Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The State appealed a circuit court order granting defendant David Almeida's motion to suppress the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) test results. Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. The issue this appeal presented for the New Hampshire Supreme Court's review centered on whether the performance of a BAC test on a blood sample, which was drawn by the State with defendant’s valid consent, constituted a search within the meaning of Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution or the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because the Supreme Court concluded that it was not a search, judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. Specifically, the State contended defendant lacked a subjective expectation of privacy in his BAC because he voluntarily gave a blood sample to the State, and that he lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his BAC because of the reduced expectation of privacy an individual has while driving. The defendant countered that the BAC test was a search because he had “a significant privacy interest in his blood,” which contains a “vast amount of personal information” including genetic predispositions, family connections, and private medical facts. The Supreme Court agreed with the State. View "New Hampshire v. Almeida" on Justia Law

Defendant Elizabeth Seibel appealed after she was convicted at a superior court bench trial on one count of financial exploitation of an elderly person, and two counts of theft by unauthorized taking. The victim was defendant's widowed mother-in-law. Defendant and the victim's son added their names to one of the victim's checking accounts without her knowledge. Defendant and the son withdrew money, and used the victim's funds to purchase a house and pay personal debts. On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on all three convictions. Because the State presented sufficient evidence to support each of the defendant’s convictions, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Seibel" on Justia Law

Defendant Volodymyr Zhukovskyy appealed a superior court order denying his third motion for an evidentiary bail hearing. Because it concluded that RSA 597:2, III-IV did not require the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing when the parties disputed facts relevant to dangerousness, and that the trial court sustainably exercised its discretion when it denied the defendant’s motion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Zhukovskyy" on Justia Law

The State appealed a superior court order granting defendant Seth Hinkley's motion to suppress his confession and subsequent statements made during an interview with the police. On appeal, the State argued the trial court erred in finding that the defendant’s confession was involuntary because the police officer’s statements constituted a promise of immunity and the defendant’s confession was induced by the officer’s statements. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court found no error, judgement was affirmed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Hinkley" on Justia Law

Juvenile J.S. appealed a circuit court’s finding of delinquency based on petitions alleging criminal mischief, simple assault and attempted simple assault. The petitions were filed after a series of events in September 2020 at the Mount Prospect Academy, a non-secure detention facility whose students are placed there due to behavioral issues. At the close of the State’s case at the adjudicatory hearing, the court granted the juvenile’s motion to dismiss one of the petitions for insufficiency of evidence, and denied his motions to dismiss the remaining petitions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The latter motions argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the State failed to comply with RSA 169- B:6, III and IV. On appeal, the juvenile argued the trial court “erred as a matter of law in determining that, on the undisputed facts in the record here, Mount Prospect Academy is not a school.” Accordingly, he contended the court erred by failing to dismiss the delinquency petitions. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s determination on the facts presented in this case, that Mount Prospect was not a “school” for purposes of RSA 169-B:6, III and IV. Accordingly, the Court upheld the trial court’s denial of the motions to dismiss and affirm the finding of delinquency. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

The State appealed filed an interlocutory appeal of certain superior court rulings which held: (1) the State had to prove, as an element of the offense of driving after suspension pursuant to RSA 263:64, IV, that defendant’s prior driving under the influence (DUI) conviction was the basis of her prior license suspension; (2) the certified case summary offered by the State was admissible, but not dispositive, evidence of the defendant’s prior DUI conviction; and (3) denial of the State’s motion to continue. In December 2018, defendant, Teresa Mercon was arrested and subsequently charged pursuant to RSA 263:64, IV for driving while her license was suspended as a result of a 1997 DUI conviction. In August 2019, she was convicted at circuit court and sentenced to serve a mandatory seven-day jail sentence as required by RSA 263:64, IV. Defendant then appealed to the superior court for a jury trial de novo. Finding no error in the superior court’s rulings, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Mercon" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Soulia was convicted by jury on three counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. He appealed, arguing the superior court erred in denying his motions to strike for cause three prospective jurors, in violation of his right to an impartial jury under the New Hampshire and Federal Constitutions. He also argued the trial court may have erred when it failed to disclose certain confidential records following in camera review of those records. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "New Hampshire v. Soulia" on Justia Law

Defendant Bryan Luikart appealed a circuit court order which imposed a portion of his suspended sentence. Defendant argue the trial court erred in finding that the State met its burden of proving he violated the good behavior condition of his suspended sentence by committing witness tampering. In 2018, defendant pled guilty to various charges and was sentenced to 90 days’ incarceration, suspended for a period of two years. Conditions on defendant’s suspended sentence included that defendant “complete [a] batterer’s intervention program and be of good behavior.” Following his sentencing, defendant enrolled in his first batterer’s intervention program, but his participation in the program ended on January 24, 2019, for reasons irrelevant to this appeal. As a result of defendant’s departure from the program, the State moved to impose defendant’s suspended sentence on February 8. Defendant enrolled in a second batterer’s intervention program on February 19, and the State withdrew its motion to impose. Three days later, defendant sent an e-mail to his ex-wife. On March 7, the State filed a new motion to impose defendant’s suspended sentence. After a hearing, the trial court granted the State’s motion to impose, finding the evidence before it “sufficient to grant the State’s motion, at least generally.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence adduced at the motion hearing failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant committed witness tampering. Witness tampering was the only theory advanced by the State in support of its motion alleging that defendant violated his condition to be of good behavior, and Supreme Court did not interpret the trial court’s ruling as having independently found, from the evidence before it, that the defendant’s behavior amounted to another type of criminal conduct which violated the good behavior condition. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Luikart" on Justia Law

Defendant Eduardo Lopez, Jr. committed murder at age 17. Following his conviction, defendant received a statutorily-mandated sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), ruling that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Accordingly, in 2017, the trial court held a two-day resentencing hearing at which it heard testimony from the arresting police officer, several members of the murder victim’s family, an addiction psychiatrist, a forensic psychologist, several members of the defendant’s family, and the defendant. Following the hearing, taking into consideration the record before it, “the nature and circumstances of the underlying crime, the characteristics of the defendant, and the traditional sentencing factors,” the court imposed a sentence of 45 years to life. Defendant appealed that sentence, arguing 45-year-to-life constituted a de facto equivalent of of lifetime imprisonment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held the trial court did not err in determining that the 45-year-to-life sentence it imposed, under which defendant had an opportunity to be considered for parole when he reached 62 years of age, was not a de facto life sentence under the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Accordingly, the sentence was affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Lopez, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner Andrew Panaggio appealed a New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (Board) determination that respondent, CNA Insurance Company (the insurer), could not be ordered to reimburse him for his purchase of medical marijuana because such reimbursement would have constituted aiding and abetting his commission of a federal crime under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). When Panaggio appealed the insurer’s denial to the New Hampshire Department of Labor, a hearing officer agreed with the insurer. Panaggio appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the Board, which unanimously found that his use of medical marijuana was reasonable and medically necessary. Nonetheless, the Board upheld the insurer’s refusal to reimburse Panaggio, concluding that “the carrier is not able to provide medical marijuana because such reimbursement is not legal under state or federal law.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court surmised the issue on appeal raised a question of federal preemption, "which is essentially a matter of statutory interpretation and construction." Although it was an issue of first impression for the New Hampshire Court, other courts considered whether the CSA preempted a state order requiring reimbursement of an employee’s purchase of medical marijuana. Panaggio reasoned that “[b]ecause New Hampshire law unambiguously requires the insurer to pay for the claimant’s medically related treatment,” an insurer that reimburses a claimant for the purchase of medical marijuana acts without the volition required by the federal aiding and abetting statute. The insurer asserted Panaggio’s argument leads to an absurd result, observing that “[c]onflict preemption applies because state law requires what federal law forbids.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court ultimately concluded the CSA did not make it illegal for an insurer to reimburse an employee for his or her purchase of medical marijuana. "[A] Board order to reimburse Panaggio does not interfere with the federal government’s ability to enforce the CSA. Regardless of whether the insurer is ordered to reimburse Panaggio for his medical marijuana purchase, the federal government is free to prosecute him for simple possession of marijuana under the CSA." Under these circumstances, the Court concluded the “high threshold” for preemption “is not met here.” The Board's decision was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Andrew Panaggio" on Justia Law