Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant Kristin Ruggiero was convicted on twelve counts of falsifying physical evidence, and on one count of making a false report. On appeal to the Supreme Court, she argued that the trial court erred: (1) in refusing to exclude audio/video recordings as violative of New Hampshire's wiretap statute; (2) in allowing into evidence, without proper authentication, certain e-mail messages she purportedly sent; and (3) in denying her motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence upon which a rational jury could find the defendant guilty of each of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant Paul McDonald appealed his conviction by a jury of first-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in permitting the State to present certain lay opinion testimony, declining to give his requested self-defense jury instruction, and prohibiting the defense from referring to the aggravated felonious sexual assault statute in its closing argument. Finding that the trial court did not err in its decisions in Defendant's case, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.

Defendant George Quintero appealed his convictions on one count of felonious sexual assault (FSA), and one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA). He argued that the Superior Court erred when it conditioned the giving of a so-called "Williams instruction" (137 N.H. 343 (1993) (requiring the State to prove the charged acts occurred in the time frame alleged in the indictments)) on his agreeing to an amendment of the indictments to conform to the evidence presented at trial. After oral argument, the Supreme Court directed the parties to provide supplemental briefing on whether "Williams" should be overruled. The Court took the arguments under advisement, and affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that the Williams instruction should no longer be given in cases tried after the date of this opinion.

Defendant John Stowe appealed his convictions of making a false report to law enforcement and of unsworn falsification, arguing that the Superior Court erred when it: (1) limited his cross-examination of a crucial State witness; (2) denied his request for a curative instruction on the State's misstatements of law made during closing argument; and (3) denied his motion to dismiss the unsworn falsification complaint. In 2005, John Deere Company was authorized to repossess a tractor that Defendant had financed through it. John Deere was unsuccessful because the tractor was not at the expected location. Defendant claimed that he did not know what happened to the tractor. During a subsequent court hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to file a police report indicating that the tractor had been stolen. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the evidence presented against Defendant at trial was sufficient to support his convictions.

Defendant Robert Burke appealed a trial court's decision to deny his motion to dismiss criminal restraint charges against him. On the morning of February 2, 2009, eighty-three-year-old Monna Greenstreet was home alone when she saw Defendant standing in the area between her kitchen and family room. He was holding a knife and demanded $75,000, which he claimed her husband had hidden in the house. Defendant was subsequently charged with burglary, robbery, theft by unauthorized taking, criminal restraint, and obstructing the report of a crime. At the close of the State's case, Defendant moved to dismiss all of the charges. With respect to the criminal restraint charge, he argued that the State had failed to prove that Greenstreet was exposed to "risk of serious bodily injury." Upon review, the Supreme Court held: "[a]lthough we consider this a close case, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that [the evidence] was sufficient to establish a risk of serious bodily injury." The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction.

Defendant Robinson Garcia was certified as an adult and convicted of one count of second-degree murder and one count of riot. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erroneously: (1) denied his motions to suppress; (2) excluded the testimony of a defense witness; and (3) prohibited him from testifying about statements made by the victim. Defendant's convictions arose out of the August 11, 2005 beating of Stephen Raymond in Manchester. After Raymond's death, Defendant was charged with second-degree murder. Defendant was also charged with three alternative theories of felony-level riot, alleging that he assembled with others with the purpose of causing Raymond to suffer serious injuries. The trial court made a number of rulings unfavorable to Defendant. Defendant appealed those rulings. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the evidence presented at trial supported his convictions, and affirmed the trial court's decisions in his case.

Defendant Diego Duran appealed his conviction by a jury on one count of being a felon in possession of a deadly weapon. He argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because there was insufficient evidence both that he possessed the weapon and that the weapon was a deadly weapon. In 2009, Defendant, who was an inmate at the New Hampshire State Prison, was showering when another inmate was seen placing a suspicious object in Defendant's shoe. Prison officials asked to see Defendant's shoes, but Defendant ignored the request. In the bathroom, prison officials observed the other inmate throw the item from the shoe into the toilet and then asked the Defendant to flush the toilet. The official ordered Defendant not to flush the toilet, but Defendant flushed anyway. Officials retrieved the object, and "[b]ased upon his eleven years of experience, [the official] determined that the object was likely a 'shank.'" Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision and upheld Defendant's conviction.

After a jury trial in superior court Defendant Christopher Guay was convicted of three counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), and one count of felonious sexual assault (FSA). On appeal he argued that the trial court erred by: (1) failing to grant his request for a mistrial; (2) failing to dismiss one of the three AFSA counts; and (3) denying him access to all of the victimâs medical and counseling records. The victim was Defendant's biological daughter, who was allegedly assaulted twice in 2008. At trial, Defendant testified in his own defense. During testimony, immediately after he stated that listening to the victim's accusations against him was "heartbreaking," the victim shouted out from the back of the courtroom, "Youâre such a freakinâ liar." The trial court denied Defendantâs request for a mistrial but twice issued curative instructions to the jury. The jury found Defendant guilty on all three counts of AFSA and one count of FSA. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant was convicted based upon insufficient evidence of guilt, and "to allow the defendant's conviction to stand would seriously affect the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings." The Court reversed the trial court's decision as it pertained to one AFSA charge. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Dana Chatman appealed a superior court decision that dismissed his lawsuit against Defendants James Brady and the Lee Country Fair brought pursuant to RSA 651:70 (2007), an immunity statute. In May 2007, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to felony operating a vehicle while certified as a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced him to one year in the Strafford County House of Corrections, with all but fourteen days to be served on administrative home confinement. As a condition of his release, he was required to wear a monitoring bracelet. Because he could not afford the daily fee associated with the bracelet, he was required to work to cover its costs. On or about September 9, 2007, Plaintiffâs work assignment was to help clean up the grounds at the site of defendant Lee Country Fair, assisting in loading tables and chairs onto a trailer owned by Defendant Brady. While the loaded trailer was being hitched to the truck, a weld on the trailer hitch failed causing the trailer to fall on the plaintiffâs leg. Plaintiff sued alleging that Brady was negligent and that Lee Country Fair was vicariously liable for that negligence. He alleged that Brady knew or should have known that loading the trailer prior to hitching it to the truck would cause excessive stress to the trailer hitch and welds, and that maneuvering the fully loaded trailer to the truck while on soft, uneven ground was unreasonably dangerous. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that RSA 651:70 did not afford Defendants immunity under the facts alleged in this case, and therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffâs lawsuit.

Following a jury trial, Defendant Peter Eaton was convicted on multiple sexual assault charges and for indecent exposure. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred when it denied his pre-trial motions for in-camera review of the victim's counseling records, for production of records from the police department and by failing to dismiss his case for lack of a "speedy trial." Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did err when it declined to review the victim's counseling records. The Court reversed the trial court's holding with respect to the review of the counseling records, but affirmed the trial court with respect to all of Defendant's other motions. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.