992. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude a juror and by allowing the victim to testify about certain statements Defendant made. Furthermore, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after testimony suggestive of uncharged acts of sexual misconduct and by providing a deadlock jury instruction after twice learning of the jury's split. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed with regard to the disqualification of a juror, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order entered by the United States Supreme Court vacating the judgment in "New Hampshire v. Dilboy," (160 N.H. 135 (2010)) (Dilboy I), and remanding for further consideration in light of "Bullcoming v. New Mexico," (131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011)). On remand, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reconsidered only its holding on the Confrontation Clause issue. As to the other five issues, the Court's prior decision in Dilboy I remained unchanged. In Dilboy I, the Court affirmed the conviction of Defendant Anthony Dilboy, on two counts of manslaughter and two alternative counts of negligent homicide. The relevant issue before the Court in Dilboy I was whether the admission of certain evidence at trial violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. On appeal in Dilboy I, Defendant did not challenge the admission of certain blood evidence on "transmittal slips." Rather, he contended that the trial court erred in ruling that the blood test results were non-testimonial, and, accordingly, that an expert's testimony at trial about the test results violated the Confrontation Clause. In its reconsideration, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that though the transmittal slips were admitted into evidence, the Court declined to address Defendant’s Confrontation Clause arguments because Defendant did not address the issue in his brief in Dilboy I. "Indeed, the defendant did not even brief the issue after the Supreme Court vacated Dilboy I, but rather raises the issue for the first time in a supplemental brief filed in response to an order issued by this court." After reconsidering its decision in light of "Bullcoming" and thoroughly reviewing the record, the Court affirmed its prior holding.