Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with sexually assaulting T.P., his nine-year-old great-niece, during a sleepover at a relative's house. Before trial, T.P. and defendant each gave a video-recorded statement to investigators. In T.P.'s statement, she described how defendant touched her inappropriately. In defendant's statement, he first denied having sexual contact with T.P., but then admitted that "in a moment of weakness" he lifted T.P.'s legs, grabbed "her booty," and placed his mouth on her vagina. At trial, defendant acknowledged making the statement, but he insisted that his admission was false. The video recordings of both interviews were marked as exhibits, played at trial, and introduced in evidence. During deliberations, the jury requested access to play both recordings in the jury room. The judge discussed the request with the prosecutor and defense counsel, who did not object. Defendant's attorney stated it was the "equivalent" of a written statement marked into evidence and given to the jury in the jury room. The judge instructed a court officer to set up equipment in the jury room. The jurors were allowed to play the recordings at their discretion and discuss them as they watched them. The jury found defendant guilty on all charges. The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether video recordings of the pretrial statements given by the defendant or a victim, could be given to the jury to review in whole or in part and as many times as it desires in the jury room during deliberations. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a video-recorded statement must be replayed in open court under the direct supervision of the judge. Applying the "invited-error" doctrine in this case, however, the decision to permit unfettered access to the video-recorded statements during deliberations was not plain error and did not warrant reversal of the conviction. View "New Jersey v. A.R." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for financial crimes. He applied for public defender representation and provided information about his financial status that was collected by court staff on a UDIR form. Defendant's application was granted. Because the State's investigation suggested that defendant owned substantial assets, it issued a trial subpoena to the Morris County Superior Court's custodian of records demanding the production of financial data provided to court staff, including defendant's UDIR form. Although it used a trial subpoena, the State represented that it did not intend to use defendant's UDIR form at his pending trial; instead, it would be used to determine whether the State should separately indict defendant for making intentional false statements to obtain free counsel and to determine whether to apply for the removal of defendant's appointed counsel. The trial court quashed the subpoena on its own motion pursuant to the attorney-client privilege. The trial court denied the State's motion for reconsideration, reaffirming its view that the attorney-client privilege protected disclosure of defendant's financial information. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the attorney-client privilege protected the information sought. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the subpoena was properly quashed because defendant was "entitled to the benefit of the long-standing practice embodied in Directive 1-06 - that 'information on the intake form may not be used in grand jury proceedings or at trial.'" View "In re Subpoena Duces Tecum on Custodian of Records" on Justia Law

After attacking and sexually assaulting victim P.F., defendant Eric Clemente Rangel was charged with various crimes including first-degree aggravated sexual assault, and second-degree attempted aggravated sexual assault. At the conclusion of the State's case, Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the first-degree aggravated-sexual-assault charge, claiming that the State failed to show that he had committed an act of sexual penetration during an "aggravated assault on another." Defendant contended that the words "on another" referred to a person other than the victim. The trial court denied the motion, finding that "on another" refers "to acts upon the victim." The jury convicted defendant on all counts and he was sentenced. The Appellate Division reversed defendant's aggravated-sexual-assault conviction, concluding that the phrase "on another" referred to a third party. The panel entered judgments of acquittal on the convictions for first-degree aggravated sexual assault and second-degree attempted aggravated sexual assault, and remanded for resentencing on all remaining counts. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that based on the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(3) and a textual reading of the statute as a whole, the phrase "on another" referred to someone other than the victim. View "New Jersey v. Rangel" on Justia Law

In 2008, acting on a tip from a reliable confidential informant that an African-American male was selling controlled dangerous substances (CDS) from an apartment in a Newark public housing project, Detective James Cosgrove and fellow undercover officers went to defendant’s apartment. The officers intended to buy CDS from defendant in order to corroborate the tip. Officer James Rios, who served as the buyer, knocked at the apartment door. An African-American man, later identified as defendant, answered it. He was smoking a hand-rolled cigarette. Cosgrove immediately recognized the burning smell of marijuana. When defendant saw that one of the officers had a police badge around his neck, he threw the cigarette into his apartment, retreated, and attempted to slam the door shut. Rios stopped the door from closing, followed defendant into the apartment, and arrested him. According to Cosgrove, he and three officers entered the apartment to prevent defendant from fleeing, destroying evidence, retrieving a weapon, or in some other way impeding his arrest for possession of marijuana. In plain view in the living room, the officers saw a plastic bag containing marijuana, envelopes of heroin stamped "Horsepower," a plastic bag containing cocaine, a marijuana cigarette, a dark-colored plate with cocaine residue on it, a razor blade, and a digital scale. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court concerned the warrantless entry into defendant Rashad Walker's apartment and whether police officers, who saw defendant smoking a marijuana cigarette during a brief interaction with him, had probable cause to arrest the defendant and seize evidence observed in plain view inside his apartment. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence collected following that police search, which was ultimately denied. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under both the New Jersey and federal constitutions, probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry into defendant's apartment and the seizure of the marijuana cigarette and all the CDS found there. View "New Jersey v. Walker" on Justia Law

In 2007, Defendant Michael Cahill was involved in an automobile accident after a night of drinking. Following his arrest for driving while intoxicated (DWI), and after administration of an Alcotest, he was charged with various motor vehicle offenses, including driving while intoxicated, reckless driving, consumption of alcohol in a vehicle, and possession of an open container. He was also charged with aggravated assault. A few months later, a grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with assault by auto. Defendant pled guilty to fourth-degree assault by auto, and a judge sentenced him to a one-year term of probation plus all applicable fines and penalties. A Superior Court judge remanded the driving-while-intoxicated charge to the municipal court where it languished until defendant received a letter notifying him that the matter was scheduled for trial approximately one month later. Sixteen months elapsed between the sentence date for the indictable offense and notice of trial in the municipal court. Defendant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that his right to a speedy trial was violated, thereby requiring the dismissal of the DWI charge. Applying the four-factor analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in "Barker v. Wingo," the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the sixteen-month delay between the remand of the DWI charge to the municipal court and the notice of trial deprived Defendant of his right to a speedy trial and that charge should have been dismissed. View "New Jersey v. Cahill" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the constitutionality of the execution of a knock-and-announce search warrant that included the use of a flash-bang device. The Manalapan Police Department investigated defendant after an anonymous informant reported that he was selling illegal drugs out of his garage. Officers determined that although defendant had been denied a handgun permit because of a previous arrest, defendant’s father, with whom he lived, legally owned four firearms. Police conducted surveillance of defendant’s residence for six days in August 2007. Officers observed defendant briefly admit individuals into the garage after opening the overhead garage door and visitors leave holding objects that had not been with them when they arrived. Officers also observed groups of people smoking what the officers believed to be marijuana in the garage. The officers applied for a no-knock warrant to search defendant’s residence and began planning their operation pursuant to a no-knock and a knock-and-announce search warrant. A warrant was ultimately granted. Officers then approached defendant’s home. Defendant opened the garage door and was standing with another man on the driveway near the open door, the first team deployed a flash-bang device on the driveway and repeatedly announced, "Police, we have a search warrant" for approximately fifteen seconds. Defendant and the other man retreated into the garage. A search yielded a substantial volume of controlled dangerous substances (CDS) and other evidence. Defendant was charged with numerous crimes. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, holding that the flash-bang device was lawfully used in the execution of the knock-and-announce warrant. Defendant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court declined to adopt a bright-line rule that would preclude the use of a flash-bang device in the execution of a knock-and-announce search warrant. "The objective reasonableness of law enforcement’s execution of a warrant should be determined on a case-by-case basis, considering the totality of the circumstances. Here, the officers’ execution of the warrant was objectively reasonable and, thus, constitutional." View "New Jersey v. Rockford" on Justia Law

Bonita Pitt visited inmate defendant Ralph Sowell in a prison area monitored by security cameras. Sergeant Salvatore D'Amico of the Department of Corrections (DOC) observed Pitt and defendant lean forward. Defendant appeared to kiss Pitt on the cheek. She lifted her shirt slightly, reached into her left front pocket, took out an item, and placed it in defendant's hand. D'Amico then saw defendant lean back and place the item into a bag of potato chips. D'Amico immediately radioed an officer to seize defendant and the bag of chips. When the officer approached defendant, D'Amico, still monitoring the security cameras, saw defendant place the bag of chips under the seat next to him, and an officer recover the bag of chips. D'Amico emptied the contents of the bag of chips, which contained a balloon with thirty envelopes of heroin inside it. After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant admitted to a DOC investigator that he received drugs during the visit. Defendant was charged with drug offenses. At trial, D'Amico testified as to his observations, and the State played the videotape recording of the entire incident. A DOC investigator was accepted as the State's expert in "narcotics investigation." During testimony, the expert opined that "an exchange of narcotics took place." The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court centered on whether the State properly elicited expert testimony in response to a hypothetical question that in this case, "an exchange of narcotics took place." Upon review, the Court concluded that the expert's opinion was improper because it related to a straightforward factual allegation that was not beyond the understanding of an average juror and because the expert referred to facts not contained in the hypothetical. The Court affirmed defendant's conviction however, concluding that under the plain error standard, there was overwhelming evidence in the record of his quilt. View "New Jersey v. Sowell" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the investigatory stop of defendant Don C. Shaw was constitutional, and if not, whether discovery of an outstanding parole warrant for his arrest was an intervening circumstance that broke the causal chain between the unlawful detention and a subsequent search. In 2011, a police task force arrived at a multi-unit apartment building to execute an arrest warrant on a named fugitive just as two people, Shaw and Niam Gardner, exited from the common entrance of the building. Detective Brown saw the two men part ways, but he did not observe any criminal activity. The officers stopped Shaw and Gardner to determine whether either one was the fugitive identified in the arrest warrant. The officers had the name and description of the fugitive, but the only features that Detective Brown recalled that the fugitive and Shaw shared in common were that both were black men. The officers held Shaw because he refused to give his name, and Brown was prepared to take Shaw to the State Police barracks to run his fingerprints to determine if he was the fugitive they were seeking. Police ultimately determined that Shaw was not the target of the fugitive arrest warrant, but that he was on their list of named individuals wanted for parole violations. Shaw was arrested, and a search revealed he was carrying heroin. Shaw was then charged with possession of a controlled dangerous substance and related offenses. Shaw moved to suppress evidence of the drugs. The trial court found that Shaw was the subject of an unreasonable stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but declined to suppress the drugs, concluding that the parole warrant dissipated the taint from the illegal detention because the warrant stood as an independent basis for arresting and searching Shaw. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the police did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the investigatory detention, which was based on nothing more than a non-particularized racial description of the person sought. The parole warrant was not an intervening circumstance that sufficiently purged the taint from the unlawful detention. View "New Jersey v. Shaw" on Justia Law

In this appeal, Defendant Stanley Smith (a/k/a Jerry Johnson) contended that the police improperly obtained certain telephone toll records and that evidence developed from those records should have been excluded at his trial. Defendant further contended that certain remarks by the prosecutor in summation were so improper, he was entitled to a new trial. Shortly before 5:30 p.m. on December 31, 2001, Robert Priester was shot to death while sitting in his automobile in the parking lot of the M & M Deli in Ewing, New Jersey. Defendant was charged with murdering Priester, and a jury found him guilty. The trial court sentenced him to serve thirty years in prison, subject to the parole ineligibility provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence in an unpublished opinion. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected Defendant's arguments on appeal and affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant Johnnie Parker was seventeen years old when he was questioned by police about the stabbing death of Demetreas Fletcher. Parker gave a statement to officers admitting that he and a friend, also a juvenile, had killed Fletcher, but he claimed that he was pressured to commit the crime by a drug dealer known as "Polo Mike," for whom Parker worked. Parker expressed to the officers his belief that he would have been killed if he had not complied with Polo Mike’s orders. The other individual involved in the slaying corroborated Parker’s statement that Polo Mike had ordered Fletcher’s death and that they feared for their lives if they did not comply. The Family Part waived jurisdiction and both young men were indicted for murder and other crimes. Parker eventually entered a negotiated plea of guilty to an amended charge of aggravated manslaughter, and the State agreed to recommend a sentence of twenty-five years in prison. When Parker appeared before the trial court to plead guilty, his attorney did not mention Parker’s belief that he would be killed if he did not comply with Polo Mike’s directions. At the sentencing hearing, Parker’s attorney made no argument on his behalf and merely expressed sympathy for the victim’s family and asked the judge to sentence Parker in accordance with the negotiated plea. Parker did not file a direct appeal from his conviction or sentence. Parker filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in 2007, and counsel was assigned to represent him. In the petition, the attorney argued that the performance of Parker’s trial attorney was ineffective because he failed to investigate the surrounding facts, did not argue that Parker had acted under duress, and did not assert at sentencing that Parker should receive a lesser period of incarceration. The judge reviewed the petition and supporting documents and denied post-conviction relief. The Appellate Division affirmed. After considering the arguments in support of post-conviction relief, and applying the strong presumption in favor of oral argument for initial post-conviction relief petitions, the Supreme Court concluded that Parker was entitled to oral argument and remanded the case back to the trial court. View "New Jersey v. Parker" on Justia Law