Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent Erica Blizzard appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Department of Safety (DOS) that suspended her boating privileges. Carrying two passengers, Respondent piloted a motorboat on Lake Winnipesaukee. There was almost no visibility due to dark and inclement weather conditions. As the respondent later told investigators, she was unable to see the bow of her boat. She was operating the boat at eighteen to twenty miles per hour, unsure of her location or depth, when the boat collided with an island. The collision killed one passenger and seriously injured the respondent and the second passenger. As a result of the collision, the respondent was charged with boating while intoxicated and negligent homicide. A jury found her guilty of negligent homicide, but not guilty of boating while intoxicated. Respondent argued on appeal: (1) whether DOS lacked the authority to suspend boat-operation privileges because it has failed to promulgate associated regulations; (2) whether RSA 270-E:17 delegated legislative authority in violation of Part I, Article 37 of the State Constitution; and (3) whether the hearing notice complied with Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution. Finding the DOS had the requisite authority to suspend Respondent's boating privileges, the Supreme Court affirmed the Department's decision.

Petitioner Donald Gentry appealed a superior court decision that denied his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The trial court held that Petitioner (an offender whose parole was revoked) was not entitled to receive credit against his ninety-day term of recommitment to prison imposed pursuant to RSA 651-A:19 for the period between his arrest and the revocation of his parole. Because the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that RSA 651-A:19 did not permit the parole board to credit the time the petitioner spent in confinement between his arrest and revocation of his parole against his ninety-day recommitment period, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision.

Defendant Daniel Bent was convicted by a jury on one count of second degree assault and three counts of reckless conduct. In 2007, the superior curt sentenced him to three to six years in the state prison, and ordered him to pay restitution, plus a statutory administrative fee. The victim of the assault brought a civil suit against Defendant, his employer and the employer's insurance carrier. The parties came to a settlement agreement. In 2010, Defendant moved the court to vacate the restitution order as a result of the settlement reached in his case. Following a hearing, the court denied his motion. After a request for clarification of its order, the court set an amount for restitution. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in setting the amount of restitution because the State did not meet its burden of demonstrating the amount of the victim's economic loss that could be attributed to the assault. Furthermore, Defendant argued that even if the record supported the amount set, the trial court erred in setting an amount without determining whether it would be a double recovery to the victim. Finding that the trial court had not determined the amount of restitution to be set in Defendant's case, nor whether any portion of that amount would result in a double recovery to the victim, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant Patricia Smith appealed a superior court's decision to deny her motion to suppress evidence. She was charged with one felony county of manufacturing marijuana, and moved to suppress evidence obtained when police searched her property after an informant tipped police that she was growing marijuana plants in her house. Defendant argued that police violated Part I, Article 19 of the State Constitution because they entered the curtilage of her home without first obtaining a warrant. Furthermore, she argued that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the wooded area behind her home because of its close proximity to the house itself and because police did not make their observations from a public vantage point. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the information contained within the four corners of the warrant application provided probable cause to support Defendant's search warrant. The Court affirmed the superior court's decision.

Defendant Jason Wilmot appealed his convictions on two counts of first-degree assault for recklessly causing serious bodily injury to a person under thirteen years of age. He argued on appeal that the trial court erred in not setting aside the jury's verdict because the evidence could not have supported a conclusion that his statements to police were voluntary, and without those statements the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal standards, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.

Defendant Jack Ward was convicted on thirteen counts of possessing child pornography. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress on the grounds that the affidavit supporting the application for a search warrant lacked probable cause to search his residence and his computer. Upon review of the trial court record and applicable legal standard, the Supreme Court found evidence sufficient to support the search of Defendant's residence and computer. The Court therefore affirmed Defendant's conviction.

In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court considered an order of the superior court which denied Defendant Empire Automotive Group, Inc.'s motion to dismiss two indictments charging with with felony violations of the state Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Defendant was indicted by the grand jury on two counts of violating the CPA by allegedly placing inspection stickers (indicative of having passed inspection) on two automobiles sold to consumers under installment sales contracts when Defendant knew the vehicles had not passed the on-board diagnostic emissions tests required by the New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles. Defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that its conduct was exempt from the CPA and subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the banking department, and that the department of justice which initiated the criminal proceedings, lacked authority to do so. Finding that the "trade or commerce" involved in this case involved the sale of motor vehicles and clearly brought Defendant's actions well within the scope of the CPA, the Supreme Court held that the trial record reflected substantial evidence to support Defendant's conviction.

After a jury trial, Defendant Kristin Ruggiero was convicted on twelve counts of falsifying physical evidence, and on one count of making a false report. On appeal to the Supreme Court, she argued that the trial court erred: (1) in refusing to exclude audio/video recordings as violative of New Hampshire's wiretap statute; (2) in allowing into evidence, without proper authentication, certain e-mail messages she purportedly sent; and (3) in denying her motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence upon which a rational jury could find the defendant guilty of each of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant Paul McDonald appealed his conviction by a jury of first-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in permitting the State to present certain lay opinion testimony, declining to give his requested self-defense jury instruction, and prohibiting the defense from referring to the aggravated felonious sexual assault statute in its closing argument. Finding that the trial court did not err in its decisions in Defendant's case, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.

Defendant George Quintero appealed his convictions on one count of felonious sexual assault (FSA), and one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA). He argued that the Superior Court erred when it conditioned the giving of a so-called "Williams instruction" (137 N.H. 343 (1993) (requiring the State to prove the charged acts occurred in the time frame alleged in the indictments)) on his agreeing to an amendment of the indictments to conform to the evidence presented at trial. After oral argument, the Supreme Court directed the parties to provide supplemental briefing on whether "Williams" should be overruled. The Court took the arguments under advisement, and affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that the Williams instruction should no longer be given in cases tried after the date of this opinion.