Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether weapons recovered from a defendant's premises during a search conducted pursuant to a warrant issued upon "reasonable cause" under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act could be admitted in a subsequent criminal prosecution of defendant for possession of those weapons consistent with Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendant moved to suppress, arguing that because the items were found during a search conducted pursuant to a warrant issued under the domestic violence statute, they could not be used as evidence in a later criminal case. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that a search under the domestic violence statute is constitutional only because it serves "a legitimate state interest," and thus evidence gathered during the search cannot have criminal repercussions. The Appellate Division affirmed the suppression of the handguns, noting that the warrant did not issue upon probable cause, but upon the lesser standard of reasonable cause; the purpose of the search had been to provide protection to the alleged victim, rather than to uncover evidence of criminal conduct; the handguns were not within the searching officers' plain view; and the fact that the Colt revolver was stolen was not immediately apparent but required further investigation through the State Police database. The panel recognized, however, that police may immediately have known it was illegal to possess an assault rifle and large capacity magazines. Thus, it reversed the suppression of those items and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that the items seized could serve as the basis for a subsequent criminal prosecution if their illegal nature is immediately apparent. A firearm's serial number is visible simply by looking at the weapon. Recording that number does not constitute a seizure, and entry of that number into the NCIC system and review of the results does not constitute a search. Whether the officers could recognize immediately that the assault rifle and large capacity magazines were illegal to possess were factual determinations that must be remanded to the trial court.

Defendant Norman Jackson entered Murul Chowdhury's taxi through the front passenger door and demanded Chowdhury's money at gunpoint. Chowdhury handed over cash and his wallet. Defendant then ordered Chowdhury to drive him to a location blocks away. At gunpoint, Chowdhury drove defendant approximately eight-tenths of a mile. Defendant departed the taxi without injuring the driver. Defendant and was arrested shortly thereafter. No weapon was found at the scene of his arrest. At police headquarters, police attempted to conduct a more thorough search of defendant, which triggered an altercation that injured defendant and revealed a concealed gun. That night, the interrogating officer drafted a false report that did not reveal the failure to locate defendant's gun at the scene of his arrest. Later that same night, Of the officer prepared and filed a second report that made clear that defendant's weapon was not recovered until after they returned to police headquarters. Before a grand jury, the officer testified falsely based on his initial fabricated report, which later prompted the State to dismiss the indictment. Defendant filed a civil suit against the officer arising out of his altercation with defendant and his false grand jury testimony. Before a second grand jury, the officer testified based on the accurate police report. Defendant was indicted for first-degree robbery and second-degree kidnapping, in addition to other charges. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether comments made by the prosecutor during summation required a mistrial. The Court also determined whether the evidence supported defendant's conviction for kidnapping. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it denied defendant's motion for a mistrial because the prosecutor's improper comments did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed defendant's conviction.

In this appeal, the Supreme Court clarified the factors that courts may consider as part of their review of petitions for expungment of a criminal record. The Court concluded that defendants seeking expungement have the burden of proof to demonstrate why their case warrants relief under the statute's public-interest prong. In early 2000, law enforcement officials investigated the sale of controlled dangerous substances (CDS) at a nightclub in Somers Point, New Jersey. Defendant was indicted for three counts of distribution of CDS, three counts of possession of CDS with intent to distribute, three counts of distribution of CDS within 500 feet of a public zone, and three counts of possession of CDS. The trial court sentenced Defendant to forty-five days in county jail (subject to daily reporting), a three-year period of probation, and various fines and penalties. After eighteen months, Defendant successfully completed all of the conditions of probation. Seven and one-half years later, Defendant filed a petition to expunge his conviction. In support of his application, he offered proof that he completed college and received a Bachelor of Science degree, and certified that he worked full-time while in school and had become active in various community service projects. The trial court in this case found that expungement was "not consistent with the public interest." Defendant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that balancing of the factors that remained in the record of this case suggested that expungement was in the public interest. "In an abundance of caution," the Court remanded the case to the trial court to weigh the relevant factors again in light of the above principles and to evaluate petitioner's conduct since the court denied his petition in 2010.

In September 2005, Defendant Leroy Munroe was charged with murder and weapons offenses for the shooting death of Christian Natal. In March 2007, he pled guilty to first-degree aggravated manslaughter in exchange for dismissal of the murder count and other charges. At the plea hearing, defendant admitted that he and Natal had a dispute, he shot Natal at close range, and Natal died. Also, defendant’s attorney stated: “I would stipulate that it’s circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.” Shortly after the plea hearing, a probation officer interviewed defendant to prepare the presentence investigation report. During the interview, defendant stated that he had been robbed by Natal more than once, so he armed himself with a gun for protection. Defendant further stated that on the day in question, Natal “pulled out a knife on him,” defendant backed up while Natal was swinging his knife, and, at a point when defendant was leaning on a car, he shot Natal in “self-defense.” Nothing in the presentence report, which included the State’s version of events, directly contradicted that account. Indeed, at the scene, police found a box cutter in Natal’s hand. Before sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that he had a viable affirmative defense of self-defense. The court did not accept defendant’s asserted justification for the use of deadly force and denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court mistakenly exercised its discretion and should have allowed defendant to withdraw his guilty plea in the interests of justice. "Defendant asserted a colorable claim of innocence based on a plausible defense of self-defense; there would not have been undue delay or prejudice had the case proceeded to trial; and the factual issues in dispute identified by the trial court should have been decided by a jury."

In 2004, an argument escalated into an altercation which left Julio Colon dead. Defendant Reynaldo Galicia and Hector Cordero drove from Vineland to Newark to confront Colon about a sport utility vehicle (SUV) that he had borrowed but failed to return. Cordero implored Colon to renew a romantic relationship the two shared, and both Cordero and Defendant begged Colon to return to Vineland with them. The three men battled over the keys to the SUV, and Colon exchanged punches and kicks with Cordero and Defendant. With Cordero in the passenger seat, Defendant twice drove his car toward Colon, prompting Colon to climb on the hood of the car and bang his fists on the window. As Colon clung to the car, Defendant accelerated and drove several blocks, running a stop sign. Defendant abruptly stopped the car, and Colon fell from the hood to the pavement. He sustained severe head injuries and died a week later. Tried separately from Cordero, Defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated manslaughter, second-degree aggravated assault, disorderly persons theft and weapons charges. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Appellate Division. At issue was New Jersey's "passion/provocation" statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the facts of this case, as developed in the trial record, did not support passion/provocation finding under the statute. The Court further held that the verdict sheet used at trial incorrectly guided the jury in its consideration of the passion/provocation issue, and reversed that portion of the Appellate Division's decision that deemed the sheet not to constitute error ("[n]otwithstanding the trial court's correct instruction to the jury that it could not find Defendant guilty of murder unless it concluded that passion/provocation did not apply, the verdict sheet improperly directed the jury not to consider the issue of passion/provocation unless it had already reached a guilty verdict on the murder charge." The Court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision that rejected Defendant's belated invocation of self-defense as a defense to the charges against him.

The issue in this appeal was whether Defendant Buddy Randolph should have been permitted, at the remand for his resentencing, to present evidence of his rehabilitative efforts between his initial sentencing and resentencing. This case involved five multiple-count indictments against Defendant arising from separate handgun-related incidents. In exchange for the State's dismissal of the remaining counts, Defendant pled guilty to two counts of second-degree aggravated assault, one count of third-degree aggravated assault, five counts of third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and other weapons offenses. At the time of sentencing in 2002, Defendant was twenty years old, had not completed high school, and had a serious, untreated substance abuse problem. He had been arrested twelve times over a two-year period and had an extensive juvenile history. The court found that there were no mitigating factors; that aggravating factors three and nine applied (risk Defendant will reoffend and need to deter Defendant and others, and that those factors supported imposing a term greater than the presumptive on each count. The court imposed three consecutive maximum term sentences but did not include its reasons on the record. Defendant appealed and the matter was remanded for resentencing. The trial court re-imposed the same sentences. Defendant appealed, arguing that his sentence should be remanded again for a reweighing of aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether three consecutive maximum terms were justified. Upon review by the Supreme Court, the Court concluded that when a trial court reconsiders a sentence, it should view Defendant as he stands before the court on that day unless the remand order specifies a different and more limited resentencing proceeding such as correction of a plainly technical error or a directive to view the sentencing issue from the vantage point of the original sentencing. The Court did not infer such a limitation in the circumstances of this case; thus, Defendant was entitled to present evidence of his post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts at resentencing.

Defendants were charged with a series of robberies that took place in Middlesex, Essex, and Bergen Counties. Defendant Alnesha Minitee was apprehended almost immediately after the Bergen County incident, while Defendant Darnell Bland was arrested several months later when one of the victims of the Bergen County crime identified his picture in a photo array. When Minitee was arrested, she was standing next to a red SUV that the police had followed from the robbery scene. The search of that vehicle produced evidence linking the parties to the series of robberies. Defendants Bland and Minitee both moved to suppress the results of that search but were unsuccessful. At the trial of Defendant Minitee, which led to her conviction, the State introduced evidence that was obtained during the search of the SUV. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether, in the circumstances of this case, evidence obtained from the warrantless vehicle search conducted after the vehicle was towed to police headquarters should have been suppressed. Upon review, the Court held that under the circumstances of this case, the trial court correctly denied the Defendants' motion to suppress because the warrantless search of the SUV that was involved in the robbery fit within the scope of the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement.

In 2003, twelve year old C.A. engaged in instant message conversations with seventeen adult men; communications with six of those men included sexually explicit language. In her instant messages, C.A. did not mention Defendant or report any history of sexual abuse. Instead, C.A. laced her communications with sexual vulgarities in an attempt to impersonate a sexually experienced adult. C.A.'s mother discovered the instant messages. At a meeting attended by C.A.'s school guidance counselor, her parents, and her homeroom teacher, C.A., for the first time, accused Defendant of sexual abuse. Defendant was subsequently indicted on one count of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, six counts of second-degree sexual assault, and three counts of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child. Some of these charges related to Defendant's former stepdaughter and the trials were ultimately severed. Defendant consistently maintained that his relationship with C.A. was entirely appropriate and denied any sexual abuse. Defendant moved to compel production of C.A.'s instant messages. The trial court found that the instant messages were protected and permitted their limited use at trial only for the limited purpose of explaining a physical injury to C.A. in the event that the State were to proffer an expert to prove such injury. The trial court also ruled that the fact that C.A. had sent and received explicit messages could be admitted to show that C.A.'s allegations "did not arise until the victim had been officially confronted by the authorities." A jury convicted Defendant on the single count of first-degree sexual assault and three counts of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant was sentenced to a twenty-year prison term with a ten-year period of parole ineligibility for the single count of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, and a concurrent ten-year prison sentence for the remaining counts. In 2011, an Appellate Division panel affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for certification "limited to the issue of whether Defendant should have been permitted to introduce the sexually explicit content of the instant messages sent by the minor, female victim to other adult males." Upon review, the Court held that the content of the instant messages written by and to the victim in this case constituted "sexual conduct" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7(f), and that content was therefore protected by New Jersey's Rape Shield Law. Any probative value of the content of the victim's messages was substantially outweighed by its prejudice.

In June 2005, police discovered Defendant Juan Pablo Santos naked and in bed with a fourteen-year-old girl. He was arrested and, after receiving "Miranda" warnings, admitted that he lived with the girl and that they had an ongoing sexual relationship. Santos was indicted by a grand jury on one count of second-degree sexual assault and one count of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child. The State proposed a plea agreement under which Santos would plead guilty to third-degree endangering the welfare of a child in exchange for the State’s agreement to drop the sexual assault charge and recommend that his term of imprisonment be limited to time served. After consulting with his attorney , Defendant decided to accept the deal. Less than three weeks after Defendant was sentenced according to the terms of the plea agreement he negotiated with the State, the United States Department of Homeland Security removed him to Mexico based on this criminal conviction. Defendant illegally reentered the United States. He was found and removed again to Mexico. In 2009, Defendant filed a post-conviction relief petition alleging that he had not read, and his attorney had not explained, the plea form before he signed it, and that his plea lacked an adequate factual basis. The PCR court determined that Defendant's allegations were sufficient to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and that Defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, which the court scheduled. Before the hearing, Defendant filed a motion seeking leave to testify telephonically from Mexico. The State opposed the motion, pointing out that telephonic testimony would deny the court the opportunity to evaluate Defendant's demeanor and assess his credibility. The court granted Defendant's motion and turned to examine the mechanics of how Defendant's testimony would be taken. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the grant of an evidentiary hearing in which Defendant was to be permitted to provide telephonic testimony must be reversed and the matter remanded for full reconsideration by the post-conviction relief (PCR) court as to whether Defendant could meet the standard for entitlement to an evidentiary hearing.

Shortly before the trial was scheduled to begin, Defendant Marcus King's attorney informed the trial court that Defendant wished to represent himself at his trial. The trial court questioned Defendant with respect to his knowledge of particular areas. At one point during the colloquy, defendant stated: "I am willing to go to trial with what I have prepared for myself. I can’t explain it. I can’t sit and explain it to you in legal terms. But I know in my terms what I am ready to do." The trial court stated that it was not "satisfied" that defendant "fully under[stood] the nature and consequences of this decision." It pointed to the fact that Defendant was unable to state what he had written down while doing research in the law library a few days ago and could not adequately answer the court’s questions about the court rules or the evidence rules. The court found that defendant’s "inability to do that" precluded an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant’s application and directed that the trial proceed with defense counsel representing defendant. Defendant appealed the trial court's decision, contending that the court improperly denied him the right of self-representation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's examination was insufficient and, as a result, its ultimate determination was flawed. The Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings.