Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner David Fischer appealed a superior court order on his motions for pretrial bail, claiming that the court delegated authority to Strafford County Community Corrections (SCCC), which is managed by the Respondent, Superintendent of the Strafford County House of Corrections, in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The written order stated that bail was set at $50,000 cash "[t]o convert to PR if found accep[table] by SCCC – Whether Bail is Posted or Converted all conditions apply." A pretrial motion to amend bail was denied, stating from the bench "[the judge was] just not going to order [SCCC] to do something it is not inclined to do. I have the power, and I have the discretion to do that, but I'm not going to in this case. The bail remains as is." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bail orders at issue here reflected "a cooperative accommodation among" the judicial and executive branches and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

Defendant Roderick Davidson appealed his conviction by a jury on three counts of simple assault and one count of criminal mischief. He argued that the Superior Court erred by: (1) denying his motions in limine to exclude evidence that he "controlled" the complainant; and (2) denying his request for a defense of property instruction. In October 2009, Defendant and the complainant lived together. Consistent with their habit of "br[eaking] up every other day," Defendant broke up with the complainant. They nonetheless drove home together, napped together for about three hours, and then went to dinner together at a restaurant. After dinner, during which they both consumed some alcohol, Defendant drove the couple home, where they began to argue about money. The complainant insisted that they talk, and in an attempt to do so, Defendant grabbed her and threw her into a wall. The complainant ended up on her back at the bottom of the stairs with Defendant above her, and that his hand made contact with her face. The following day, the complainant had a bruised eye, which she tried to conceal with makeup. After speaking with several people, she ultimately decided to go to the police. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior bad acts. However, the Court concluded the trial court erred in admitting "unlimited context" evidence as inherently prejudicial. In light of the Court's reversal of Defendant’s convictions for improperly admitted evidence, it did not reach Defendant’s jury instruction argument.

Defendant Derrick DiMaggio appealed a superior court's denial of his motion for pretrial confinement credit for approximately 471 days he participated in the Grafton County Drug Court Sentencing Program. Finding there was no dispute that he was entitled credit for at least sixty-three of those days (for failing to comply with the Program’s rules), the Supreme Court was asked to review whether Defendant was entitled to credit for the days he was at liberty while participating in the Program. The Court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to pretrial confinement credit, and affirmed the superior court’s denial of his motion.

Defendant Joshua Guild appealed his conviction on one count of felonious assault and one count of aggravated felonious assault (ASFA) involving the same minor victim. He contended that the superior court erred by: (1) violating New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 615 and RSA 632-A:6, IV (2007) by failing to sequester the minor victim’s mother; (2) erroneously denied his motion to disqualify a juror without first conducting a voir dire of the juror; and (3) erroneously denied his motion to dismiss the AFSA charge. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court held that when, in a criminal trial, a trial court has violated Rule 615 and RSA 626:6, IV by failing to sequester a witness, a new trial is in order unless the State proves that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying that rule to this case, the Court concluded that any presumption of prejudice was rebutted. Furthermore, because Defendant's conviction was supported by other substantial evidence, and because the evidence did not support a conclusion that the victim’s mother tailored her testimony to the victim’s testimony, the Court held that any error in failing to sequester the victim's mother was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. With regard to the denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss the AFSA charge, the Court found Defendant did not preserve the argument for the Supreme Court’s review. Defendant’s convictions were upheld.

Defendant Deicy Urena Ortiz appealed a district court's denial of her motion to withdraw her plea and vacate her misdemeanor conviction. On appeal, she contended her plea was not knowing because the court did not advise her of its potential adverse immigration consequences. Defendant had been a lawful resident of the United States since 2002. In 2007, she was charged with the class A misdemeanor of shoplifting. She appeared before the district court and entered a plea of nolo contendere. She was not represented by counsel. Defendant signed a standard acknowledgment and waiver of rights form, which, at the time, contained no acknowledgment of the potential adverse immigration consequences of entering either a guilty or nolo plea. During the plea colloquy, the court did not advise Defendant that her plea could result in adverse immigration consequences. In 2011, the federal government commenced removal proceedings against Defendant, contending that her shoplifting conviction constituted "a crime involving moral turpitude," a deportable offense. In response, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her plea and vacate her conviction. In her motion, she argued that her plea was not “knowing” because: (1) the court failed to inform her "that a conviction could subject her to deportation"; and (2) she "was affirmatively misled (albeit innocently) [by the prosecutor] that there would be no such consequences." The State objected. Acknowledging that it did not advise Defendant of the possible immigration consequences of her plea, the court concluded that Defendant raised a "pure issue of law," and, therefore, there was "no need for a hearing on the factual basis for [her] request." The court was not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that "Padilla v. Kentucky" (130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010)) supported her appeal. Accordingly, the court denied the motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because immigration consequences are collateral, the court’s failure here to advise Defendant of them did not render her nolo contendere plea unknowing.

Defendant Glendon Hill appealed his conviction for aggravated felonious assault on the ground that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. At trial, the State elicited testimony from Defendant's young step-daughter that he subjected her to various types of sexual abuse. Her statements being the only evidence introduced by the State, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictments before putting on a defense, arguing that the mode of questioning was so suggestive that the State had failed "to provide a rational jury with proof beyond a reasonable doubt" that he committed the elements of the charged crimes. The trial court agreed that the direct examination of the child contained leading questions but denied the motion, reasoning that the child's testimony was sufficient to submit the matter to the jury. After calling a single witness to the stand, the defense rested. The jury convicted, and Defendant appealed without making any post-trial motions. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant did not preserve his challenge to the weight of the evidence. As such, the Court affirmed his conviction.

Defendant Daniel Matton appealed a superior court order that denied his motion to preclude the State from seeking an extended term of incarceration under RSA 651:6 II(a). In 1998, Defendant was convicted of arson and sentenced to seven and one-half to fifteen years in state prison, all suspended, and five years of probation. In 1999, Defendant was found to have violated the terms of his probation and ordered to serve three and one-half to seven years in prison. In 2002, Defendant was convicted of assault by a prisoner and sentenced to prison for one and one-half to three years. In 2010, Defendant pled guilty to one count of second degree assault. The State, pursuant to a capped plea agreement, indicated its intent to request an extended term of incarceration under RSA 651:6, II(a) (2007) based upon Defendant's prior record. Defendant moved to preclude the application of RSA 651:6, II(a), arguing that he had only one qualifying prior conviction (that for assault by a prisoner) because his imprisonment on the arson charge resulted from a probation violation rather than from the original, suspended, sentence he received on the arson conviction. The superior court denied the motion, ruling that Defendant had served two terms of imprisonment within the meaning of the statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court correctly found that the statutory requirements were satisfied, and properly denied Defendant's motion to preclude.

Defendant Christina Smith appealed her conviction for driving while intoxicated. She argued the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the State failed to establish that the arresting officer had a reasonable suspicion that she had violated the law when he stopped her. Upon review of the district court record, the Supreme Court found the district court did not err in issuing its decision, and affirmed the court's ruling.

The main issue on appeal was whether Defendant's statements to police during an interview were voluntary. A portion of the interview was videotaped. Paramedics were called to the home of Defendant Nicole Belonga when Defendant's twenty-one-month-old child was sick. The child was left in the care of Defendant's boyfriend David Kaley who was living with Defendant at the time. The child suffered a seizure and was admitted to the hospital. She was discovered to have serious brain injuries and later transported to a hospital in Boston with a pediatric intensive care unit. Nashua Police arrived at the hospital and requested Defendant give a statement to them at the station. At first she did not agree to go so that she might be with her daughter in Boston, but Defendant later acquiesced. Detectives made clear that Defendant was at the police station voluntarily, but in her pre-trial motion, Defendant argued that her statements to the detectives were involuntary and the admission of those statements at trial would violate her constitutional rights. After a hearing, the court denied her motion. Her statements were admitted at trial through the videotape and the testimony of the detectives. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's pre-trial motion: "the jury had before it overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. The defendant’s description of the incidents in which she used physical force against her daughter closely correspond with the doctors' testimony. The defendant's testimony, together with the doctors' testimony, strongly supports the conclusion that the defendant was caring for her daughter when [the] injuries occurred. The defendant made several statements suggesting she had had used too much physical force against her daughter and that she did something wrong. Also, the defendant's general description of the events paints a picture of a person using unwarranted and dangerous physical force against a very young child. Accordingly, [the Court] concluded that the evidentiary errors at trial were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."

Defendant Roscoe White appealed his convictions by jury of first degree murder and attempted first-degree assault. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress inculpatory statements he made to an informant. He asserted on appeal that the informant's questions about his pending drug charges violated his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution, and that his statements about the shooting should have been excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree." He further argued that "[a]llowing the State to intentionally violate the constitutional rights of an accused in order to elicit incriminating statements is fundamentally unfair and violates due process." Finding that use of an informant does not constitute a per se constitutional violation, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's denial of the statements Defendant made to the informant.