Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Elizabeth O'Brien was found stuffed inside a closet in her home on the afternoon of January 30, 2008. It was determined that she died from blunt force trauma to her head. Defendant Demetrius Diaz-Bridges was questioned and made no direct statements to inculpate him in the crime. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendant's request for permission to speak with his mother in the midst of his custodial interrogation was an assertion of his right to silence that required officers to stop their questioning. The trial court concluded that it was, and ordered suppression of all statements made by Defendant after that request. The Appellate Division disagreed, but found that Defendant invoked his right to silence during one of his several subsequent reiterations of the request to speak with his mother, and ordered the suppression of a lesser portion of Defendant's recorded confession. Upon review of the trial court record and transcripts of Defendant's interrogations, the Supreme Court concluded that neither Defendant's statements about his wish to speak with his mother nor any of his other statements were assertions of his constitutionally-protected right to silence. Therefore, the Court held that suppression of any portion of Defendant's confession was in error.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a trial court erred in denying Defendant Stanford Yough's motion for a mistrial after the victim of a robbery testified that he observed the perpetrator more times than he had indicated in his statement to police. At trial, the victim testified during his direct examination that he was certain Defendant was one of his attackers. But on cross-examination, defense counsel highlighted the inconsistency between the victim's direct testimony and the statement he gave to police. In charging the jury on identification, the judge instructed the jury that it could consider the victim's testimony that he knew the perpetrator from having seen him before the incident. The instructions did not suggest that the victim observed Defendant after the robbery. Defense counsel did not object to the jury charge or request a limiting instruction on the use of the victim's testimony. The jury found Defendant guilty of second-degree robbery and imposed a fifteen-year term of imprisonment subject to the No Early Release Act. Despite defense counsel’s failure to object to the victim's testimony as "prior bad-acts evidence" or to the jury charge, and his failure to seek a curative charge, the majority of the Appellate Court found the statement inadmissible and highly prejudicial "that undermined the fairness of the trial to the extent that cautionary or limiting instructions were not a feasible alternative." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court: "[t]rials are not perfectly orchestrated productions. The testimony of witnesses may not always be predictable, particularly in criminal cases where depositions are not a typical tool of discovery. On the stand, a witness may give testimony that is different from or more expansive than an out-of-court statement recorded by the police. In many instances, discrepancies will advantage a defense attorney attempting to discredit a witness -- but not always. Every witness's digression from a prior statement cannot be grist for the granting of a new-trial motion."

Rodney Harper was shot to death in a Camden apartment early in the morning on January 1, 2003. James Womble was present when two men forcefully entered the apartment, seeking to collect money from Harper. Womble knew one of the men, co-defendant, George Clark, but the other man was a stranger. According to the State's evidence, Clark shot Harper while the stranger held a gun on Womble in a small, dark hallway. Thirteen days later, police showed Womble a photo array from which he identified Defendant Larry Henderson as the stranger. At trial, additional evidence relevant to Womble's identification was adduced. Neither Clark nor Defendant testified at trial. The primary evidence against Defendant was Womble's identification and a detectiveâs testimony about Defendantâs post-arrest statement. The jury acquitted Defendant of murder and aggravated manslaughter charges, and convicted him of reckless manslaughter, aggravated assault, and weapons charges. He was sentenced to an aggregate eleven-year term subject to a parole ineligibility period of almost six years. The Appellate Division reversed, presuming that the identification procedure in this case was impermissibly suggestive under the first prong of the "Manson/Madison" test. The court remanded for a new 'Wade' hearing to determine whether the identification was nonetheless reliable under the test's second prong. The panel contained its finding to what it considered to be a material breach of the Attorney General Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting Photo and Live Lineup Identification Procedures. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the current legal standard for assessing eyewitness identification evidence must be revised because it does not offer an adequate measure for reliability; does not sufficiently deter inappropriate police conduct; and overstates the jury's ability to evaluate identification evidence. The Court held that Defendant was entitled to a new pretrial hearing, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

At issue in this case was whether suggestive behavior by a private party, without any state action, should have been evaluated at a pretrial hearing to determine whether an eyewitnessâ identification could have been admitted at trial. Defendant Cecelia Chen was indicted on charges of aggravated assault, armed robbery, and weapons offenses for her role in an attack on her ex-boyfriendâs wife. Nearly twenty-two months after the attack, police presented a photo array to the victim and an eyewitness for the first time. A detective testified that one of the reasons the police waited to show the photo array was out of concern that the website pictures might have prejudiced the victim. The victim and eyewitness separately selected Defendantâs picture. Defense counsel moved for a Wade hearing, arguing that the victimâs identification was based on seeing photos that her husband showed her rather than her memory of the attack. The trial court denied the motion finding the procedure followed by the police was not impermissibly suggestive. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that even without any police action, when a defendant presents evidence that an identification was made under highly suggestive circumstances that could lead to a mistaken identification, trial judges should conduct a preliminary hearing, upon request, to determine the admissibility of the identification evidence. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

A Union County Grand Jury indicted the two defendants for first-degree murder, third-degree unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit, and second-degree possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose. After closing his bar, Luis Lecaros proceeded to drive home several of his employees in his pickup truck, including Sandra Narvarro and his son Paul. At some point, Luisâ truck slid on the rain-slicked road and slammed into the rear of a black Honda, shattering its back window and causing its rear bumper to fall off. The Stateâs theory was that Defendant Timyan Cabbell was driving the Honda and that Defendant John Calhoun was a passenger. Immediately after the collision, Cabbell and Calhoun, armed with handguns, opened fire on the pickup truck, and then fled in the Honda. The central issue at trial was the identification of the shooters. Two key State witnesses gave statements to police about the shooting, but in front of the jury, neither wished to testify. Because the witnesses insisted they did not wish to testify, the trial court conducted a Rule 104 hearing outside the presence of the jury. At this point, neither Defendant was given an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses before the jury. The witnesses' out-of-court statements were deemed admissible under a hearsay exception. The primary issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether Defendants were provided an opportunity to cross examine the State's key witnesses consistent with the Confrontation Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that both defendants were denied their federal and state constitutional rights to confront one of the two key witnesses before the jury. For that reason, that witness' out-of-court statement to the police incriminating Defendants should not have been read to the jury and the admission of that statement was not harmless error. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant Marie Hess shot and killed her husband Jimmy Hess, a police officer. Defendant entered into a plea agreement in which she pled guilty to aggravated manslaughter; acknowledged that she would receive a thirty-year sentence; conceded that aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors as to make the term appropriate; agreed that neither she nor her attorney would affirmatively seek a lesser term of imprisonment; and agreed not to appeal her conviction. The plea agreement did not bind the court to give any particular sentence, and nothing in the plea agreement denied defense counsel the opportunity to provide mitigating evidence. Defendant did not pursue a direct appeal. Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) claiming that she was denied her constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. At the PCR hearing, Defendantâs PCR counsel alleged that trial counsel made numerous errors, including that he failed to argue mitigating factors and to bring to light evidence suggesting defendant was a battered woman. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant was denied her constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel because her attorney failed to present and argue mitigating evidence at her sentencing. The Court also held that Defendant's plea agreement provisions that restricted the right of counsel to argue for a lesser sentence were void.

In this appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether Defendant George Calleia's convictions were appropriately reversed because the State used the deceased victim's "state-of-mind" hearsay statements as evidence to suggest Defendant's motive. The victim in this case was Susan Calleia, Defendant's wife. Her body was found wrapped in a yoga mat in the cargo area of the family's SUV parked at an arts center two miles from their home. Mrs. Calleia was strangled to death. Before trial, the court denied Defendant's motion to preclude statements that Mrs. Calleia made to friends that she was unhappy, wanted a divorce, and was seeking a lawyer. The court found them admissible as "state-of-mind" evidence to show the nature of her relationship with Defendant and whether it had significance in establishing his motive to kill her. The court instructed the jury that Mrs. Calleia's statements could only be considered as her state of mind and plans, and as evidence of the nature of her and Defendant's relationship, but not towards his motive to kill her. The jury found Defendant guilty of murder, and sentenced him to fifty years in prison. On appeal, Defendant challenged the admission of his wife's "state of mind" statements. Upon consideration, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling in admitting the statements. "If a victim's state-of-mind hearsay statements are relevant to show the victim's conduct, and if such conduct also can give rise to motive when it is known or probably known to the defendant, then the statements are admissible" to establish motive. The Court held that any error in this case that stemmed from the admission was harmless.

A mother and her adult son were found dead and bound together in the son's home. Each had been killed by a gunshot wound to the back of the head, and the son's throat had been slashed. An investigation lead police to three suspects: Keith Mercer, Defendant Dwayne Gillispie and Defendant Gregory Buttler. Before trial, the State moved to introduce evidence that Gillispie and Buttler had participated in a robbery and shooting that took place in a New York barbershop twenty days before the murders. The trial court conducted a joint hearing to determine whether "other-crimes" evidence was admissible under state law. The court found the evidence was probative to identify who committed the murders. Although the court acknowledged the evidence was prejudicial, it concluded that the probative value outweighed the prejudice and admitted it. Gillispie and Buttler were tried separately, and separate juries found Gillispie and Buttler guilty on all charges against them. In an unpublished decision, the appellate court reversed the convictions and remanded the cases for new trials. The appellate court found that the other-crimes evidence was too prejudicial, and that the probative value did not outweigh the prejudice. Upon consideration of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, and affirmed its decision. The Court held that the admission of this evidence was harmless error that ultimately would not have affected the outcome of the trials. The Court remanded the cases back to the appellate panel for disposition of other issues unanswered due to its "new trial" order.

Defendant Andrea Hernandez was arrested in 2006 in connection with a series of armed robberies. While in custody awaiting trial on robbery charges, in 2007, she was charged in another county for burglary and theft charges. She pled guilty and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for burglary which was to run concurrently to any sentence she received on robbery charges. With the burglary conviction, Ms. Hernandez was awarded 213 days of credit for the time she spent in jail awaiting trial. Ultimately, Ms. Hernandez pled to concurrent sentences of twenty years for the robbery charges. At the robbery sentencing hearing, Ms. Hernandez objected to the amount of credit she received for the burglary charges. She believed she should have received more credit. In 2006, Defendant Derrick Rose allegedly sold cocaine and heroin to an undercover officer. He was not arrested at the time. In 2007, Mr. Rose was arrested for theft, and charged with theft and the earlier drug charges. Mr. Rose pled guilty, and received two five-year sentences on the drug charges, and a four-year sentence for theft, all to run concurrently. Mr. Rose was awarded 357 days of credit for time spent in jail awaiting trial. On appeal, Mr. Rose argued that the allocation of his jail credit should have gone towards his longer sentences so as to improve his chances of being accepted into a drug treatment program. In both the Hernandez and Rose cases, the appellate courts affirmed the calculation of credit awarded. The Supreme Court consolidated the two cases, and reversed the trial courts' calculation of credit in both cases. The Court found that the lower courts misapplied the rule for calculating credit based on a defendant's time spent awaiting sentencing. The Court remanded both cases for reconsideration of jail credit.

Defendant Zarik Rose was incarcerated in 1995 on charges relating to the to the attempted murder of Charles Mosely. While awaiting trial, Defendant allegedly told one of the State's witnesses against him that he wanted to have Mosely "whacked," and that Defendant solicited the witness to kill Mosely. The State moved to admit Defendant's comments at trial. The trial court found some of the evidence admissible as "res gestae." During the trial, the court provided instructions to guide the jury's use of that evidence. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that, among other things, all evidence relating to his incarceration on attempted murder charges was improperly admitted at trial. In this appeal, the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed Defendant's conviction, finding that the trial court appropriately instructed the jury on use of the admitted statements. However, by this case, the Court ended the practice of using "res gestae" as an explanation for the admission of evidence: "[e]vidence of uncharged misconduct that is not intrinsic evidence of the crime is inadmissible unless proffered for a proper purpose. ... The Court direct[ed] trial courts to make the Rules of Evidence the touchstone for the analysis of all bad acts categories of res gestae evidence, and disapproves further use of res gestae to support evidential rulings."