Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was arrested and charged with third-degree possession of cocaine. Prior to trial, she challenged the admissibility of her statements to a patrolman. At a pretrial "Jackson-Denno" hearing, the patrolman testified that he showed a clear packet to defendant and asked "what is this," to which she replied that she "did not know." The Patrolman read defendant her Miranda rights and defendant, who was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained, indicated that she was willing to speak with him. Patrolman Buss again asked defendant if she knew what the substance was and she replied that it was "crack," and that she knew this because she "had been in trouble for it in the past." The judge who conducted the Jackson-Denno hearing issued a written decision determining that defendant's statements to the patrolman would be admissible at trial. The judge also determined that defendant's post-Miranda statements were admissible. The jury found defendant guilty, the trial judge denied defendant's motion for a new trial, and imposed a one-year probationary term, subject to service of 270 days in jail. Defendant appealed, but the Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the admission of defendant's other crimes constituted harmful error: "Defendant's prior admissions of drug use are not relevant to any material issue in dispute. Even if they were, the minimal relevance would be substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice. The statements that defendant admitted to prior crack cocaine use and to using crack cocaine, alcohol, and Vicodin two days prior to the incident . . . may lead jurors to the conclusion that defendant must have possessed crack cocaine on this occasion because she has a propensity for having and using illegal substances generally and cocaine specifically. That is precisely the sort of reason for which N.J.R.E. 404(b) evidence cannot be introduced." View "New Jersey v. Carlucci" on Justia Law

"Kyle" had been adjudicated delinquent on three occasions prior to the offense giving rise to this appeal. The first two adjudications involved minor offenses that did not meet N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3)'s predicate requirement of first- or second-degree offense adjudications. Also, neither of those adjudications resulted in his commitment to a juvenile detention facility. However, in March 2008 Kyle was adjudged delinquent of second-degree aggravated assault and was sentenced, consistent with a plea-agreement, to twenty-four months' incarceration at the New Jersey Training School. Kyle was subsequently placed in the Juvenile Intensive Supervision Program (JISP). Kyle's participation in the program was terminated after he was deemed noncompliant. The Family Part court, however, dismissed the JISP violation and discharged the few months remaining on Kyle's sentence, noting his approaching eighteenth birthday. Less than two months later, Kyle committed the act of delinquency resulting in his current sentence and this appeal. The Supreme Court held that N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3) requires two separate previous predicate adjudications for the imposition of an extended-term sentence on a juvenile, including one that resulted in incarceration in a juvenile or adult facility, exclusive of the adjudication for which the disposition court is sentencing the juvenile. The Court reversed the extended-term sentence. View "New Jersey in the Interest of K.O." on Justia Law

In 1999, Defendant Joseph Diorio and two others conceived and executed a “bust-out” financial scheme by creating a business for the purpose of defrauding creditors. Defendant and the two others formed a corporation to distribute fresh produce, leased warehouse space, obtained a license from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and submitted information to obtain a credit rating. Once the business established its reliability with suppliers, the size of the orders increased, and payments to suppliers slowed and then stopped altogether. Meanwhile, every shipment of produce immediately left the company’s warehouse and was transported to one of the warehouses operated by defendant and a co-defendant, who commingled the produce with their stock and sold it. Defendant was indicted in 2005. The statute of limitations for the charged offenses was five years. This appeal centered on whether the State returned its indictment on the money laundering and theft by deception charges against Defendant before the statute of limitations expired. Central to the issue was whether the offenses were continuing offenses, because the statute of limitations on such an offense did not begin to run until the prohibited conduct ceased. The limitations period for the theft by deception charge ran from receipt and acceptance of the last shipment of goods or the date on which payment was due. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that both offenses were continuing offenses. Furthermore, when property has been obtained by a deceptive transaction that included the extension of credit, the crime of theft by deception is not complete until payment has not been made in accordance with the agreement. View "New Jersey v. Diorio" on Justia Law

Based on information from two confidential informants and a concerned citizen that a dilapidated Camden row house was being used as a "stash location" for illegal drug transactions, a State Trooper set up a surveillance of the property. The Trooper observed what he believed to be four drug transactions. He did not attempt to determine who owned or lived in either residence or to secure a search warrant. One of the two front windows of the house was broken. The front door was padlocked, and the rear door was "off the hinges" and "propped closed" so that no one could exit from inside. Another trooper observed through the front broken window trash bags filled with clothes and soda cans; he did not observe any light fixtures, and the electric meter was missing. The trooper concluded the house was “abandoned” and could be searched without a warrant. Troopers then opened the padlock, entered the residence, and searched the house. There was evidence of criminality inside: a sawed-off rifle inside a floor air vent and drugs and drug paraphernalia on a shelf above the stairs to the basement. Troopers concluded that the next door house was “occupied” and therefore a search warrant was obtained to enter. The search of next door uncovered more cocaine and drug paraphernalia. The trial court granted defendants’ motion to suppress the evidence seized at the "abandoned" house, finding that the State had not satisfied its burden of proving that the house was an abandoned building that justified bypassing the warrant requirement; that defendants had automatic standing to challenge the search because they exercised "possessory control over the premises" by the manner in which the front door was padlocked and the rear door secured; and that exigent circumstances did not justify a warrantless search. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s suppression order. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the State did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the house, though in bad condition, was abandoned or that defendants were trespassers, thus failed to justify the warrantless search of the property. View "New Jersey v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2008, Catrell Robinson picked up his friend, Sharon, her sixteen-year-old sister, S.C., and Sharon’s two-year-old daughter, M.A, to take them to the laundromat. Sharon placed M.A. in the back seat; S.C. sat in the driver’s seat and watched as Sharon and Robinson loaded laundry bags into the car. A man later identified as defendant Jarrett Parker walked by and got into a verbal altercation with Robinson, ending in a fistfight. A group of men who knew Parker rushed to help. Robinson managed to escape and ran a short distance away, but the men caught up to him, knocked him down, and kicked him. Sharon ran to help Robinson as Parker walked toward the Accord. Parker forced S.C. out of the driver’s seat. Sharon and S.C. screamed that M.A. was still in the back, but Parker drove off. Parker would later deny taking the car. At trial, the court ruled that the State could cross-examine Parker as to the number of counts and sentences imposed in two prior convictions, but could not reference specific charges. Parker requested that the State be prohibited from referring to the aliases listed on the judgments of conviction. The State countered that Parker’s aliases were relevant to his credibility. The court, explaining that certified court judgments are admissible, permitted the State to question Parker about his aliases because they were included in the judgments of conviction. During cross-examination, after establishing that Parker had previously lied to the police about his name when it benefited him to do so, the prosecutor asked Parker whether it also would benefit him to lie to the police about the carjacking. During summation, the State asserted that, since Parker would lie about his own name, he also would lie about taking the car and whether he knew M.A. was in the back seat. Parker was found guilty of first-degree carjacking, but acquitted of first-degree kidnapping and third-degree endangering the welfare of a child. He was sentenced to a twenty-year prison term subject to an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period and a five-year period of parole supervision. Parker appealed, contending in part that the prosecutor’s summation and references to his aliases for impeachment purposes violated N.J.R.E. 405(a) and 608 and deprived him of a fair trial. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded that an alias which appears on a defendant’s prior judgment of conviction may not be used for impeachment purposes in a future trial unless the alias was the basis for the prior conviction. Thus, the State’s use of Parker’s aliases to demonstrate his character for untruthfulness was in error. The matter was reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Parker" on Justia Law

D.J.B. was adjudged a juvenile delinquent for acts that would be considered crimes had they been committed by an adult. As an adult, D.J.B. pled guilty to fourth-degree receiving stolen property in 1996. In 2011, D.J.B. filed a petition seeking to expunge his 1996 criminal conviction. The trial court denied the petition, finding that “[t]he combination of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-4.1(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2 served to prevent a petitioner with an indictable crime from obtaining expungement if that petitioner has a prior juvenile record.” The Appellate Division affirmed substantially for the same reasons. The following month, another appellate panel analyzed a similar question and reached the opposite conclusion about the effect a juvenile adjudication has on an attempt to expunge an adult conviction. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that based on its language and legislative history, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-4.1(a) applied only to the expungement of juvenile adjudications and did not transform a juvenile adjudication into a “crime” that would bar a later attempt to expunge an adult conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2. View "In the Matter of the Expungement Application of D.J.B." on Justia Law

Defendant Oscar Porter was denied an evidentiary hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief. Charges against him stemmed from an armed robbery that ended with the shooting death of one man and the wounding of another. Defendant filed his PCR petition pro se. Subsequently, assigned counsel submitted a brief alleging numerous deficiencies on the part of trial counsel, primarily the failure to investigate an alibi defense. With respect to the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on failure to investigate an alibi defense, the Supreme Court concluded defendant made out a prima facie showing and raised material facts in dispute, entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on that issue. View "New Jersey v. Porter" on Justia Law

During jury selection in the criminal trial of defendant Amir Andrews, the prosecutor complained that defendant was impermissibly striking jurors based on race. The trial court found that the State established a prima facie case of exclusion based on race and informed defense counsel that he must articulate some rational, articulable reason for excluding jurors. When defense counsel could not provide a sufficient reason for his subsequent challenges, the judge seated the challenged juror. The court completed jury selection, trial proceeded, and the jury found defendant guilty. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that that the trial court resorted to an improper remedy for the unconstitutional exclusion of a potential juror. The Appellate Division agreed, reversed the jury’s verdict and remanded for a new trial, finding that reseating the juror was in direct contravention of "Gilmore." Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded "Gilmore’s" remedy was ineffective to fully and fairly respond to the use of constitutionally impermissible peremptory challenges. The Court therefore modified Gilmore and permitted trial judges to choose from a broader set of remedies to address the impermissible use of peremptory challenges. View "New Jersey v. Adnrews" on Justia Law

Until her death in March 2009, defendant Gene Hinton’s mother was the tenant in an apartment owned by the Newark Housing Authority. Although Hinton lived with his mother, he did not have a lease or any other documents identifying him as a tenant. The landlord commenced a summary dispossession action, and a warrant of removal was issued. When no one answered his knock, a Special Civil Part Officer served the warrant by placing it under the apartment door. Hinton moved to suppress his statements to the police, as well as the evidence seized from the apartment. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the officer’s actions were not governmental in nature and the officers had probable cause to conduct a search based on Pratt’s reliable citizen informant tip. Although it did not address whether Hinton had a reasonable expectation of privacy, it found that the State’s actions fell within the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. Hinton was convicted of third degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance and possession with intent to distribute and was sentenced to two years of probation. Hinton appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that: (1) his motion to suppress the seized evidence should have been granted; (2) his statements to police were improperly admitted; (3) the court’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence; and (4) his sentence should be modified. The Appellate Division agreed that the officer’s entry into the apartment did not raise constitutional issues, but determined that Hinton had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. Therefore, the officers conducted an improper warrantless search. Without reaching Hinton’s other arguments, the panel reversed the denial of his suppression motion and his conviction. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that where an eviction proceeding has advanced to the point that a warrant of removal has been executed, a tenant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. Therefore, the police action in Hinton’s apartment was not a “search” under either the federal or state constitutions. View "New Jersey v. Hinton" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the armed robbery of the home of supermarket owner Syoma Shnayder (Sam) and his wife Rita. Igor Chichelnitsky planned the robbery when Sam turned down his offers to supply products to Sam's supermarket stores. Chichelnitsky recruited defendant Juan Rodriguez, and Nathan Jakubov to commit the robbery. According to the State, defendant and Jakubov drove in Jakubov's car to Shnayder's home, at which time defendant took photographs of the house. A few days later the pair returned. Rita was not home but arrived during the robbery. At some point during the ordeal, Rita managed to run out of the house and called 911. Sam was able to get himself loose from zip ties, at which time defendant shot him in the abdomen and ran out of the house. Rodriguez, who was upstairs, heard the gunshot and came downstairs. He saw defendant running from the home and he ran too. Outside, Rodriguez saw Jakubov driving away with defendant. Rodriguez fled on foot with the stolen property: $7000 in cash and two expensive watches. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the trial court was required to instruct the jury sua sponte on accomplice liability and whether it was also required to charge the jury on the lesser-included offenses of attempted theft by receiving stolen property and conspiracy to receive stolen property. The Supreme Court concluded trial court did not err by failing to sua sponte instruct the or by rejecting defendant's request to charge the jury on the lesser-included offenses. View "New Jersey v. Maloney" on Justia Law