Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Christina Smith appealed her conviction for driving while intoxicated. She argued the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the State failed to establish that the arresting officer had a reasonable suspicion that she had violated the law when he stopped her. Upon review of the district court record, the Supreme Court found the district court did not err in issuing its decision, and affirmed the court's ruling.

The main issue on appeal was whether Defendant's statements to police during an interview were voluntary. A portion of the interview was videotaped. Paramedics were called to the home of Defendant Nicole Belonga when Defendant's twenty-one-month-old child was sick. The child was left in the care of Defendant's boyfriend David Kaley who was living with Defendant at the time. The child suffered a seizure and was admitted to the hospital. She was discovered to have serious brain injuries and later transported to a hospital in Boston with a pediatric intensive care unit. Nashua Police arrived at the hospital and requested Defendant give a statement to them at the station. At first she did not agree to go so that she might be with her daughter in Boston, but Defendant later acquiesced. Detectives made clear that Defendant was at the police station voluntarily, but in her pre-trial motion, Defendant argued that her statements to the detectives were involuntary and the admission of those statements at trial would violate her constitutional rights. After a hearing, the court denied her motion. Her statements were admitted at trial through the videotape and the testimony of the detectives. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's pre-trial motion: "the jury had before it overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. The defendant’s description of the incidents in which she used physical force against her daughter closely correspond with the doctors' testimony. The defendant's testimony, together with the doctors' testimony, strongly supports the conclusion that the defendant was caring for her daughter when [the] injuries occurred. The defendant made several statements suggesting she had had used too much physical force against her daughter and that she did something wrong. Also, the defendant's general description of the events paints a picture of a person using unwarranted and dangerous physical force against a very young child. Accordingly, [the Court] concluded that the evidentiary errors at trial were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."

Defendant Roscoe White appealed his convictions by jury of first degree murder and attempted first-degree assault. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress inculpatory statements he made to an informant. He asserted on appeal that the informant's questions about his pending drug charges violated his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution, and that his statements about the shooting should have been excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree." He further argued that "[a]llowing the State to intentionally violate the constitutional rights of an accused in order to elicit incriminating statements is fundamentally unfair and violates due process." Finding that use of an informant does not constitute a per se constitutional violation, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's denial of the statements Defendant made to the informant.

Respondent Erica Blizzard appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Department of Safety (DOS) that suspended her boating privileges. Carrying two passengers, Respondent piloted a motorboat on Lake Winnipesaukee. There was almost no visibility due to dark and inclement weather conditions. As the respondent later told investigators, she was unable to see the bow of her boat. She was operating the boat at eighteen to twenty miles per hour, unsure of her location or depth, when the boat collided with an island. The collision killed one passenger and seriously injured the respondent and the second passenger. As a result of the collision, the respondent was charged with boating while intoxicated and negligent homicide. A jury found her guilty of negligent homicide, but not guilty of boating while intoxicated. Respondent argued on appeal: (1) whether DOS lacked the authority to suspend boat-operation privileges because it has failed to promulgate associated regulations; (2) whether RSA 270-E:17 delegated legislative authority in violation of Part I, Article 37 of the State Constitution; and (3) whether the hearing notice complied with Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution. Finding the DOS had the requisite authority to suspend Respondent's boating privileges, the Supreme Court affirmed the Department's decision.

Petitioner Donald Gentry appealed a superior court decision that denied his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The trial court held that Petitioner (an offender whose parole was revoked) was not entitled to receive credit against his ninety-day term of recommitment to prison imposed pursuant to RSA 651-A:19 for the period between his arrest and the revocation of his parole. Because the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that RSA 651-A:19 did not permit the parole board to credit the time the petitioner spent in confinement between his arrest and revocation of his parole against his ninety-day recommitment period, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision.

Defendant Daniel Bent was convicted by a jury on one count of second degree assault and three counts of reckless conduct. In 2007, the superior curt sentenced him to three to six years in the state prison, and ordered him to pay restitution, plus a statutory administrative fee. The victim of the assault brought a civil suit against Defendant, his employer and the employer's insurance carrier. The parties came to a settlement agreement. In 2010, Defendant moved the court to vacate the restitution order as a result of the settlement reached in his case. Following a hearing, the court denied his motion. After a request for clarification of its order, the court set an amount for restitution. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in setting the amount of restitution because the State did not meet its burden of demonstrating the amount of the victim's economic loss that could be attributed to the assault. Furthermore, Defendant argued that even if the record supported the amount set, the trial court erred in setting an amount without determining whether it would be a double recovery to the victim. Finding that the trial court had not determined the amount of restitution to be set in Defendant's case, nor whether any portion of that amount would result in a double recovery to the victim, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant Patricia Smith appealed a superior court's decision to deny her motion to suppress evidence. She was charged with one felony county of manufacturing marijuana, and moved to suppress evidence obtained when police searched her property after an informant tipped police that she was growing marijuana plants in her house. Defendant argued that police violated Part I, Article 19 of the State Constitution because they entered the curtilage of her home without first obtaining a warrant. Furthermore, she argued that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the wooded area behind her home because of its close proximity to the house itself and because police did not make their observations from a public vantage point. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the information contained within the four corners of the warrant application provided probable cause to support Defendant's search warrant. The Court affirmed the superior court's decision.

Defendant Jason Wilmot appealed his convictions on two counts of first-degree assault for recklessly causing serious bodily injury to a person under thirteen years of age. He argued on appeal that the trial court erred in not setting aside the jury's verdict because the evidence could not have supported a conclusion that his statements to police were voluntary, and without those statements the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal standards, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.

Defendant Jack Ward was convicted on thirteen counts of possessing child pornography. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress on the grounds that the affidavit supporting the application for a search warrant lacked probable cause to search his residence and his computer. Upon review of the trial court record and applicable legal standard, the Supreme Court found evidence sufficient to support the search of Defendant's residence and computer. The Court therefore affirmed Defendant's conviction.

In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court considered an order of the superior court which denied Defendant Empire Automotive Group, Inc.'s motion to dismiss two indictments charging with with felony violations of the state Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Defendant was indicted by the grand jury on two counts of violating the CPA by allegedly placing inspection stickers (indicative of having passed inspection) on two automobiles sold to consumers under installment sales contracts when Defendant knew the vehicles had not passed the on-board diagnostic emissions tests required by the New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles. Defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that its conduct was exempt from the CPA and subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the banking department, and that the department of justice which initiated the criminal proceedings, lacked authority to do so. Finding that the "trade or commerce" involved in this case involved the sale of motor vehicles and clearly brought Defendant's actions well within the scope of the CPA, the Supreme Court held that the trial record reflected substantial evidence to support Defendant's conviction.