Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a thirteen-year-old's confession provided outside of the presence of his father should have been suppressed. After it was reported that thirteen-year-old A.W. sexually touched his five-year-old cousin K.P, A.W.'s father voluntarily brought him to the county child advocacy center for an interview. A.W. is bilingual, but because his father speaks very little English, the interview was conducted initially entirely in Spanish. A detective advised A.W. and his father of A.W.'s rights using a pre-printed juvenile rights form, written in Spanish. A.W. initially denied touching K.P. and blamed their other cousin J. At A.W.'s request, the detective permitted him to state what J. had said about touching K.P. in English, but then resumed the questioning in Spanish. Approximately twenty minutes into the interview, A.W. asked in English, "could I tell everything in private, like without my dad here, outside, it will be easier." The detective explained that to his father in Spanish. Although A.W.'s father immediately stood up to leave, the detective advised A.W.'s father that he would need to waive his right to be present during the interview before leaving and that he could return to the interview room at any time. A.W.'s father then signed the required parental waiver form without objection and left the interview room. Thereafter, A.W. continued to deny wrongdoing before eventually admitting that he had touched K.P. sexually. A.W. was charged as a juvenile with two counts of aggravated sexual assault. Considering the totality of the circumstances, A.W.'s father willingly and voluntarily left the interview room, the questioning comported with the highest standards of fundamental fairness and due process, and the confession was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; the Supreme Court concluded A.W.'s confession was admissible. View "In the Interest of A.W." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court centered on a decision by a county prosecutor to seek waiver of three juveniles, aged sixteen at the time of their offenses, to adult court for acts of delinquency that, as charged, were equivalent to aggravated assault, robbery, and second-degree conspiracy. A Family Part judge found probable cause that the juveniles committed the offenses but denied the waiver motion. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the Family Part overstepped its bounds. The case called into question the standard of review to be exercised by a court reviewing such motions for waiver. "An abuse of discretion review does not allow the court to substitute its judgment for that of the prosecutor. Rather, a review for abuse of discretion involves a limited but nonetheless substantive review to ensure that the prosecutor’s individualized decision about the juvenile before the court, as set forth in the statement of reasons, is not arbitrary or abusive of the considerable discretion allowed to the prosecutor by statute. Cursory or conclusory statements as justification for waiver will not suffice to allow the court to perform its review under the abuse of discretion standard because such statements provide no meaningful explanation of the prosecutor’s reasoning." Applying that standard, the Court held that in this case the prosecutor’s explanation in the Statements of Reasons lacked detail. The Court reversed and remanded this case for a more full explanation by the prosecutor according to the new standard outlined in the Court's opinion. View "State In the Interest of V.A." on Justia Law

This case required the Court to address the standard to be applied by Family Part judges when they determine whether the prosecution has demonstrated probable cause under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(a)(2). It arose from a 2009 shooting in which one victim was killed and one seriously injured, allegedly by a group of men led by Angel Ramos, the father of one of the two juveniles in this case -- A.D. #1. Ramos was alleged to be a leader in a street gang. The incident closely followed a fight in which A.D. #1 and A.D. #2 were beaten by an uncle of A.D. #2 and others. According to the prosecution, the two juveniles, motivated by a desire for revenge following the fight, contacted A.D. #1's father and participated in a conspiracy to murder A.D. #2's uncle and others, precipitating an assault in which the targeted uncle was unhurt, but another uncle of A.D. #2 was killed and A.D. #2's mother was severely wounded. The two juveniles, both approaching their eighteenth birthdays, were charged with murder, aggravated assault, conspiracy and attempted murder, among other offenses. The trial court denied the prosecution's application to waive the juveniles into adult criminal court, concluding that the State had not demonstrated probable cause under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(a)(2). It found "no evidence" that the two juveniles had understood that their response to the fight would lead to murder. The State appealed, and an Appellate Division panel reversed the determination of the trial court, holding that the trial court had committed several legal errors in its application of the probable cause standard to the setting of this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision: "the probable cause standard that governs waiver of juvenile complaints into adult criminal court under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 is similar to the standard that guides a grand jury's determination whether or not to indict. If the trial court finds that the State has presented evidence which, combined with reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence, leads to a well-grounded suspicion or belief that the juvenile has committed one or more crimes enumerated in the statute, the "probable cause" standard of N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 is satisfied. " View "In the Interest of A.D." on Justia Law

Defendant Manaf Stas, was convicted of allowing an intoxicated person to operate a vehicle over which he had custody and control. Defendant and another individual, Joseph Putz, were involved in an automobile accident in a minivan owned by defendant's sister, minutes after leaving a bar where both had been drinking. After police arrived on the scene, Putz told the investigating police officer that he had been driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. After failing field sobriety tests, Putz was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI). Defendant stood nearby in silence as Putz told police that he had driven the car, failed field sobriety tests, and was arrested. He offered no comment on Putz's confession to being the driver at the time of the accident. Given Putz's admission that he was the driver, the police did not subject defendant to field sobriety tests or administer a breathalyzer. Instead, defendant was given a summons for allowing Putz, while intoxicated, to drive the minivan. Defendant and Putz were jointly tried in municipal court. Rejecting the proffered testimony, the municipal court found defendant and Putz guilty of different violations of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a). Defendant appealed, and the Law Division also convicted defendant. The Law Division relied upon defendant’s silence while Putz was questioned and arrested, construing that silence to be "an admission on [defendant's] part." Defendant appealed, and an Appellate Division panel affirmed. The panel concluded that if the Law Division's invocation of defendant's silence constituted error, it was harmless. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the municipal court for a new trial. The Court concluded that defendant was entitled to the protection of the constitutional, statutory and common law privilege against self-incrimination in the quasi-criminal proceedings before the municipal court and the Law Division, and that the use of defendant's silence as substantive evidence of his guilt and for the purpose of assessing his credibility violated defendant's federal constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and his state statutory and common law privilege against self-incrimination.

Defendant, who was convicted at trial of sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child, argued that the trial court and the Appellate Division, which affirmed his convictions and sentence, deprived him of a fair trial. Finding no merit to Defendant's arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence.

Police responded to an unverified 9-1-1 call reporting "a domestic dispute possibly involving a handgun" at a Carteret residence. Outside her apartment, Kamilah Richardson told the police that there was no problem in her home and that her eleven-year-old son was inside alone. Against her will, the police entered the apartment to assure the safety of the young boy. The police found him unharmed, without any visible injuries or signs of distress and no indication of a domestic disturbance inside the apartment. The police removed defendant Shareef Edmonds from an adjoining room, where he was watching television, and frisked him. Without evidence to corroborate the earlier domestic-violence report and without first securing a warrant, the police searched the area where defendant had been seated. A handgun was found under a pillow. Defendant, who was charged with the unlawful possession of the gun, claimed that the warrantless search yielding the weapon was unconstitutional. The trial court agreed, determining that the search of the home without a warrant was objectively unreasonable and could not be justified by either the emergency-aid or community-caretaking exception to the constitutional warrant requirement. The court suppressed the gun, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found credible evidence in the record to support the trial court's ruling.

In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether defendants were entitled to racial profiling discovery to challenge their convictions for attempted murder. The convictions relate to defendants' attack on a law enforcement officer after a motor vehicle stop. A New Jersey State Trooper stopped two Hispanic men for speeding on the New Jersey Turnpike in 1992. As the officer questioned the men immediately after the stop, they tried to overpower him. One defendant grabbed the officer around the neck and began to choke him, while the other tried to get control of the officer's firearm. During that struggle, the officer ultimately broke the second defendant's grip, retrieved his weapon, and fired twice, hitting defendants. The police later obtained a search warrant for defendants' car and found about fourteen ounces of cocaine in it. Both defendants were convicted for drug charges as well as attempted murder and related offenses. Years later, in a motion for post-conviction relief, defendants sought racial profiling discovery to prove that the stop was racially motivated. After a series of rulings at the trial and appellate levels, the Attorney General dismissed the drug convictions, leaving only defendants' convictions for attempted murder and related offenses. Defendants pressed for profiling discovery to challenge the remaining convictions. They contended that they needed the discovery to demonstrate that the drug evidence should have been suppressed. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the exclusionary rule did not apply in this case, there was no need for further discovery to determine whether the stop was in fact illegal. Furthermore, the Court concluded that defendants offered no viable theory to use possible evidence of racial profiling at trial. The Appellate Division order directing that discovery be produced was reversed.

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether defendant Aurelio Ray Cagno's 2004 conviction for racketeering conspiracy was time-barred under the general five-year statute of limitations governing criminal prosecutions. If not, the Court had to determine whether certain evidence was improperly introduced during defendant's 2004 trial to establish the continuation of the criminal conspiracy and whether that evidence was so prejudicial that defendant's murder conviction, achieved at the same trial that resulted in his RICO conviction, was "irremediably tainted" and should have been reversed. Defendant also challenged certain of the trial court's instructions that were provided to the jury that found defendant guilty of all the charges he faced. Finally, defendant raised an issue related to his sentence. After study of the extensive record of this case, the Supreme Court was satisfied that defendant presented no basis upon which his convictions or sentence should be reversed. Accordingly, the Court affirmed.

Defendant Barrington McDonald appealed a trial court's denial of his motion to vacate his plea of guilty to three offenses arising from an automobile accident. Defendant, driving under the influence of alcohol, struck and seriously injured a pedestrian. He was indicted for second-degree assault by automobile while driving in a school zone, and was issued summonses for several motor vehicle offenses. Several months after the accident, defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State. The plea agreement called for defendant to plead guilty to second-degree assault by auto in a school zone, driving while intoxicated (DWI), and driving with a suspended license. The prosecutor agreed to recommend a single, three-year sentence for all three offenses. The same day, defendant pled guilty to the three offenses, and the trial court found that he had knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Prior to sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that he had not entered into his plea agreement knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily. He challenged the State's contention that his motor vehicle accident occurred within 1,000 feet of school property. The trial court denied the motion, and sentenced defendant to a term of imprisonment, a license suspension and fines for the three offenses. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court should have permitted him to withdraw his guilty plea. An Appellate Division panel affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for the school-zone offense, merged defendant's DWI conviction into his conviction for assault by auto in a school zone, remanded for a determination of whether defendant should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea on the offense of driving with a suspended license, and corrected minor sentencing errors. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that because his accident occurred within 1,000 feet of a school property used for school purposes that meets the statutory standard, and because the statute clearly applies at all times of the day and night, defendant could not present a colorable claim that he did not commit the offense of assault by auto in a school zone. Furthermore, the Court rejected defendant's argument with regard to withdrawing his guilty plea, and affirmed the trial court's decision.

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the trial court erred in not sua sponte including the variation of the insanity-defense jury charge recognized in "State v. Worlock," (117 N.J. 596 (1990)), specifically including additional language to separate defendant's ability to appreciate legal wrong from moral wrong based on "deific commands" to kill. The trial testimony showed that defendant had developed a set of delusional religious beliefs derived from his interpretation of scripture. Both defendant's and the State's expert diagnosed him with schizoaffective disorder. Defendant's expert testified that defendant believed that he was supposed to kill because God was telling him to do it and he had to follow God's word. The State's expert emphasized that defendant admitted to not hearing voices at the time of the killing and opined that defendant was merely acting on his interpretation of what God wanted. According to the State's expert, defendant stated that he only heard the voices when sleeping, that the communications were not actual voices, but were rather subconscious thoughts, and that he had not heard any voices on the night of the incident. The State's expert also opined that other considerations indicated that defendant knew that killing was wrong, including a history of violence toward woman; that he stabbed his victim to put her out of her misery; that he drank alcohol and smoked marijuana afterwards; that his forensic evaluation test results indicated that he was trying to make himself look better by claiming that God had him do it; and that he decided to evade police. The court and all parties agreed to use the Model Jury Charge for the insanity defense. The jury rejected defendant's insanity defense and convicted him of murder and the other charges. In a motion for a new trial, defendant claimed for the first time that the jury should have been provided with the deific-command variant of the insanity-defense jury charge recognized in Worlock. The trial court denied defendant's motion. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to give, sua sponte, a Worlock charge as part of the insanity-defense jury instruction. The evidence did not clearly indicate defendant killed as a result of a deific command.